A Study of Happiness in the Major Works of Immanuel Kant by Johnson, William Paul
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations
1960
A Study of Happiness in the Major Works of
Immanuel Kant
William Paul Johnson
Loyola University Chicago
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1960 William Paul Johnson
Recommended Citation
Johnson, William Paul, "A Study of Happiness in the Major Works of Immanuel Kant" (1960). Master's Theses. Paper 1594.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/1594
A S'IUDY 0 F' HAPPIN.ESS 
IN 'IRE MAJOR WORKS 
OJ" IMMANUEL KANT 
by 
W. Paul Johnson, S.J. 
A Thesis Subm1 tted to the Facul ty of the Gradua te School 
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of 
the Requ1rements for the Degree ot 
Master ot Arts 
January 
1960 
LIFE 
\'Ulliam Paul John~on, S.S. 1'Ia:.~ born in Morganfield, Kentucky, 
July 1, 1924. 
He was graduated from the Morganfield Public High School, 
June, 1942, and from the UnIversity of Detroit, June, 1951, with 
the degree of Bachelor of Arts. 
From 1956 to 1958 the author ta~gh t Latin and ReliFdon at 
Saint Ignatius High School, Cleveland Ohio. He began his graduate 
studies at Loyola University in September, 1954. 
11 
PRJ£FACE 
For the purpose of study Kant'~ works have been d1v1dl,d into 
into his Pre-Critical and Critical works. His critical works be-
gin with the Critique .2! .E.!:!£! Reason and Include all his works pub 
li.lied. up to the t1ae of 111a d&ath 1n 1804. 
The study of Kant's meaning of happiness will be l1mited to 
Kant'. DUljor works of the eri tIcal Period. This stud,. will not in 
'" 
clude ~.a reflection. and notationa published posthumously alnce 
they were never specifically put in final form by Kunt himaelf. 
'rhe thesis 1. 11m! t'ld to the cr':!' tical works beca.use a study of 
happiness accord log to the pre-or 1tical works hl s alroady been 
ad. by Dr. Paul Arthur Schilpp 1n Kant's Pre-CritIcal ~thlca, 
hicago, 1938. 
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CHAPTER I 
IN'l'RODUCTION 
"[01ne's .2!!l hap:elness is, no doubt, lin end that all men have 
(by virtue of the impulse of their na.ture) • • • 
1 
• ,f Philosophers. 
in general, agree wi th this observa tion of Immanuel Kant. lJ,'he Hi-
-
comachean Ethics of Aristotle is an attempt to show that living 
revell and doing well are the consti tuents of the happiness ror which 
2 ~ 
man s tri ves. The central problem for the Gr~1ek philosophers was 
the problem of the d"tapa!i;la, that1a, how man. can maintain his peace 
pf soul.. The Epicurean sought to establish the thesis that this 
peace is maintain~d through the quest for happiness. The stoic, 
bn the other hand, argued against the r:plcurean by pointing out 
tha t one must flrst pursue virtue to maintain his poace of soul and 
only then can man be happy, since consciousness of his virtue oon-
stitutes the essential element of his happiness. Saint Augustine 
lImmanuel Kant, The MetaE~s1c of Morals. trans. Thomas ~ingsrui11 Abbott. 1n Xintts ~~Ifiue Of Practical ROdson and ~~h~ 
Morks 2!! .E!l!. Theon gf EthIc s, 6t ed:-C tondon. 1969), p. ~o • 
Page numbera refer to the Rosenkranz edition and Ar)bott tra.nslation. 
~~i8 work will be desIgnated simply as M. of Morals. Italios in 
quotatlOll! in this thesis are always In 'Origrnal unless othorw iae 
IS t.ated. : 
2Arlatotle. Ethioa Hlohomachea. I. ~, and I. 7. 1098a , 15. 
~_ Works of Aristotle. ed. W.D. Rosa. IX, 2nd ed. (Oxford. 1928). 
J.uere are no pi!. go numbers in thia edition. 
1 
2 
finds in man's quest for happiness a basis for arguing to the exis-
tence of God. Mlile Aristotle had emphasized the subjective nature 
of man's natural quest for happiness, Saint Thomas Aquinas consid-
ered at greater length the ultimate object of this quest. 3 
Turning to some modern philosophers, we find Helvetius main-
taining the futility of proposing any standard of vlrtue, except 
that which conduces to general hapPiness.4 Then Jeremy Bentham 
~ased the correctness of certain legal reforms on the principle of 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number,5a principle which he 
took over from the last book of Hume-!s Treatise of Hu:ma~ Nature, 
~nd which had been explicitly professed by the Italian jurist, 
~eccaria. So, also, previous to Bentham, the British moralist, 
J-Iutcheson, ,bad written that "moral evil or vice is as the degree 
pf misery and number of sufferers; so that the action is best 
~h1ch accomplishes the greatest happiness for the greatest num-
6 [bers. n Bentham' 3 norm for happiness would be based on tne maj ori ty. 
~. S. Mill maintained that Bentham's rather quantitative theory of 
3S• '1' ., 1-11, 1-5. 
4Harry Sidgwick, Outlines of ~ ~~to~ 9!. .~~ (London, 
l868), p. 210. . 
5 John Theodore Merz, A History of Europem 'fhoup,ht in the 
Nineteenth-Century, IV (F..din6urr;h, 19'5'0), p. 2. --
6 . 
Leslie Stephen, The §relish Utilitarians, I (London, 1900), 
p. 178, n., citing ll:Enquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil," iiI, 
par. 8. Stephen also refers to wDrks by Priestley and Beccaria in 
which some form of the grea tes t happinesf\ t i1eory had heen previous-
ly used. 
3 
happiness as the foundat 10n of man's act1Vity should be modIfied by 
making the measure of happiness qualitative and by 8ubst1tuting man 
ldnd for the indIvidual as tihe norm. Thus, for MIll. mants aotivi-
t,. should be governed by the principle, the greatest happiness of 
mankind rather than by the greatest happiness ot the individual.1 
Mill him.elf' had already been influenced by the French philosopher. 
Auguste oomto.S.ho bad given prominence to the greatest happinoss 
prIncIple under the name Altruism. In this same a~e, John Henry 
Cardinal Newman reiterated Aquinas' position tha.t "the soul or man 
is made ror the oontemplation ot its,,! Maker; and that nothing short 
ot that htghoontemplation 1s its happIness •••• ,,9 Plnall7, 1n 
our own cent\U7, Morris R. Cohen pictures the background of' Am.pi. 
oan tradl tion by t alling us that a "nervous re.tlessness and un-
quenohed questar~.r pleasure set. tho tone and oharaoter of Amer1-
can recreat1on, the phrase 'pursuit or happln8sB' 1s typically 
IAmerican. ,nlO 
Tho problem of happiness does not arise booauso philosophers 
deny the faot that happiness 1s an end for which man s tr1vos. Hap-
piness becomes a problem when one tr1es to decide two things. 
7John/Stuart Mill. US11ItarIan1sm, 7th od. (London, 1879), 
p. 48. : 
8l!?1a.., p. 49. 
9Jobn Helll7 Newman, "The Stay of the !>oul, II Paro9!lia.l and 
PlaIn Sermona. V (London. 1868), p. 315. 
,,,,,,.lOAmerlCan Th2W)bt: A Critical: S}cetoh (Glencoe, Illinois, 
111;>«+). p. 30. 
4 
irst, what 1s happinGss subJeotively considered? Secondly, in 
obJocts or object is happiness to be realized? The answer to 
question will ~ •• ult in the objeotive ooncept of happiness. 
subjeot1ve state ot happiness 1s tba~of calm 
ossession at self o~ that of complete oontrol over ane's inter10r 
H1s objective concept of happiness 1s u good whose attain-
m thin the oapacity of his natural powers. The Epicurean 
ould e.g:ree wi th the Stoic .1 th regard to tho object! \"8 concept of 
object must be oapable ot' yielding an enjo1Ment. 
'or the Epiourean, t~e subjeotive at~te or happ1nes~ 1s pleasure. 
aint Thomas Aquinas plaoed the ultimato obj~ct of mants happiness 
The subjectIve state of' happiness cons1sts 1n contempla-
lovinp: God and all t.~l1ngS in Him. Again, while Mill may 
isagree with Bentham aa to whether the greatest happiness prinei. 
be qualitative rather than quantitative, subjective hap-
iness for them both is to be found 1n aeeking pleasure and 1n a-
oiding pain • 
. Why then are there dirrorent ideas as to tho meaning of hap-
The reason for this dIversity seems to be that the concept 
In888 grows out of an involves a man's whole philosophy of 
lire--meta~hysloal. epistemological, psychological. ethlcal_ and 
el1gioua.: Tho concept hagpine.~J as a consequence, dIffers aeoo 
. :>to a philosopher's view of rea11 ty and 1 ts mean1ng, and, more 
roolsoly" acoo:rd1ntT. to his concnpt of' the nature of man. Thus" 
at all philosophera conceive of human nature as involvIng the same 
5 
relationships to different goods. Some philosophers will include 
in their concept of human nature a man-God relationshIp, a relatioll 
to sooiety, a relation to equals, and so on. Others will deny this 
or that relationship in their conception of human nature. UltIma~ 
ly, it becomes a question of determining the nature and reality of 
the good. 
If God is denied recognition, He cannot be th·e objoct of man's 
happiness. If tho man-sooiety relationship is lleld to dominate in 
the conoept of man, man's happ!ness is subordinated to the natural 
good of the State. Thus Auguste Com~ets concept of human nature ill 
its various relationships will omit man's relationship to God in 
11 favor of a relationship of man to humanity. The problem of happi-
neas would then consist in working out a hierarchy of values for 
mankind apart from God, and this would suppose a norm by which one 
could judge what is the good. of man apart from God. 
In short, we may say that the history of human thought shows 
that the concept of happiness oan be found to be dependent upon the 
two main factors mentioned above: onefs conoept of the nature and 
~eaning of reality and, especially, onets concept of man in rela-
tion to the good. Therefore, in studying immanuel Kant's ooncept 
of happiness attention must be given to these two points. Once 
~antt. position on these two points are recalled to mind and the 
reasons why he adopted his own characterist1c doct~ines on these 
llAlburey Castell, An Introduction ~ Modern Philosophy (Hew 
York, 1944), pp. 240, 24l>-47. 
6 
points, we oan prooeed to examine: (1) What his concept of' happi-
is; (2) IJ'fuy he makes ha.ppiness empirical; (3) lIlhy he cannot 
happiness the end of man: and, (4) ~~at relationship happiness 
has to morality. 
Our procedure will be to examine tho major works of Kant and 
to draw out the meaning from his use of the word happiness in each 
particular context. Principal secondary sources will be used 
herever they are found useful. 
Using the two factors outlined above, the chapters of this 
thesis will fall under four headings ~ In Chapter II our intent w 
be to learn what etfect, if any, Kant·s philosophy (epistemology) 
as upon his concept of man and, in turn, upon his concept of hap-
piness. In Chapter III a oonsidera ti on of the primacy ei ven by l'i..ant 
to morality will be directed to show how Kant broadens hls concept 
of human nature and how this, in turn, affocts his ooncept of hap-
piness. In Chapter IV we will be in a position to consiaer the 
essential notes assignod to happiness by I{ant and to establish the 
correctness of the conclusions reached in Chapters II and III. 
hapter IV will also consider happiness as it is made a constituent 
f Kant's Summum Bonum. We will thus be ermbled to consider the ... 
elationship Kant has established between happiness and morality. 
, 
hapter V will oOllsist of a brief summary of conclusions reached 
n this study together with an indication or some or the problems 
esulting from Kant's position. 
CHAPTER II 
MAN AND HAPPINES;:;.; vrr THIN KANT'S 
}l~PISTEMOLOGICAL FRAMEViORl{ 
[AJs far as our nature as sensi-
ble beings is oonoernod,our b&2-
~iness is the o~lY thing of S2ll-
sequenoe. • • • 
The philosophy of Immanuel Kant is largely a result of his 
-. 
agets conoern for certitude as to the real. In reading Kant's 
works one beoomes aware that the real for Kant was twofold: the 
world of morality and tho world of determined mechanistic reality. 
As to the sciences of mathematios and physio!}, Kant says: "We 
often hear oomplaints of shallowness of thought in Ol~ ap,e and of 
the oonsequent decline of sound science. But I do not see that the 
soiences whioh rest upon a secure f"ounda.tion, such as mathematics, 
physics, etc. in the loast deserve this reproach. On the contrary, 
they merit their old reputation for solidity, and, in the oaBe of 
physics, even surpass it. 'file same spirit would have become active 
lImmanuel Kant, Critique of Practioal Reason, trans. Thomas 
~ingsm1ll 4bbott, in Kant's Cr~lgue of Practicai Reason and Other 
Works 2!l ~ ~eorz 21 Eti'iics. th ed. (London, 1927), p.l8l 0:52). 
First page number reters to Rosenkranz editionj seoond page number 
to Abbott translation. This work will be designated simply as 
Practical. 
7 
8 
in other kinds of knowlodge, '~f only attention had first been di~ 
2 ted to the determination of t~leir princ1ples." However, Kant found 
that John Locko and David Hume had reducod science to a habit of 
the mind and morality to sentimentality. In Kant's eyes, Wolffian 
metaphysics had not only failed to reconcile science and morality 
for the scientist, but had also allowed freedom in human activity 
to be crumbled into the ruins of fatalism and atheism. The real, 
for Kant, was under attack. If moral activity, responsibil1ty, was 
to have any meaning, Kant saw that morality had to be grounded on a 
universal and necessary principle an~ not on Rousseau's sentimen-
tality. If the sciences and their methods were to have universal 
application and validlt7, Kant determined that he had to wrest fron 
the prinoiple of oausality and other categories of being Hume'. la-
bel, "an empirical habit of mlnd.'~ Kant's argument, then, is a-
gains t those who would interpret tho W) rld merely in terms of what 
is revealed to the senses in favor of those whose 1nterp~etation 
would also include a world of freedom or moral act1vity. IUs argu-
ment is also against the metaphysicians whose vindioation of these 
realities he found to be faulty. They were, Kant felt, causing 
scandal by their endless disputes. 3 He points out that the cause at 
, 
2Immanuel Kant. Critlgue ~ Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp 
Smith (London. 1950), p. Axi, n. ;-(9). First page number refers 
to the first German edition by Friedrich Hartknoch, 1787; second 
number refers to the Smi~l translation. B numbers, which reter to 
~le second Hartknoch edition, will be given when passages are in 
both editions. This work will be desi~nated simply as Puro. 
3Ibid., p. Bxxxiv (31-32). 
9 
these disputes was due to their failure to utilize Ii correct method 
oI.n philosophy •. It was Kant's intention to give to philosophy a 
oorrect method. 
Kant's method of Ii pproach is similar to that of Descartes and 
~ohn Locke. Locke, reporting on a. meeting in wt.d. ch the discussion 
centered on the problema of morality and laws of nature, wrote: 
'It came into my thought that we took a wrong course; and that, be-
~ore we set ourselves upon inquires of that nature, it was necea~ 
to examine our own ablllties, nnd see what objects our understand-
ings were or were not 1'1 tted to deal fli th • • • • n4 In like manner 
Kant began wi th an analys1s or the faculty of reason. He tells us 
the the cri tioal method of transcendental philosophy "is occupied 
inot so much with objects as wi th the mode of our knowledge ••• ~.5 
rais approach doH not b3gjnw1:tb. the fact that an object (other than the 
awareness of the mind and will) is. Hls inquiry is directed to the 
princ1ples involved 1n the acts of knowing and willlng--h2! we know 
and will. As Kant visualizes the problem, only in the process of 
explaining ~ we know and will can one proceed to say ~ he 
knows. Thus, any inquiry into the nature of happiness according to 
Kant MUS t take into account the principles accoroing to whi ch hap-
piness can be known. Is happiness real for Kant? What relation-
ship does it have to other Kant1an realities? Is happiness as 1m-
4John Locke, !a ~say conoerning Human Understanding, 31st ed. 
(London, 1853), p. vi. 
SPur~, p. A12, B26 (59); of. lE1a., n. 
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po~tant in one's lIfe as soience and moralIty. If an answer Is 
sought independently of a oonsideration of Kant's critique of the 
knowing mind and of what was the real for him, our answers would 
refleot little of his true notion of happiness and less of the r~a. 
Bons wny his notion of happiness can only be empirical or in time. 
Our first step, then, will be to inquire about Kant's method. The 
second step will be to oonsider the grounds on which the supposi-
tions of the first step are based. OUr third step wIll be to as-
certain the effect of the conclusions found in steps one and two 
on Kant's concept. of man and happin~ss. 
"(T]o know an object I must be able to prove its {real or lo-
gical] Possibillty.n6 Now by proving ~eal or logIcal possibility 
Kant means that ~ must show what !. pl:'iori prInciples must be posi. 
ted 1n any act of knowing and willing it we are to understand7an 
_ ............... oiiiooiiio .................. 
object to have real existenoe or only logioal existence. Since 
~udgments are the record of one's knowing aots, Kant.s method be-
~in8 with an analysis of." judgments. ThIs analysIs ultima.tely leads 
~o his decision as to the logioal and the real possibilIty of oh-
~ects. The problem thell Is one of finding out In what judgments 
~oal possIbility of an object, as opposed to logical possibility, Is 
6Ibid .,/, p. Bxxvl' n. (27). 
7J.t'1or Kant, "to understand" an object embraces !SAowledg, both 01. 
~ts exIstence and of its essence 1n terms of phenomena. To under-~tand Is opposed to the act to think. To think an object:rs:not to ~~lrm the objec~ existence-or lOlowledge of its essence, but rat~ 
~o ~how thG icgical oonsistency of its notes. The object which is 
thought" can become an object ot' faith if practIcal reason deems it 
oractloally necessary. but it never becomes an object of knowledge. 
11 
ad. 
Kant found that the logical possibill ty 0 f an object results 
tram an analytio proposition. He postulatos that in such a judg-
ent only a "clearness" of knowledge results. In such a judgment 
one only "thinks" the consistency of the notes of an object, that 
Is, he elucidates the content of the subject thought. For example, 
the predioate B belongs to the subject! as something hidden in th 
latter ooncept. Important here 1s Kant I s posi tion that nothing !l!!! 
is added by the predioate to the conoept of the subject. The mind 
need not go outside itself to ascert~ln the notes of the predicate. 
Fur thermore, analytic proposi tions are the products of the faculty 
of reason as opposed to the facultyof' understanding. Finally, 
analytic propositions have the charaoter of universallty and ne-
cessity sinoe they are the activities of reason alone. Thus, in 
Kantian terminology, they are oalled ~ priori JUdgments. 
The second t,rpe of judgment, a synthetic judgment, testifies 
to the real possibility of an objeot, that is, that it does exist, 
and that one can have knowledge of the existenoe of such an object. 
ny object signified by a synthetio prop')si tion can be known 8.S 
real. Here Kant postulates that an "expansive" knowledge rosul ta, 
that is, that the predicate llea outside the concept of the subject 
but is yet:connected with it. lienee, thore is more in a synthetic 
proposi tlon than just a «clearness fI of knowle~;ge or a process of 
"thinking" by reason. More important for Kant Is his further dis-
tinction of synthetlc propositiOns into .!. priorl !.!!! !!:. posteriori. 
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Wbile the object signified by both types of synthetic judgments 
really exist, the ground for the connection between the subject and 
predicate of the ~ priori proposition is necessary and universal 
while the p,round for the A posteriori proposition is only contin-
gent. The problem of chief import. then. is to ascertain the 
"ground lt according to which Knnt makes judgments that are sometimes 
analytic and sometimes synthetic. This ground on which synthetic 
propositions are based will also enable us to distinguish between 
synthetic propositions and analytio propositions according to some 
ultimate norm. This ground will giv~ to us a oriterion for dis-
tinguishing real objeots from logical objeots of thought. This 
brings us to step number two of our inquiry-. Before proceeding 
to the inquiry into the nature of Kant's criteria for known roalitJ 
it may be pointed out that Kant has reduced the problem of explain-
ing how the mind works to the problem of finding the ~ priori prin-
ciples which he considers to be necessHry if synthetic propositions 
are to be rendered intelligible. He stutes the problem very broad-
8 1,.: "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?tf 
In the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the first Cri tigue. Kant 
takes as fundamental that all synthetic judgments expand knowledge 
and prove the real possibility of an object. ~le sources of such 
judgments are two: sensibility and understanding. whose roots, he 
tells us. are unknown to us although they may be common. Kant's 
8Pure , p. Ala. 819 (55) .• 
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oriterion ror knowledge of real objects is thnt objects be Intuited 
sensibly and known throufrp the faculty of the understanding. 
Considering first the root of sensibility as a source of knOl'l-
ledge of real objects, Kant establishes the ideality of space and 
time as pure ~ priori forms of the subject knowing. That is, the 
outer sense Is subjeot to the pure form of space. Hence, the oute 
sense will giVe us the material of our representations (extonslon, 
hardness, etc.) only 1n the background of space. ~le inner sense 
is subject to the pure form of time. Hence, the inner sense will 
only represent the manifold of thlng~ successively, that Is, in 
time. Hence, whatever is known is known as objec~, intuited and 
ordered through sensibIlIty with its ~ Erior, rorms of space and 
time. Sensible IntUition, to be more speciric, ordered by these 
forma constltut~the rirst element necessary to know what objects 
are real and whiCh are logical. 
In the "Transcendental Analytic" Kant discusses the" second 
source of lmowledge--the understanding. Here Kant is interested 
in establishing the ground for the dIstinction between A Erlor! 
and ~ posteriori propositions. Thus, he distinguishes between em-
pirical eoncepts (~posterIor,) and A priori conoepts. Empirical 
oonoepts are raohioned in the understanding by abstraoting from 
experienoe. However, by abstraotion Kant does not mean that the 
resulting oonoept indicates the essence or an objeot. A concept 
is the understanding's way of 8ynthesi~lng or conneoting together 
under one general name the diverse peroeptions gIven through inner 
and outer sense fwd ordered by tho forms of space and time and the 
fac~lty of imagination. The empirical concept merely desir~ates 
one group of diverse phenomena as tree, desk, house, body, etc. 
11 empirical concepts are gained through this process of synthesis 
A prior~ concepts or clltegorios of the mind, Kant maintains, 
are not abstracted from sense perceptions. They are derived from 
pure reason alone. They express the general combining activity of 
ers tanding wh lcb s eaks. to bring perceptions presented to it un-
der the mind '8 own ordered un! t7. For example, understanding com-
bines phenomena in relation to one anptber according to the mind's 
a eriori and universally necessary law of cause and effect, or into 
a relationship of substance and accident. Kant is now ready to an-
8wer his question as to the possibility of synthetic propositions 
especially a Briori syPthetic propositions. 
In the case of an .! posteriOri synthetic proposition the 
round which enables us to get beyond a conception and add ne. e1e-
ents is the new experienoe or the empirical perception. L~timate­
y, the sensible intuition or perception is the glllound for the dis-
tinction between a real and a logical object of thought. We have 
too that the intuition is the ultimate reason for the distino-
between an analytio and a synthetic proposition, since Kant 
onaeives tne analytia proposition to be but an expression of an i-
entity between the subject and predicate and not a synthesis. Now 
ant tells us that tbe matter ot the intuition is the ground for 
the eonnection between the subjeot and predicate of an empirical 
1$ 
proposition. 
In the case of an ~ prIori synthetic proposition, its possib~ 
i t Y .i..s grounded, first, on the pure forms (space and time) of per 
caption, and secondly, on the matter of perceptions. Final1~ it 
i8 grounded on the A priori concepts. By reason of the fact that 
th1. type of synthetic propositions is grounded on the A priori 
forms of space and time and the A priori categories, primarily, 
it is an !. priori synthetio proposi tion. It 1s dis tinguished fro 
the !. poate£1orl beoause the latter rests primarily on the matter 
of the peroeptions. 
This analysis of propositions to determine the real or logical 
possibility of objects leads to Kant's characteristic doctrines. 
First, intuitions without concepts or concepts without intuitions 
can never yield knowledse either of the fact or of the gUiddiSi of 
real objeots. Seoondly, since the forms of peroeptions are ~ B£12-
ri and the manner in whioh the subject and predioate of any propo-
sition are oonneoted depend upon the ~ priori categories of though 
Kant concludes that what man knows is the appearances of things-
in-themselves. What man knows is only the prooession of d1verse 
and unique phenomena: sights, feelings, sounds, thoughts, choices, 
etc. Bence, Kant made his well known distinction between noume-
non (essence or thing-in-itself) and phenomenon (appearance). Suc 
a distinction, he maintaina, saves him from complete idealism. His 
or gumen t is at mple • Gran ted, he says, the. t we canno t know the es-
senoe of a thing except in terms of phenomena, the word 2henomenon 'I I 
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has no meaning except that it be an appearance 2! something_ Thus, 
we can know ~ something (noumenon) exists but we have no intui-
tion of it directly since what we intuit is also ordered by our 
subjeotive !. priori forms of space and time. Finally, this analy-
sis leads Kant to think that he has placed the sCienoes once again 
on a firm foundation. By reducing the science of mathematics, phy-
sics and geometry to ~ priori synthetic propositions, their univer-
sali~ and necessity is insured thro~~h the !. priori forms of space 
and time together with the~prior1 categories of thought. 
The consecluences of the "Analytiec lt are further delineated in 
the "Transcendental Dialectic." We need only :reca1l Kant ts conolu-
sions very briefly; they are necessary for our purposes because his 
doctrine on the transcendental ideas will have reference to his 
doctrine on ,deals. The latt~r involve his notion of happiness. 
In the "Dialectic" Kant sets out to deliver the death blow to 
the metaphysiCians. He does recognize that the mind has 'j a propen-
sity for a greater synthesis of knowlodge than that given by the 
forms of the categories ot the understanding to phenomena: know-
ledge Its tarts lid. th the senses, proceeds from thence to unders tand-
ing, and ends with reason, beyond which there is no higher faculty 
to be tound in us for elaborating the matter ot intuition and brl~ 
ing it und.r the highest unity of thought. H9 Two things are to be 
noted. First, Kant only admits a prop!nsitz for knowledge beyond 
9~., p. A 299, B355 (300). 
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the unity of the unders tanding. He does not say the~e is lenowlod{?: 
in his understanding of the word.. Secondly, the faoulty of rea-
son is introduced as playing a role in this propensity for know-
ledge. Here Kant sets reason its field of activity and its limits. 
Since knowledge is lim1tod to objects which can be sensibly intui-
ted, supra-sensible objects cannot be known to exist by the under-
standing. Such supra-sensible objects are the objects of reason's 
thought, and among these objeots aro what Kant calls the tr~ee 
transoendental ideas and the numberless ideals of reason. 
The three transcendental ideas-~od, Cosmos, and Soul--are the 
produots of speculative reason. Reason is compelled to "th1nk" 
these ideas by its very nature, but roason oannot prove or disprove 
the existenoe of these objeots signified by the ideas. The reason 
is that these ideas are concepts w1thout either sensible or intel-
lectual intuition. Henco, reason cannot know or prove their real 
possibility, nor can anyone prove that such objocts do nbt exist. 
Kant tells us tlmt the ideas funotion as a negative norm for specu-
lative reason in the sonse thatspeculative reason realIzes ita lack 
of intuItion, and hence, the limits of its power 1n gaining "expan- ! 
ai ve" knowledge of ei ther the noumenal or phenomenal TO rld. Iie 
conoludes that the metaphysician wastes his time by speculating on 
the objects signified by the transcendental ideas. The positive 
use that Kant has for the transcendental 1deas will he considered i 
in Chapter II. In general, he tells us that the thought of compl 
unity realizable through the ideas does motivate us to set up idea 
:1 
II 
I 
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for the continued exercise of the understanding. Furthermore, it 
stimulates the mind to seek completion of its work, and the mind, 
in turn, then seeks to bring the event. and object. of experience 
into a un5 ty of its own making. An ideal is such a un: ty, that is, 
Ie. "thought" which cannot be realised as knowledge. Were one to ask 
~at constitutes a transcendental object, Kant replies that al-
though "no answer oan be given stating .!h!l U is, we can ••• re-
1P1y that the gues tion itself is nothIng, becauae there Is no ob-
ject [corresponding] to it. • •• We have here a case wlere the 
10 
common saying holds, that no answer 1e itself an answer. ft 
This concludes our second step in which we have summarized the 
essential principles presupposed by Kant in his critical approach 
to philosophy. We can now prooeed to our third step of determinin~ 
Ihow Kant's concept of happiness falls into the pa ttern of this 
epistemologioal framework. 
The first consideration will be to determine under Whlch cate-
~ory of judgment one's propositions about happiness fall. Is a JUG\: 
~ent about happiness an analytic proposition? If so, does it re-
main an ideal statement so-chat nothing is expressed concerning the 
real possibility of happiness in ono's exporience? Or, is a happi-
~ess-judgment synthetic, and if so, does this judgment express 
ineoessary o.t" only contm gent knowledge about happiness? 
We have seen that the sourCe of judgment, the concept, 1s giv-
lO~., p. A479, B$07, n. (432). 
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en either.!. priori or .! posteriori. The empirioal ooncept, based 
on the matter of all empirical perception, cannot yield any ttsynthe-
tic proposition except ~oh as is itself also merely empir10al 
(tha t is. a. proposi t10n of experience), and whioh for the. t very 
reason oan never possess ••• neoess1ty and absolute universali-
t ,,11 y. • •• Bow Kant is very specific at this point 1n labell1ng 
the concept happiness empirical: "[T]he elements whloh belong to 
the concept ot happiness are without exception empirioal--that Is, 
12 they must be bo~o.ed from experienoe." Since we may have synthe-
tic propos1t10ns about happiness, we~may conclude that happiness 
has real poss1billty for Kant. Kant is admitting individual acts 
of man in time that are resultant of a very conoretely dete~lned 
ooncept conoerning happiness. The proposition may express a spe-
cific objeot, which is considered a part of <ne'a happiness, as de-
sired, or it may express the means neoessary to attain some speci-
fiedobjects of happiness. Again, the proposition conoerning hap-
piness may have referonce to a very concrete in terior s ta. te. Thus 
the elements contained in synthetio propositiOns about happiness 
Which 40es actually exist must be very ooncrete and very real for 
the individual seekIng happinesa. Just what constitutes both 
llIbid., p. A47, 864 (85). 
12Imr.1anuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaptgsic of Morals, trans 
H. J. Paton, in The Moral Law (Lonaon;-l947), p. ~6-r85) !ne 
first paf!8 numberrefers to'the seoond German edition published In 
Kant's lifetime; the second number refers to the Paton tranalatIon 
This work will be desIgnated sim.ply as Gt!oyndwork. 
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concepts, the subjeotive and objective aspects of' happiness, will be 
seen in Chapter rJ, below. 
If we abstract from the individual conorete element. peculiar 
to the objective concept, we have a description of ~w subjective 
concept of perfect happiness in ita abstract state. Kant calla 
thi s concept an ttideal." In order to determine the real possibi-
lity of perfect happiness, we must submit the concept to the first 
Critique's no~ for the possibility of existenoe: Does the 1deal 
of perfeot happiness result in a synthetio judgment? 
For Kant an ideal requires an a~aolute whole or a maximum of 
content 1n the concept. The ideal should be uniVersal, necessary 
(that is A priori), and determinate as to its contents which must 
be given A Eriori to experienoe. In the oase of happiness, then, 
the ideal must contain not only a desoription of the subjeotive 
elements relating to the 3Ubjective ~tate of an agent seeking happi-
ness, but also it must exhaust all possible objects vmioh might 
oonceivably make up happiness. Applying Kant's general norm for 
an ideal to his ideal of happiness, we find that happiness is an 
ideal completely indeterminate in an !. priori manner. The ideal 
merely designates an end (abstractly stated) hoped for. All that 
is contained in the ideal of happiness is a general description 
and qualities appropriate to the subjective state of an indivIdual 
possessing or enjoying perfect happiness. The ideal lacks impli-
cit designation of any means by which the st!lte of happiness can 
be attained. The ques tion arises, then, as to why Kant may call 
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happ1ness an ideal when the concept does not meas~e up to the 
th1rd Peq~red quality for an ideal, that is, a detorminate con-
cept. Kant's answer is that happiness is an ideal in a specific 
aense even if not according to striot definition. 
Happiness is an ideal, not of reason but of the imagination. 1: 
The distinction between theae two types of ideals is presented in 
the firs t Critique as follows: 
'rhe prodUcts of the imaginHtion are of an entirely differ-
ent nature [than the ideal of reasonJJ no one can explain 
or give an intelligible concept of them. each is a kind of 
monosram, a more set of particular qualIties, determined 
by no asaignable rule, and fo~~g r~ther a blurred sketch 
drawn from. di,verso experiences than a "determinate image--
a reprosentation such as painters and l*lYsiognomists pro-
fess to carry in their heads, and which they treat as being 
an incommur.dcablo shadowy image of their creations •••• 
[They] are viewed as being models (not indeed realisable) 
ot possible empirical intuition, and yet turJlish no rule. 
tha t allow of being explained and exnmined.J.4 
Here, in giving the charaoteristics of an ideal of the imagi-
na.tion, Kant seems to be very preci.e in establishing the ideal of 
" 
happiness on empirical grounds. Henoe, the ideal, while it may 
yield synthetio propositions, cannot 71eld ~ prIori synthetic pro-
positions. Nor does the ideal result in anal1tio propositions. 
Kant says that 11' it were easy to fInd a determinate concept of 
happlnes~. then the ideal .,.,ould yield analytic proposi tions or what 
he calla imporat1 ves for attaining hq.> Plness. l "only if' tho means 
13~., p. 47 (B6). 
14~, p. A571,B599, (lt87). 
l50roundwork, p. 46 (85). 
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~eading to happiness would be explicitly o~ Implicitly in the ideal 
~ould the ideal be analytic. He argues by way of analogy ~ th 
~athematios to bring out his meaning. Thus, if one haa the work 
pf dividing a line into two equal parts. 1mplioit in the end pro-
~osed is the action required tor div1ding the line: "I must from 
16 ~ts ends describe two intersecting arcs." Cassirer, co~~enting on 
this, says tl~t it may seem absurd to oonsider even hypothetically 
that the concept of happiness could yield analytic propositions 
~ince 1t is Obviasly very diffioult or impo8u1ble to have perfect 
~owledi:!:e at mat we should do to ma.lc;.e ourselves happy. But. he 
~dda that 
it 18 important to not1ce that the difficulty is in know-
ing h2! to aohieve happiness. It 1s no~ at all difficult 
to see thn t if we had rull knowledge of the nature of hap .... 
ness and the meana of achieving 1 t, our actions would fol-
low immedi!~elY and would be in strict accordance w:tth our 
knowle dge. 7 
In raising the question as to whether the ideal of happiness 
" 
~il1 result 1n analytic propositions, Kant scems to wish to point 
put two facts. He stre.ee. the fact that the ideal would be capo. ... 
)le of yielding rulalytic propositions if it were determined. As we 
~aw above, objects signified by analytic propos1 tiona only have 
~ogical p08sibI11 ty~ sinoe one does not have to appeal to sense 
~ntultion tp verIfy the analytic concept. Hence. Y~nt is pointing 
l6IbId ., p. 45 (8~). 
l7H• w. Cassirer, 1\ Commenta!7 .2!! Kant·s Critique 2!. Judgment 
(London. 1938). p. 104.-
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put that speculative reason would yet have no intelleotual or sen-
~ible intuition or the object, perfect happiness, to validate its 
'thinkinglt the ideal even if it could have !. priori a determinate 
~oncept of the ideal. The ideal will never have empirical exlst~ 
A seoond fact that Kant possibly means to stress is that pro-
~os~tions proceeding from the ideal of happiness, while in a sense 
practical propositiona, depend entirely on a conorotization pro-
cess by the faculties of t~le understanding and imagination. Since 
these faculties have Deen limited by Kant to the knowledge of phe-
nomena, it follows that propositions about happiness can only be itl 
"" 
terms of phenomenal states and phenomenal objects. The proposi-
tions of happiness explain what is known to exist. Hence, tne de-
termined proposi t~.on abuut happiness is a tneoretical principle of 
action as opposed to what Kant calls a pract!c:tl principle. More 
will be seen of Kantts "practical principle of action" in Chapter 
II. At tilis point of our investigation Kant's epi8temolo.gical 
framework seems to indicate that happIness will be 11mi ted to amp! .. 
rical concepts, that is, l1mit(-,d to states and objects of the phe-
pomenal world. Th 1.s conclusion will be verified later in h'c 13 doc-
trine on happIno8s. HowHver, it might well be pointed out that 
not all the commentators agree. In his work, Ka.nt's P!"e-Crit,ical 
, 
~th!.cs, Dr." ?aul Artilur Sch11pp gives some oonsideration to Kant's 
idea.s about happiness. Dr. Schilpp maintains that happiness for 
Kant in this period 18 not 80 much something sensed as something 
thoueht. He shows that hap;Jiness embraces the noumenal order as wel 
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as the phenomenal order of reality. 'Finally, Dr. Sohilppts work 
shows that Kant's doctrine of happiness holds a place of relative 
importance and is not completely overshadowed by Kant's doctrine of 
duty in the pre-critioal period. For this thesis, it is important 
that we especially note his oonolud1ng remarks: 
We may be told tho. t whatever my be true tor the 
pre-Critioal period, Kant's tormalism in the Grundle-
guns, in the seoond Crltlsue, and In the MetaihY~os ot Morals of 1797 is Indu ltably that of the mo dft 
type, the Categorical lmperative standing irrevooably 
as tho central teaching of his definitive ethical 
treatises. I am not ready to accept such a statement. 
Rather I suspeot that the understanding and interpre-
tation ot Kant's definitive ethical thought have been 
mistaken just as I believe them 'to have been mistaken 
tOl" hi s I%"e-Crltlcal pel"iod. The proof of rr13 suspicion 
would require a cri tical analysis of Kant fS definitl ve 
ethical treatises. This I hope sooner or later to be 
able to make. Until then I must_reserve the rirht, in 
vIew of the results of the present study, to doubt the 
truth of the current Int!,rpretations of Kant's more de-
finitive ethioal theory. ~ 
Dr. Sohllpp has not yet published the proof of his 8.lSpicions. 
However, in view of his warning, it should be pOintod out that the 
positioI'll as to the phenomenal character of Kant's happiness and as tc 
the formallstio method in whlch duty domina. tes happiness will be 
upheld for Kant'. Critical works. 
OUr third step In this chapter requlres yet another oonsidera-
tion. As was pOinted out in the introduction, the notIon of happl-
, 
ness is inseparably involved In the notion or man's nature beoause 
18 Paul Arthur Schllpp, Kant's Pre-Critical Ethios (Chicago, 
1938). pp. 134, 142, 153, and 1S3, n. 32. 
19 4 Ibid., p. 17 .. 
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both concepts involve the notion of an obj ective good. Wha t, then, 
can Kant's notion of' human nature toll us about his concept of hap-
piness? Concerning manls nature, Kant tells us that n(m]an is hlm-
self an appearance. • • • There Is no concU tion determining :man in 
acoordance with this oharacter w!lloh is not contained In the series 
of natural effects, or which is not sUbject to their law. ,,20 
• • • 
In other words, such diverse phenomena or natural effects as see-
ing, hearing, smelling, seeing, thinking, imagIning, or willing are 
intUited, subjeot; to the forms of spaoe and time and "thought" as a 
unit or a whole through understandin&'s empirical ooncept or gene-
ral term,!!!!!l. All that we know about man is oontained in the suc-
cession of accidents going to make up the notion m!!!. Vie hn.ve no 
!. priori perception and no !. priori conceptlon 01' the obj ect ~ 
as he Is. The appearances of man are evidence only to the fact 
tha t man Is and not evidence of whe. t he is. Nor does one have any 
-
self' knowledge of what man is, th'it i8, a knowledge which 1s at-
tained by a simultaneous interior concomitant reflection 1n the act 
of knowing an object. The reason, Kant tells us, is that man knows 
himself only as object and never as subject. The nearest realiza-
tion ot real oneness ~owed 1n Kant's epistemological framework to 
man Is the pure loglcal form which Kant calls "unity of appercep-
21 
t1on, t1 an c,lmpty tI I think" or the transcenden ta.l 8S0. One is not 
aware of such a logical form. One argues to 1 ts existence. 
20~., p. A552, BSSO (416). 
21 Ibid ., p. AI01-ll0 (136-31). 
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'l"hut does such a form tell us? It tells us two things, Kant 
aSBures us. P'irst, the fa.ct ~ I am: tl I am conscious of myself, 
not as I appear t,) myself, nor as I am in myself, ~ onll .!:h.!ll 
"22 1 "" i 1" e- SecoIXl y, the r think expresses the necess ty 0 a synthe-
sis of all a.ppearances according to the forms of space and time, 
the concepts of the understanding, and the re-presenta tion of the 
imaginative faculty into the one group phenomenon,!?!S. Without 
the "I think" there would be no Wll ty or consoiousness underlying 
the d1 verse phenomena grouped together as man nor any capacity for 
the process of synthesis_ Without tne logical transcendental ego, 
one could never attribute any activity as belonging to a subject 
such as man. Nor could anyone ever be aware of the process of how 
knowledge is constructud wl thout the supposi tion of the unifying 
transcendental !..S2..23Furthermore. the It I thinktt remains only a lo-
gical ant1 ty for Kant beoause the form 1s w lthout a correspond1ng 
intuition of self as one substance 01' un1ty. Some, Kant"says, 
call the "I Wnktt the soul, but he irmnediately warns us that the 
loul ~is not ••• knowledge of the simple nature of the self as 
subject, such as might enable us to distinguish it from mattor. tt24 
'rosp.ale of the terms ~ or ingomor.al substans:e, for Kant, 
is merely to designate under those terms what sensations 01' pheno-
22 Ib1d ., p. BlS7 (168). Italics not in original. 
23Ibid ., pp. A103-110 (133-138, Bl31-1S9 (152-169). 
24Ibl~., p. A360 (340). 
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nena come from inner sense. The terms, bodY; or c,orporeal substance, 
on the other hand, designate what sensations oome from outer sense. 
l'hus, to Bay that man is a union of soul and body is not knowledge 
pf man's nature. The only s1gn1fioanoe that Kant gives to the 
~erms bod! and soul is that man may be oonsidered to have a soul 
~n so far as hems an aotive aspeot (understanding and wil11ng) and 
~ body in. so tar as he has a pass1ve aspeot (matter or sensibility). 
pn the supposi tion that the ooncept, nature, indicates an end, and 
rrom Kant's position that man has no theoretioal understanding of 
~nts nature, it follows that man oa~have no theoretioal knowledge 
pf mants end or gocxi exoept in terms of phenomona. Ii ibrt10rl Kant 
~annot say preoisely what the nature of happiness is exoept in terrrll: 
of phenomenal objects since the oonoept haPl?iness 1nvolves 1n its 
ordinary oomprehension man in relation to somo good. 
However, the question arises as to how Kant can have knowledge 
ot the phenomenal man 1n relation to some good. Kant woUld answer, 
through the oategory of relation. The relations which are to be 
found in all the representat10ns mak1ng up the phenomenon man are: 
-
(l) relation to the subject; (2) relation to the object; and (3) 
25 
relation to all things 1n general. Fram the aspect of man himself, 
it is not ~, the soul, and the body that 18 in rela~ion to some 
some other'phonomenal object. Rather man's speoifio faoulties, his 
feelings, his wanta, his desires oonstitute one term of the rela-
2S!2!a., p. A334, 8391 (323). 
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tion. In so far as these feelings and desires are unifIed under 
ogloal transcendental ego, man can oonsider himself 1n relation to 
ome external good. Happiness will involve these feelings and de-
sires and other bodily faoulties and powers and the objeots that 
them. Happiness, then, will have an active aspeot and a 
assive aspeot in so far as phenomenal man must act and be acted 
pon in terms of the needs of these faculties. On the other hand, 
the seoond torm of the relation, the good to which the faoulties 
tend or the objects of happiness, can never be any sort of trans-
endental object, such as God. The berm ~ Is only a transcenden-
tal idea of reason. The category of relation can never be applIed 
to bring the phenomenal aspects 01" man into relationship wIth a 
transcendental object. The same thing Is to be said tor the term 
societ. Society is an ideal of reason tor Kant. Henoe. man's 
ppiness oannot be known to involve the good of sooiety o~ the 
ood of humanity. If happiness must be explained in term. 01" the 
ategories 01" the understandIng, then it seems to involve only the 
oods that can be known to be 1n relation to the phenomenal aspeots 
Hence, the objects, themselves, muat be phenomenal. 
Does the idea of spiritual happiness have any significanoe? 
an happin~ss be spiritual. Kant says that such terms as Immateri-
inoorruptibil1ty (simplicity), and personality gave birth 
to the idea or spirituality. lIe attributes the origin and use o~ 
26 Ibid 
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~le idea ot these terms to the attempts ot the metaphysicians to 
ascertain the nature 01: the !. priori form ot apperception, III 
think. II Such ideas, according to Kant, are mere predicables inher-
~nt In the transcendental idea!.2.Bl. 'lbe only meaning the proposi-
tion, "Happlness is spiri tual," might have tor Kant is that happi-
ness at Its best consists in the activi~ of inner sense as dis-
tinct from the passivity of outer sense. In what way is man aotive 
rwith regard to happiness? Kant says that "ft]he greatest happiness 
a man can experience is to feel that he is the originator and build 
8r of his own happiness and that wha~ he enjoys he has acquired 
I""",, It ,,21 fIoJ..i.ue • rI • • 
In yet another place, Kant shO'M3what he means by the state-
Iment tha t man is the source and builder of his own happiness: "Man 
1s a being who, as belonging to the world of sel'lS e, has wants, and 
~o far his reason has an oftice which it cannot refuse, namely, to 
~ttend to the interest 01: his sensible nature ••• with"a view to 
the happiness of thts life, and it possible even to that ot a fu-
ture.,,28To say, then, that happiness is spiritual means only that 
~applne8s Is to be directed by reason and not suttered (passively) 
~oth according to the whIms of the passing moment and without rule. 
~piritual happIness for Kant cannot mean that the subjectIve act 
~ons18ts !n some experience transoending the natural raculties or 
27Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield 
(London, 1930) •. p. 127-28. This-;ork will be designated as Lectures. 
28~ractical, p. 181 (1$2). 
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natural objects. Kant's epistemological principles 11'111 allow for 
knowledge of ~ en3ib 1 e love but never knowledge 0:<- ~ pi r i t u a 1 love. 
No so-called spiritual reality can be understood as a part of the 
concept happiness. 
Also_ accordin~ to Kantian principles, the notion etornal hap-
p1ness arises because of the propos1tion liThe soul is s1mple, and 
consequently immortal." Theoretical understanding would understand 
this proposi tion to menn t.hat happiness consists of a never-end ... 
ing series of phenomena grouped together and thought by the under-
standing as having a never-ending re¥tion to the subject, en. 
~oes such an idea have objective possib11ity? In accordanoe with 
Kantlan principles man has no intuition of such a never-ending 
series which would serve as a ground to the idea that happiness is 
eternal. The contents of happiness must, then, remain always sub-
ject to the A Rriori form of time and as a consequence appear and 
be known only in one unique instant. One can never predict with 
certainty what the next point in time will bring. Happiness, then, 
29 is in time, and this means that happiness is re8tri~ted in its ob-
jective and subjective conceptions to the phenomenal order. Man 
cannot know that his happiness will be never ending. To say that 
-
happiness is eternal because mants soul is simple, or to say that 
the ultimate object of happiness i8 spiritual and, hence, eternal, 
has no meaning for Kant. Such reasoning, Kant points out, is based 
29u In time" must not be taken to mean thH.t Kant excludes 9. fu. 
ture life. Kant holds that one cannot theoretIcally know this fact. 
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on the supposition that the natures of Ood and man can be compre-
hended. 
Kant's picture of man resulting from an epistemolo~loal 'ap-
proach has limited man's theoretical undepstandlng of himself to 
the phenomenal world. Theoretical knowledge is not about man in 
himself, but about man ns he appears. We must be satisfied with 
knowledge of phenomenal man and not with man as he is essentially. 
It seems, then, that mants happinoss is to embraoe only tha.t which 
is intelligible to theoretioal understanding, that is, phenomena. 
~s stated at the beginning of this c~pter~ppine.8 is the only 
thing of oonsequence as tar as our nature as sensibl, belngs 1s 
ooncerned. Happiness is at its best when man is active 1n planning 
his happiness and man is aware of the part he plays as an agent of 
happiness. But even this intellectual contentment is the conoern 
of man as a sensible beIng, th~ is, as phenomenal man. It is ex-
perienoed as phenomenal man and not as noumenal man. 
How does Kant evaluate the quest for happiness? Our answer 
depends upon Kantts evaluation of man as phenomenal man. Thus, for 
Kant, the faculty of understanding, even though it yields theprice-
less knowledge of the soienoes of phenomena. and enables man to at-
ta1n intelleotual superiority over nature, does not constitute a 
dlgni ty suffIeiently worthy of man '8 ti tie to ttpre-eminence over 
nature and beasts .. " Possession of intellectua.l powers does not 
30 7 See page ,above. 
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~alse man above the level of mechanistic nature. With understand-
Imr , man Is not so elevated, for the understanding Is subject to 
the !. priorI categories In expressing Itself. Hence, man's under-
standincr, operates according to fixed laws. The categories are na-
ture t s gIfts, a.nd they are mechanically applied to the MH.n:1fold of 
experience muoh the same as animals follow their instinctive powers. 
WritIng of the merits of man's speculative and theoretical reason, 
·r:ant says: 
I am myself by na.ture a speculator. I reel a oon.umlng 
thirst for knowledge and a. compelling unrest to progress 
(in advancing knowledge]; also I,feel a contentment at 
each a.dvance. There was a time when I believed that all 
this (kn_ledge] is what canters real dignity upon human 
lIfe, and I despised the masses who know nothtng. Rous-
seau has set me r1 ght. This blInding excellenoe disap-
pears; I learn to honor man, and would find myself no 
more usefUl than the COMMon laborer, if I did not believe 
that those oonslderal;lons could give 13. valuo, surpas1ing 
all, on whtch to establ:ish the rights of human 11fe. J 
The path whIch Rousseau poInted out to Kant, the path on "hleh 
the rIghts of human life are established, the path on wh1!ch even 
the common laborer.1)as excellence surpass lng all and worthy of es-
teem from all menr-thls path is the path of freedom. In this path, 
the ideas of wIll, faith, and moral activity are the sign-posts. 
Since knowledge Is limited to th1ngs which can be known phenomenal. 
ly, knowledge does not make man free. Man t s outlook on nB. ture 
t'lrough knowledp;e alone is deterralned and mechanis tic. Through 
31 Immanuel Kant Sttmmtllche \Verke, ed., B. Hartenstein, VIII 
(Leipzig, 1868), p. ~24. fiet's translated. Thlswork ,dll be des1g-
nated s1mply as Wsr~~. 
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nOVlledr,e man is subjoct1cd to the whims of h:'.s Olin nature as \vell 
s external nature. The will, on the other hand, is a faculty that 
an tran!'lcond the lawA of nature. Nor is the will concernfJd wtth 
nowledge. Henco, the exercise of this faculty in its hifhest per 
action can belon?, to the rich and poor or the ignorant and learned 
like. From these remarks we may estimate Kant's attitude toward 
he quest for happIness. 
Since happiness seems to be limi te(: to objects over v.t15.ch 
heoretical understanding can have knowledge. the quest for hap,.i-
oss in itself does no t confer a tltl.e to the rights of human life 
Nor does the quest for happiness necessarIly imply a pre-
ence of some quality within man whereby he is worthy of esteem un-
eS5 In some l1ay happiness can have some relation to the faculty of 
Kant 1s preparing the way to brtn,r: in man's faculty of 
ill and freedom .for a (~reater role in his c oneept of man. Kant 
ishes to broaden his 11m! ted concopt of man as presented' wI t!1in 
is epistemological framework. Al though he cannot have knowledge 
f man other than that given by concepts backed up by phenomena, 
ot Kant feels that he can offer an 1dlal of man wh tch 1s more com-
rehensive than the empirical concept ot: man. The part that the 
plays 1n this broadened concept of man and the consequences of 
on tho· concept of happiness 'fIill be unfolded. within Kant's 
oral framework .• 
CHAPTER III 
MAN AND HAPPINESS WITHIN 
KANT t S MORAL FRAMEWORK 
Suppose now that for a bei~~ possessed of rea-
son and a. will the real purpose of nature were 
his ereservation • • • or in a word his happi-
ness. In that case nature would have hit on a 
very bad arrangement by choosing reason 1n the 
creature to carl"1 out this purpose. For all 
the aotions he has to perform with this end 1n 
View, ••• would have been~mapped out for him 
far more surely by instinct; and the end in quos-
could have been maintained far more sure 1 y by 
ina ti nc t th.an it ever oan by reason. • • • 
These judgements ••• have as their hidden 
ground the Idea of another and much m or~ worthy 
purpose of eXistence, for which. and not fOr 
happiness, reason is quite properly designed. 
In the ttpretaoe of the Second Edition" of the first Critique 
lKant answers t..l-J.e objection that his Cr1 t1gue 1s negative" and not 
~ositive. His critique, he tells us, has removed an obstaole which 
had long stood in the way of and had threatened to destroy the em-
ployment ot praotical reason. What 18 that obstaole and what is 
the employment of praotical reason of which Kant speaks? First, the 
obstaole of whioh Kant speaks 1s the illegitimate use ot' reaaon in 
80 tar as the metaphysioian speoulates about the existenoe of ob-
lOrQunQwgrk. pp. 4-6 (63-64). 
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jeots not verified by sensible intuitions. Kant believed that spe-
oulation about the existence of objeots signified by the transoen-
dental ideas led only to the fact that reason oould show neither 
that the objeots exist nor that they do not exist. Suoh speoula-
tion, he thInks, had resulted in a oontemporary concept of man as 
a determined or mechanical creature of nature. Furthermore, this 
speculation had diverted phIlosophers t attention from reasonts 
more noble use. By restrioting the proper task of man fa under-
standing to an inquiry into the functions of senaible phenomena, 
and of speculative reason to showlng~the logical oonsistency of itl 
oonoepts or ideas, Kant believed he had prepared the way for en-
lightening mankind, not only as to wha t exaotly the more noble use 
of reason entaIled, but also, as to how the oonoept of a tree man 
could be maintained. Our second consideration, then, conoerns the 
employment of reason aside from its speculative employment. 
"We are convinced that there is an absolutely necessary prao-
tioal employment ot pUN reason ••• In whioh it Inevitably goes 
~eyond the limits ot senslbillty.,,2 Now by the practioal use of 
reason, Kant means In general that whieh Is possible through the 
oonoept ot freedom.) Freedom 1s beyond the limits of sensibIlity. 
Freedam, in turn, is the essent1al oonditlon of moral obligation. 
Henoe, Kant fInds that in his moral quest, that is, In the praotl-
2Pure • p. Bxxv (26-27). 
)~., p A632. B660 (525). 
cal employment of his reason man is provided with the necessary 
olue, not only to the existence of a higher reality than the pheno-
menal world, but also to the logical possibIlity of his existence 
as a free man. Moral activity substantiates what Kant had already 
posited as neoessary in the epistemologioal framework, that is, tb 
noumenon. Kant reasons that to be moral, man must be free, and to 
be free man must belong to a realm of freedom. Were our na tures 
entirel,. phenomenal. they would be Wlolly subjeot to the causal 
la •• of the phenomenal world. Hence, man's moral experience potnt 
to the existence of an addl tlonal e81Jence--a noumenal man. One 
oommentator sums up Kant '8 reasons for distin g uishing between the 
noumenon and phenomenon by telling us: "Nature takes on a pheno-
menal aspect for the sake of morali ty. ,,4 
Por Kant, then, man 18 more than a croature or nature. He is 
also a being of freedom wbose reason exerts a determining influenc 
on his actIvIty. When reason exerts this influence on mants activ-
1 t y, then reason is oonsidered by Kant to function practically an( 
not speculatively. The big question for Kant i8 the fact of man's 
moral quest or that reason does functlon practically. Can it be 
proved theoretically: Kant nev~r retrenches fram the position of 
the first 9rltlgu~. Speculative reason can neither prove nor dis-
prove the existenoe ot freedom. 
'lie must not lose s1ght of Kant1u method in trea.ting of morali 
4RiOhard Kroner, Kant's Weltan,ghauuns, trans. John E. Smith 
(Chicago, 1956), p. b). 
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ty. The terms morality and practical reason are, for Kant, mere 
ideas of reason. One does not have a sensible intuition of theex-
istenc. of mora11ty or of practical reason which verify what Kant 
or anyone else Ddght have to say about these ideas. This is ac-
cording to Kant's own premises. Hence, Kant's approach to mora11 t¥ 
a. n d practical reason 1s h7pothet1cal 1n nature: "If' morali ty 
exists and If reason 1s prac tical, then this 1s what these ooncepta 
must mean in order to have 1ntelligIbil1 ty.!I Time and again Kant 
will repeat that his analys1s of morality 1s not a theoretical 
knowledge of what the noumenal mottal,,:world 1s. Speculative reason 
~rely examines the consistency of its ideas about moralitJ and 
practical reason, and praotical reason ;lUts these oonsistent oon-
cepts to use by commandIng activity in accordance to t hem. Specu-
lative reason merely spells out what ought ~ be. Practical rea-
son wills what ought to be (moral'.ty, or the freedom of man) to 
exist actually by putting tnto action wha.t spooulat1ve reason mani-
fests. Thus, Kant never claims that his moral insights are know-
ledge or that his judgments are true. Knowledge and truth belong 
1n the sphere of man's taculty ot understanding with its categories 
an,d .a priori perceptions ot space and t1me. Morality, on the 
other hand, belongs to the realm of the good which Is unknowable 
by theoretical reason but a tta:1nable throup)l. practical reason. 
n1US, Kant puts the good outside the field of knowable being. The 
good cannot be said to be true Ott talae sInce, according to Kant's 
theory of correspondence, there 1s no intuition corresponding to anj 
one notion or the good. Thus, one cannot have oertitude with re-
gard to the good wher'e the good is sometht Hg transcending phenomena 
But one can have practi ca.l oertI tude. Wha. t ev Idonc. does Kant 
offer to substantiate the possibility that man has a moral qU6t'1t, 
that reason functions practically, and that a moral good is practi-
cally certain and nece~sary? The answer involves Kunt's hypotheti-
cal explanation of man's possIbIlity to act as a moral agent. What 
is man when he is really human or mo.ral, and how certain is man that 
he oan be tree and act morally? Kant busied h.imself with these is-
sues in his Groundwork g£ ~ Metaph;y .. lC !!f. Morals, the Cri tigue 2! 
Praotict;l.l Reason, and the Metaphysio 2f. Morals. In p,ivlng a brief 
summary of Kant's answer to the question of morality and its oonstlt-
uen ta, our purpose will be twofold: to lay stress on the impor-
tance of man's moral qaost in Kant's ooncept of man; and, to show 
the pc-r·t happiness as conceived by Kant plays in this moral quest 
and 1 ts importance. 
PhIlosophers of the Enlightenment attemptud to esta.blish a 
theory of ethios apart from the eternal la.w of God. Since Kant 
believed that his Critique had shown the futility of all attempts 
to prove the existence of God, he had to follow in their footsteps. 
Su·~:~ln.g up the attempts of Baumgarten, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson, 
each of whom had based a self-suffj,jient ethics on pleasure and pam 
or a moral senae, Kant says that 1 t Ylo'uld be "superfluous labortt 
to refUte them,Stor they had asked the wrong question. They had 
'Groundwork, p. 93 (111). 
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~sked "What motivates man basloa1ly--plea9u~e, happiness, perfec-
tion, or self-interest?'l Kant says that they should have asked: 
"What kind of men do people ordinarily consider p;ood?t1 Is it the 
man who has attainod happiness and self-contentment, or a man who 
has manaved to make his pleasures outweigh hls pains, or Ii man of 
great talent? Kant replies that it Is none of these. His reason 
is twofold. Against 't.1.e above mentioned opinions Kent observes 
that a man may be contented, talented, and suooessful, but if he 
has no rIght intentions, he is considered as immoral. Honce, Kant 
offers his own solution. 'fuus, the ~n whom people consider good 
is the man ot good w1l1. nle only unqualified good to be aimed at, 
the one good "mse attainment wl1 t make man mO~!llly ~ighteous and 
truly human 1s the good will. 'lhat, then, makes the will good? 
Even If, by some speoial dilravo~ of destIny o~ 
by the niggarrily endowment of step-mothe~ly nature, 
this will is entirely lacking in power to carry 
out ito 1ntent10ns; if by its utmost effort it 
still aocomplishes nothing, and only good will Is 
lett; ••• even t:.'1en it would still shine like a 
jewel for Its own sake a~ somethtng which has ita 
full value in itself. Its usefullneso or fruitless-
ness o~n neither add to, nor subtract fram this 
value.O 
'lhus the will 1s not good by what it accompl1shes or even bY' 
1 ts lotty desires. tI It Is good throuE~h 1 t:3 willing alone, .11 and 
the only p6s~l1ble interior principle In wIllIng Is man's motive. 
Here Is Kant's objective found~~tion for morality. He parallols his 
6 ~., p. 3 (62). Italics not in original. 
7Ibid ., p. 3 (63~. 
revolutlon in ethics to his "Copernican revolution" in his episte-
mology. By .hifting from an objective norm--theeternal Divine Law 
--to the subjective intention of man in a speoific aot as the sole 
norm for objeotive good, Kant abstraots from the material content 
of man's aots, the conditions, oircumstancos and objects, and con-
siders onl,. the form of the wIll. What is the moti". that makes ar 
action of man to be moral or fully human? 
The essence of man's mot'al experienoe is his sense of duty. 
Kant defines this tlsense of du ty" as the necessi ty, not only of 
aotlng !a con1'om! ty !!..!al the law, b~t also of aoting ~ 2.! duty'. 
sake or reverence for the law--not fot' any specific law but for la1 
In general. An act done from the sense of duty is an act for the 
sake of the good will as distinc~ from an act motlvated by man's 
cravlng for pleasure or by an Impulse to avoid pain, or by love or 
fear of God, In til word, by anything exterior to the wl11 i taelf. 
The motive of duty' in contrast to any exterior motlve Is" an !. prio-
n motIve. 'Ibls means It is the", motive of pure reason alone, with· 
out any dependence upon experience. Thus, it is a motive applioa-
ble to all rational creatures and not just man. Kant sums up in a 
formula how any good will having duty 8.S its motive will act: "I 
ought never to act except In such a way that I can also will that 
, .......-... ... ~---..-.-
m. tngim 8~Oul;i beoome !. unlv!rsal .!!.!.. n8 This rule expresses, for 
Kant, nothing but the form tha. tall nBxims motl vated by duty will 
8lbid., p. 16 (70). 
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take. Thus, any particular maxim motivated by ruty should be cape 
ble of universal application. F'or example, the maxim 1'1 ought to 
tell the truth,U is a maxim motivated. by duty, and is universal or 
categorical only if tnis general law remains that this exact form 
hen carried over as a practical principle for one's activity. 
If one would say, f1 I ought to tell the truth because I do not wish 
to be punished," then, his practical principle of action 1s no 10l'lg 
er a law because something personal has been added to the law. 
Hence, as a principle of ac ti vi ty the principle cea::H~S to be uni-
versal for all men. PunIshment, tor--:Kant, Is not a motive of actio 
capable of raising man above nature since man is acting from pas-
sion rather than from tLe sake of duty. All acts proceedIng from 
passion or extrinsic force are, fJr Ka.nt, a-moral, that is, not im 
oral, and yet not moral. If someono should ask why he ought to 
tell the truth, the only anSV'/er that can make a consequent act mo-
ralls "because he ought. II No other motive can enter intb a man's 
practical prInciple of' a ctivi ty if his reaul tant act is to be mol' 
Now with tbehypothesls that duty is the motIVe \vhich makes the wil 
good Kant has connocted a sense .2!. duty wi th the good-will. The 
clue which enables Kant to postulate the existence of morality as 
a logical possibile.and at the same time argues to the ~ of the 
existence of a noumenal world 1s manta awareness of a sense of du-
ty. This sense of duty 1s Kant's given. This given, for Ka.nt, ex-
presses the essentials of Llorallty, and Kant has connectod duty to 
the essence of morall ty by 8.nalyzlng what tho orolnary man consl-
d.~8 as essential to a good man, that is, the good will. Kant's 
hypothetical conclU910n 1s that 11" morality 1. not be be an illu-
sion, then, it must be possible for a man, a moral man, to act 
from the motive of duty alone, or, at the most,ss the pr1nciple 
motiva.ting cause of activity. Upon the oompletlon of this analy-
sis Kant then tllms to a seoond analysis of the ooncept of p:ractl-
.2.!! reason. His purpose 1s not to Rrove the existence of such a 
reason, but rather to show its logical possibIlity and what is 
meal t by the term. 
When Kant says that reason is ~actical, more specifically, 
he means its capacity of effecting changes in the phenomenal world. 
If reason 1s p~actical, then it forms practical judgments which 
serve as pl"lneiples or action. '!'hus Kant's analysis of practical 
~eason,lik8 the analysis of 'pure reason, consists of an ana.lysis of 
the ~81atlonshlp between the subject (rep~8senting l~actical rea-
'j 
son) and the predicate (l"ep~esenting some action to be undertaken) 
of judgments assumed to be practical. Some of these judgments he 
calls categorical imperatIves, and others, he calls hypothetIcal., 
Wha t 18 the ditterence? Befol"e Kant an.we~8 thIs, he inquires into 
the origin of the concept imperative. 
Kant a,8se~ts that the concept imperati va al"ises because a ra-
tional creature works net in "accordance with laws" inherent in na-
ture but in .. ...,a ... c... c..... o,;;.:rd ........ a..... no ;;;,c ..... e ~ !!!! !!!!!..,. of laws. 9 In explanation ot 
this, Kant eives as an examplo a hypothetical rntioI~l being whose 
9Ibld., pp. ,36-37 (80). 
43 
ideas of law would infallibly determine tne will. For such a bein~ 
there would be no imperative, because the acta of such a belng 
would always be determin~ in perfeot accordance with hie idea of 
the law. Such a will would be a holy will. At the other extreme, 
would be the irrational creature Wllich acts only in accordance with 
laws of instinct. For this brute animal, there would also be no 
imperative. An imperative arises only where a beinp, is subjeoted 
to reason and to the sensible elements of nature. Consequently, a 
man, who is subje(~t to both, will aot through hls animal will (!,£-
bitrium brutum) or through his eleotive will (arbltr1um liberum). 
Thus, an imperative ar1ses preoisely because a conflict results be-
tween the two wl11s when man seeks to bring his activity under the 
rule of his idea of the law. Kant concludes that If [t]he conceptioll 
of an objective prinoiple so fdr as this principle is neoessitatins 
for a will 1s called a oommand (of reason), and the fonaula of thi. 
coDt.'!Iand ie called an Imperative.nlOBy taking d1frerent examples, 
Kant!hows tr~t some imperatives are true practical laws, commanding 
actions categorically. Others, while called practical principles, 
are not true praotical laws of reason for the reason that they oom-
~and only hypothetically. and are based on knowledge, not on faith. 
In an,hypothetlcql Imperative, the action is oonnected with til 
~ill only Under a oondition of a desi~e, or an inclination for 
something to be attaIned. For example, "If I want success, I oup)1t 
lO~., p. 37 (Al). 
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to develop9my talents." In this proposition, the predIcate, tlde_ 
ve loping my talents, \I is oonneo ted 911 th a oondi ti oned subj eo t, \I r, 
influenced by the desire to succeed," and for that reason the oom-
mand is hypothetical. Perfection of my talents depends on my desire. 
The categorical, on the other hand, simply says, "I ought to 
dev(~lolD my talents." The propos! tion is oategorioal and not bypo-
thetical. The subject! is not modif1ed by aqyexterior influence. 
The basis ror the oonnection between the subject and predioate, 
Kant Say8, is the will Itself. The wlll, then, Is unconditioned, 
that is, tree tram any inollnation. ~Hence, 1n the categorical pro 
position, there ia expressed an absolute necesslty. The subject, 
representlng the wl11, Is not lnfluenced by any It!. The hypothe-
tical propostlon, In contrast, Involves only contIngent necessity: 
Do this, 1n order to gain that. l'oe hypothetical Imperative 1s op 
tional because the command depends upon an end which can always be 
rejected without moral scruple. For example, a slothfUl" man who 
had no desire for sucoess would see no necessity for developing hi 
talents. The moral man at all times develops his talonts because 
of the categorical command, ItI ought to develoremy talents.1t Thus, 
Kant ooncludes that it reason Is practical, the principle 01' Its 
aotivi ty must be expressed in the manner of the categorioal or hy-
pothetioal'lmperative. But a true practical law is only categorical. 
Advanoing one more step, Kant makes usa of the analysis of 
'.' 11 judgm~*t8 aocomplished in the first crItique. He fInds that the 
11 
, pp. A6-l0, Bl0-2 (h8-58); see pp. 10-12, above. 
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~ategorical maxim is both synthetic and ~ priori since the predica~ 
I1s not contained in the subject nor is the ground for the connec-
tion between subject and predicate based on the contingent phenome-
~l world. On the other hand, he finds thnt the hypothetical im-
perative Is }JU1'e17 analytic since the subject--the \111 11 affected by 
the desire of sucoese--already contains implioitly the predicate--
developlngo! talents. This position on the analytic proposition 
can be summed up as follows: n [T]he proposition 'If I fully wIll 
tne effect, I also will the action required for it,' Is analytic; 
for It Is one and the same thIng to ~onoelve something as an effect 
possible in a oertain war through me and to oonceive myself as aot. 
12 ing in the same way with respect to it." 
The significanoe of this dis tinc tion Is thn tIt determines 
what Kant means when he says that reason is purelY practioal. When 
reason is purely praotioal, It manifests itself through an A oriorl 
synthetio proposition (oategorioal imperative). Analytib proposi-
tions, on the other hand, express the form of reason funotioning 
theoretieally.13Uence , in analytic propositions, inclusive of hy-
pothetioal propositions, reason is not purely practical because it 
aot. according to knowledge and not in aocordance with whe. t is 
thou6h~that la, one's ldeals or ideas of reason. To act according 
to knowledge is merely to act according to nature, and Kant often 
120roundwork, P. 45 (85). 
13See pages 19-20, above. 
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~peaks of this use of roason as an instinct! ve action. Yfue re moy!-
-
ledRe 1s concerned it is always tho evidence of the sonsible intul .. 
t1on--either tho matter of the manifold or the ~ priori forms of 
space and !.!!!!.--and the limited categories of the understanding 
that explain propositions. Where reason is practical, reason does 
not act from knowledge but rram its own self-imposed ideas, or 
rul •• , or categorical imperatives. Kant's final step is to abstract 
from the matter of all possible categorical imperatives, and to 
describe the manner in which the will i8 ;rflctical: 11A2l ~ on 
that maxiDl through which you 2!n !l She !.!!!!!. time !!!!. ~ !!:. 
should beoome !. un! versal !!.!.. tf14What has Kant d.one in this final 
step? 
A cODlparison of the formula of the categorical imperative with 
the one expressing the form of a morally good will shO\'1s thn t both 
formulae are substantially the same. While in the first analysis 
Kant has connected the hypothetical essonce of morality with the 
senae of duty 1n tho fo~ of an imperative, in the second analysis 
he has connected morality and duty with the idea of Rraotlcal rea-
aon in the :form or an imperative. This step is important for Ktmt 
-
ainoe it is with a morality both based on a sense of duty (rather 
than on God) and brought into existence through praotioal reason 
thE4; Kant hopes to save the ooncept or a morally responsible mao. 
Moralit,y has no foundation but practical reason itselt and its 
.priori categorical commands. With regard to both formulae, by 
a-
-
140",..," .'... P. 52 (88). 
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call1ng thom synthetic ~ Erior! propositions, Kant has reduced the 
defense of a morally responsible man to the techndcal te~inology 
already seen in his epistemological framework: How is a categorl-
cal imperatIve completely!. prlori and yet synthetic possible? He 
considers that his analyse. of the concepta of the good wlll, moral1 
ty and practical reason have shown only the consl. tency ot:the eon .. 
cepts, that Is, their loglcal possibility. The latter concepts 
have meaning tor Kant only when 87plained In terms of acting trom a 
sense ot duty. But to show the real possibIlity or the objects 
signified by these concepts, Kant D1U9t return to the method of the 
first C~it19ue and show what postulates are necessary if the cate-
gorical imperative is to be synthetic end !. priori. 
Kant reiterates thnt we do not enjoy the adVantage of having 
15 the reality of morality eiven In experience. Thus, accorolnf; to 
Kant's hypothetical explanation of the essence of moralIty, morali-
ty depends on one's !ntentio~and the form of a morally good will 
Is that or the categorioal imperative. Now experlenoe manifests 
only external aotivlty, not internal experience. Kant ooncludes 
that one oannot predict that hIs motive of aotivity wlll rest or 
~s rested solely on a sense of duty rather than on some inclina-
tion: n If we look more olos ely at our soheming and strl ving, we 
everywhere'oome cross the dear self •••• ,,16Hence., the justifloe.-
tion tor morall ty, t~t Is., the possibility of the categorioal 
15Ib1d., p. 49 (87). 
l6 Ib1d ., p. 27 (15). 
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!. priori synthetic tmperat1ve can come about only through what Kant 
calls a synthetic deduction. 
In brier, the deduotion begins Wi th the fact thHt man has an 
awareness that he ought to dosoMothing--his sense of duty. How is 
this sense of duty posslble because experience only indicates that 
man is determined. Kant replies that one can never aot fram a se~ 
of duty "except under the idea of froedom •••• tt 17 The Idea of 
freedom. then, Is the t1rst postulate on which the real possibili-
ty ot moral! ty depends. But, Kant oontinues, freedom in 1 ts posi-
tive 8ensel~oroea man to further pos~ulate the idea ot a noumenal 
wIll opposed to the phenomenal will. In faot tho idea otfreedam 
makes time a member of an intelliglble world. ,,19,11 thout the postu-
lates ot freedom and noumenal wl1l, mants given awareness of a 
sense of duty is unintelligible. 
In the technical terminology of his p!111osophy Kant explains 
that the categorical ImperatIve or onets sense of duty arises in 
tho following manner. To the idea of phenomenal will is added the 
idea (postulate) ot the noumenal will or free elective will. Then, 
the c~ntliot that results in man's consciousness because of ~~ese 
two wills expla ins t he origin ot' t.l10 g1 ven- -the tl I ought." whl Cll 
Is the categorical tmperative. The oategorioal imperative, then, 
l7~., p. 100 (11S). 
18 Spontaneous causality conforming 
immutable laws (d1fferent from nature). 
19 Ibid., p. 111 (122). 
-
to some "special k1nd" ot 
cr., ~., pp. 97-98(114). 
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~ust be ~ priori. It opposes itself to man's phenomenal wIll whicb 
proposes activities from experience for empirioal purposes. The 
trlu'I1ph of the noumenal 1'1111 over the phenomenal will is precisely 
what raises man to the level of freedom. 
Kant must now justifY his assertion that the imperative is 
synthetic? 1.bis step 1s necessary for the !:.!!!. possibili tj' of any 
object signified by the proposition. The categorical tmperat1ve, 
Kant believes, signifies man's sense of duty. Kant tall. us that 
the concept or the predicate (some a.ctivity represented by the 
phenomenal will--the sensible elemen~) is not contained in the con-
cept ot the 8 ubject (noumenal will), but that the subject and pre-
dicate are joined by reason of their conneotion with a third term 
20 in whioh both the subject and predioate are to be tound. That 
third term of whioh Kant speaks is the idea nownen .. l world. Both 
wills, he explains. have their foundacion In the noumenal \\Orld 
in the sense that the noumenon is conoeivod and postulated not only 
as the ground of the senslblA ",~",':4 9.nd Its goveming laws. but at 
the aame time as legislatinr the laws tor the intollIg1ble will 
immodiately. th~~ is. without any instrument. Thus, Kant has con-
formed to his norm tor real possibIlity. First, the conoept 1s 
that ot ~le categorical Imperative given by the noumenal w111. 
" 
Secondly, there 1s the sensible intuit10n ot an external act re-
presented bl the phenomenal will. Hence, tho catogorical impera-
20Ibid •• p. 99 (115). 
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tive 1s synthetio as well as ~ Eriori. It is important to under-
stand what Kant toels he has proved and W!lat he has not proved. 
Firs t, he will admit that he has shown the real possi bII! ty of the 
oategorioal imperative or one's given sense of duty. Kant does no 
prove the existenoe of the E'). ~'en taot preoisely beoause it is a giv 
en. Granted the existenoe ot the given fact, Kant says th<:l. t this 
sense of duty is the es.ence of morality, of the good will, and of 
the oonoept of praotical reason. This is nis hypothesis. He sta 
that he nortatl7 one else oan understand moralIty exoept in terms of 
a sense of dutJ. But Kant does not ~Ink that he has provod the 
existenoe of morali ty, nor does he belleve that anyone e18e oan. 
Furthermore, given the awareness of duty, then, Kant says, it we 
are to make it intelligible we must suppose the postulates of tree 
dom and the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal wills. 
Again, he denIes that his analysis has given any intuition into th 
existenoe ot eithor the noumenon or freedom, as far as tlleoretlcal 
reason or knowledge is oonoerned. Freedom exists only when praeti 
cal reason, aooepting the theory of morality based on duty, does i 
faet aot out ot a sense of duty. The existence of one's awareness 
of duty would lead one to belleve that freedom exists. Hence. man 
will act as if freedom does exist. Rut, as to the fact, that man 
~-
did in a certain moment of time act froe fram all external motives 
and subject oray to the cat6gorical imperative can never be proven. 
Kant simply denies that one oan be aware in any given moment that 
he oould have done other than what he in tact dId. One must be 
satisfiod vdth the lJractloal neoessity for t~1e oxlstence of free-
dom. We must have faith that we can act free from the mechanistic 
forcos of nature contrary to what we know of phenomena. 'lie come 
now to the flnal development of Kant's categorical imper'ltive whieb 
has n great signifioance for understaluing his concept of man. 
Kant does not rest with the idea that a sense of duty oonsti-
tutes the essence of morali ty. He expands the meaning of the 0& te-
gorloal formula into tihe formula of the kingdom of ends and the 
formula of autonomy. Kant admits that these formulae are merely 
different aspects of the original ca1(egorical f'ormula, but they 
bring out a more pI'eCiS8 quality belonging to an agent who acts 
from a sense of duty. Not only wIll man act as if he belongs to a 
kingdom of ends, but the prinoipal goa 1 to whlc!l these step by 
step formullltioltS lead seems to be the paramount notion of the auto-
nomy of man's practical will: "rle :HlVO merely shown by developing 
the ooncept of morality generally in vogue th .... t autonomY" of the will 
Is unavo.tdably bound up with it or rather is its very basls.,,2l 
Kant ha.B~one through considerable arb"Ulllentation to show that the 
ordinary comr10n senae notion of' a good will implies the sophisti-
cated notion of the elements proper to an autonomous will. ·.~hat 
are its oharacteristios that give value to the nature of man? 
The au tonomoua will simply a ta ted 115 the wl11 that 18 a law tc 
itself. l'r1marily, it i8 a wlll whlch enacts law, yet it is not 
21Ibid., p. 95 (112). 
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lawless. The autonomous wll1 is free in the positlve and nogatlve 
sense of freedom. Negatively, freedom means independence of any 
determinatIon, expocially of na.turB.l laY!s whichg overn phenomena. 
Positively, freedom ls spontaneous activity in effecting changes i~ 
the phenomenal world according to the self-imposoo. laws of pure 
reason itself. It is easy to see, then, why Kant says that the 
autonomous will sets its own end. ~le most important el«ment of 
the autonomous will is that the w111 set. itself as ita own end: 
Rational nature separates ltself out from all other 
things by the fact that it sets itself an end. An end 
would thus be the matter of ever:y good will. But in the 
Idea of a will which is absolutely good--good without 
any qualifying condition (namely, that it should attain 
this or that end)--there must be complete abstraction 
from evex-y end that has to be froduced (as something 
which would make overy w111 on y x-olativelY good). 
Hence the end must here beconcelved, not as an end to 
be producod, but as a self-exlstent end. It must there-
fore be concel vod negii'tl vely--that21s -;Us an end against which we should never act •••• " 2 
Thus, Kant does not make the'ood 1'/111 as an end to be a t-
tained. Rather, he makes the f;OOO will a pre-existent end. Tho 
good will soems to be a high01'" part of the villI directing the low_ 
e r to become conformed to the higher and also to ha.ve duty as the 
moti ve of activ 1ty. The higher is also the autonomous will for 
which reverence 1s had. The lower evokkg no praise for its exoel-
lence in no way transoends na tUN. The lower part has its maxims 
which are subj octi ve and part!culax- as opposed to the object! ve 
and un! vex-sal impel's. ti ves of the highex- part. Kant himself express-
22 Ibid., p. 82 (105). 
I' 
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11 states that a man, in following a subjeetive maxim which cannot 
be universalized. has a w111 at variance with itself.23 
~1US. Kant's concept of man finds ita pre-eminent characteris-
tic in moral activity. Only through moral activity does man trans-
cend what we know as phenomenal man. Only through exercising :free· 
dom does man become truly human. Chesterton once observed that th4 
hungers of humanity are never merely hungers tor humanity or tor a 
completely humanized humanity because a sel:f-contained and aelf-
centered humanity would chill us in tne same way as does a self-
contained and selt-centered human be'\ng. Man, Chesterton cont.muM, 
will be haunted by something which Is emphatically not human and 
which can onli be explained rationally by calling it superhuman.24 
Kant has attempted to explaIn man's need for transcendency by tak-
ing what other philosophers have considered as belongIng to man, 
thnt Is, moral activity, and making it supra-human. In the Kantie 
man, all forces are directed to the wIll comnanding. Kaht's pri-
mary objective Is not to tell what man must choose and command as 
the object of the will. His purpose 1s to tell man b2! to will, 
since the wIll itself is Its own end. Kant turns the emphasis 
away from the thinking man to the willing man, and the willIng man 
is the man who belongs to a "kingdom ot autonomy" ra ther than to 
the "kingdOm ot nature." 
23 Ib1d., p. ~6 (91). 
240 • K. Chesterton, "IntrOduction" to Will Men be Like Gods? 
Owen Francis Dudley (London, 1931) , pp. v1-VIT:" - - - -
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How valuable 1s man's autonomy? Kant says that if anyth1ng 
has a price, something else can be put 1n its placo as an equi va-
lent. But, he continues, whatever has dignity acmits of no equiva-
lenre and is exalted above all prlce.25Autonomy Is Kant.s only ba-
sts .for digni ty. Man is an end in himself', but only in 80 far as 
he is regarded as making universal law to himself. The share "hiel 
morali ty offers man in making universal law i8 that which makes 
him tit to be a member in a possible kingdom of' autonomy. Autono-
my endows man with intrinsio value and entitles all men who posses. 
rt to euch I-everence whi ch should prahi 1)i t anyo..l'le from using them as 8 
meana to an end. By following autonomous oonsoience, by tulfillln~ 
one's duty, by oonquering nature's inclinations and des1res, by 
overcom1ng the susplolon that perhaps he alone 1s faithful 1n pay-
ing reverence to the idea of a kingdom of autonomous men, by re-
straining his fear that nature, after all. may not work 1n harmony 
with hi. lofty moral commands--those are the noble ways, acoording 
to Kant, through which an autonomous man penetrates into the super-
sensible. These ways are the good willts already present and act-
ing goal. The synthesiz1P8 transcendental ego of the epistemologi-
cal tramework becomes a c~Andins ego in the moral framework. The 
~ takes c~re to preserve Its autonomous Integr1ty. One commen-
tator well 'summarized Kant t s concept of man when he wrote: tiMan 
in his essential nature, la, for Kant, an agent, lb! agent, 1n fact 
25aroundwork, P. 77 (102). 
I 
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26 apart from God. 1.1 
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In t118 t:rue spIr1 t of the Enlightenment Kunt allo· ... s tho free 
autonomy of man to extend not only beyond the bounds of nature but 
even beyond the condi tion of all auperna. tural powers. By removIng 
lJod's Etornal Law from moral :;:>h1loBophy and by attemptIng a- com-
plete morality wi thout God, Kant was forcod to turn to XIlll.ll himself 
a.s the source and norm )f morali f;;J. How does the qUest for happI-
ness fi t into Kant' 8 concept of this morally autonomous and s upra.-
patural man who 1s his own end? Is happIneB~ a part of man's moral 
Ftuest ftO that virtue 1s happiness? Or, is man's moral quest a part 
Iof happiness 80 that if a man ia hap~ h~ is also virtuous? 
To answer our problem we must conaidsr Kant's concept of the 
good. Kant argues against his contemporary relativists WI10 denied 
the reality of an objeotive good. Equally as well, he argues a-
gainst tr...ose whom he cfillls rlauthoritarians, n thtd; is, those who not 
pnly inaist that objective good Is available to all men but that 
ita eS8ential nature can be known with absolute certainty, b.1 ap-
~ealing to authority. Kant seeks a middle road. His position 1s 
that man mus t somehow beli.eve in an objective good and in ma.ll' a 
ability to tt th1nk" a coherent system concerning this good wi thout 
claiming infallible moral insight or a knowledge of its nature. 
Theoretically, for Kant, one mus t remain agnostic with respect to 
~he nature 'of tIs good since man ha.s no intuition to veri.fy his:ideal 
of the good. In practiee, one simply proposes "What reason 
26John E .. Smith, "The '-uestion of Man,tI 1n The PhilOSO~hil of . 
1K"s.nt 1n our Modern World, ed., Chas. rJ. Handel nrewYOrk, 195r, p:'23 • 
...... ......-. .J 
shows ought to be." The concept good, then, 1s not open to under-
standing or knowledge, but remains an ideal 2!. roason to be 
"thought." What content Is, "'thought" and assignod to the con-
cept ot goodZ 
We saw in the first part of this chapter that the objective 
good proposed by Kant Is the good will. The good, to be more spe-
citlc, is nothing but will's command, the proper object or practical 
reason. Kant Uses the word object (ot praotical reason) in throe 
dlfferent senses: the w11l, the action, and what the w111 accom-
plishes.27eur quest10n with regard t. happlness, then, wIll be whe. 
ther or not mants quest for happiness is an objective good in one 
of these three senses: (1)1n so far as the quest produoes a good 
will; (2) 1n so far as the quest itself, as an activity, is good; 
and, (3) in so far a8 the object sougnt as fulf111ing the quest fOl 
happiness 1s itself good. 
Kant sets down tho principle that when praot1cal reason wills 
in aocordanoe with same objective principle, objective good is 
28 
willed to exist. Now by an objective principle Kant means a motive 
ot aotion whioh oo~ain8 the "~ same prinoiple .9!. deterrnlrw.tlon 
of the w111 1n all cases and tor all rational beingse n29 
Tt.l.e first objective principle Kant proposes 1s the prinoiple 
27Practica~, PP. 116-180 (148-151). 
28Ibid., P. 182 (153). 
-29~., p. 134 (112). 
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or skill. This prinoiple states that mnn must use the neoessary 
means to attain a neoessary end. Theorotioally, Kant says, suoh a 
principle is universal, but when applied in circumstanoes peouliar 
to one's individual needs, partioular ends always oame into play 
and hence, as applied, the princ1ple ceases to be universal. If 
one pursues an activity simply beoause this activity is the means 
itself to an end or is a means to same object which, in turn, is a 
means to an end, the VG17 activity and the object pursued is a KOO~ 
30 to or for someone. In other words, a good that is relative to 
- -
some particular person; it is a skil~. Kant fUrther comments that 
perhaps if all rational beings could put themselves into t.l:le parUc 
ular conditions of the agent, with his circumstances of time, 
place, and the end desired, they would choose the same effective 
means. Does the principle of' skill for that reason offer the pos .. 
sibility of resultIng in an activity or a quest good in itself and 
not merely relative to someone! Kant answers that with the prin-
ciple of skill there is only the question or placing some activity 
as a means !! the end is wanted. Since the end may be dropped on 
one ocoasion or another without moral scruple, suoh a prinCiple or 
aotion is not a true practical law beoause it does not serve as a 
-
principle of determination or t he '" 11 in all cases and for all ra-
tional be1ngs. In other words, there 1s no obliging necessity for 
plac1ng ~l partIcular aotivi ty or for seeking a oortain end. Fur-
300roundwork', p. 38 (81). 
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thermore, Kant concludes, the principle of skill implies knowledge 
of means capable of erreoting an end. As such the prinoiple 1s 
basioally a theoretical principle rather than a true law of prac-
tical reason. The good, according to Kant, is not fashioned ao-
cording to ~ 1t- The good is, rather, fashioned aocording to 
what ought lQ!. l!!.. Consequently, actions moti va ted by the prine iple 
of skill do not raise man's quest above phenomenal nature~s laws 01 
cause and etfect.3lHence, the will, the action, and the object to 
be effeoted where practioal reason 'a motive is the prinoiple of 
skill are not objective goods but on~ subjective. 
The seoond proposed objective prinoiple 1s that ot prudence 0] 
self-love. Such a principle ate. tea t..'1.at man by nature necessarily 
seeks his own well being for the very reason th~ he belongs to the 
phenomenal world and necessarily hns wants and needs which must be 
fulfilled. Now it is of grea t significanoe that Kant identifies 
the prinoiple of prudenoe or selt-love 1'1 !th the principle of hap-
piness. Kant's crt tique of til 1a prinoiple tollows the same line as 
that of the prinoiple of I kill reoounted in the preceding paragra}il. 
Hence, the principle ot happiness is not a true law of practioal 
reason, but only a praotical prinoiple ot skill. Acting fram the 
principle of happiness produoes perhaps a good-for-me. The will, 
the action or quest for happiness, and the object of happiness are 
not objective goods in themselves. Thus, the qu{)st for happiness 
does not give to man's will that character of autonomy whlch 1s 
)lpract1oal, pp. 126-28 (10$-07). 
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Kant's ultimate in determining a concept of man's good. ,n th the 
prinoiple of happiness as motive to aotivity, man does not fashion 
necessarily what ought 12 ~ but only what he knows. that is, what 
he knows to exist as phenomena. 
The only true obJeotive prinoiple of reason whi ch is at the 
same time a pure praotioal law is the oategorical imporative. Law, 
Kant says, n oarries with it the conoept of an ungondi tioned, and yet 
obJeotive and so universally valid, neoessitz •••• "32The prinoi-
ple of happiness, In oontrast, oan only be characterized as inde-
terminate and ~ posteriorI, that 18,~ne must always appeal to ex-
perience to determine the constituents of happiness. ~lUS, when 
one aots from the prinoiple of happiness, Kant says that the ideal 
is so indeterminate that appeal to oxperienoe is neoessary to dis-
oern whether or not some proposed object of ha,ppiness will satisty 
its quest.33Reason, though It has an !. priori and abstpaot notion 
as to what is desired in the subjectIve state of perfect"happlness, 
does not have an ~ priori and universal notlonwhlch is also de-
tel'Ddnate. To answer our question, then, man's good is not sought 
in the pursuit of happiness. 
As to Kant's notion ot the good, we have seen already that on 
!his l'17Pothesis his primary notion of.' the good 1s tied up with the 
autonomous will. that is. the moral will. The only absolute unoon-
32qroundwork, pp. 43-44 (84). 
33~ •• pp. 46-47 (85-86). 
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ditioned and ~ priori good Is the quest for or the maintenance of 
the autonomous will motIvated by one's sense of duty. A good wl1l, 
the action producing the contInued state ot all Integral will, and 
the obJoct that Mayor may not be aocomplished as a result ot the 
willed actlvity--these are the objeotive goods that gugbt to be 
sought. Because of the motIve ot duty. any activity wh'toh reason 
alone oommands is good in every kind of ci~urua~ance. With the 
sense of duty as motive, one oannot act without regard for moral 
scruple. The principle or happinos:~, in contrast, wavers and mayor 
lmay not pr 0 d uce a moral good-will on every occasion. The wl11, 
its activity, and its object motivated by the prino1ple of happi-
!ness are "morally good in the lette.l!. not in the spirit (the in-
tention). n3400odneS!J, then. in the case of happiness is legal or 
right. Is there any sense in which happiness may be momlly good, 
tha t is, a t 1me when happiness not only conforms to the law but al-
so proceeds out of a sense of duty (aua pfllcht)? 
Here we see tho. t Kant doe8 allow for a sense in whioh the 
~rinoiple of happine8~ oan be considered as an objeotive good. 
~ant says that an action leading to happiness has real moral worth 
only When the indirect duty of furthering one's happiness and not 
the universal inclination tor happiness whioh we have by our very 
~ture determines man's tree eleotive will. At .first such a state-
~ent would seeM to conflict with Kant's view that man has no duty 
34Pra.ctical, p. 196, n. (164). 
I 
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flO promote his own hllpp1neS3 as an end. His distinction here 1s 
~ath0r subtle but val1d. Sometimes, he says what reason proposes 
as a duty 1s also an end 'which man can s at for himsel!, as a pal"t of 
tlis happiness. As an exa:. pIe Kant cites one t s own perfec tion in a 
certain line or wishing to secure the happiness of others • 35However, 
in so far &s any end Lil a p~.u' t;. of ou r hurp ir .. ass, K~in t re i te ra tes t.11e 
position that nature already 1nclines us to this end and, hence, 
reason does not command that we seek happiness as a duty 1n itself. 
Ends wh1ah are also duties must proceed tram reason or noumannl man 
and not from phenor:wnal man. How, then,",!ia happiness an indireot duty? 
Adv 0 '-'a 1 ty, P ,.un, and VI an t may tamp t us to trans gras 8 duty. 
~ence, Kan tallows, to guard aga.ina t poverty, it tempta tion to v ice 
and a detriment to happiness as well, 1ndireotly one has a duty to 
seek hie own well being. But Kant hurries to add the t "i t is not 
~y ha.ppiness but my moral! ty [W:lt ch I s eak] to ma:tntain which in 
its integrity is at ome my aim and my dUty'.,,36Thus , happ!ne:.!s can 
~ecome a good objectively, but only bocause of some connection)7 
wi th a. duty-motiva. ted act. If man seeks happiness for its own sake 
pis 8.0 tion is a-moral, or even immoral if not in contorm! ty with law 
3S~ ot Morals, pp. 230-31 (296-97). 
36I bld.', p. 23.4 (299) J cf., a1eo, Groundwork, pp. 11-13 (67) 
~nd Lectures, p. 2b, for a disoussion of indirect duties. 
31 The que, tion of the relationship betw(~en happlness and moral. 
ity will be more tully treated In Chapter IV. It suffices to men-
tion at th:ts point th;l.t Kant establishes a more significant relatia: 
~han the example g1ven here. This example 1s an instance of the 
happiness-morality relationship in this lite only. 
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If he must seek an end which is part of his happiness and at the 
same time involved in tho preservation of his l1'Oral integrity, thet'l 
~e must seok the object of happiness 1n so far as reason commands 
and as reason commands. Never~leless, it remains that happinoss, 
for Kant, is never man's objeotive good. apart from dutr. 
ThIs chapter has served to point up the radioal dualism or 
Kant's ooncept of man: phenomenal man opposes noumenal man and 
man's phenomenal end of happiness op.oses his human end of maral 
integrity. Hnppines;i ooncerns objects that are; morality with ao-
tivi ties that ought to be, while obJtcts are of no lmportance w1 th 
regard to the value of an act. The propositions of happiness are 
oommands equal to imperatives of skill or prudence or a.lr-lov~and 
are the matter of man's understanding when considorod concretely 
as motives of action. 'l'I'l.e propositions of r:l0rality are oategori-
oal commands of reason alone and cannot,B.s a consequenoe, be disre-
garded without moral soruple. Moved by the natural desfre for hap-
piness, mnn does not, Kant would say, attain virtue. As to whe-
thor the quest for v1rtue will lead to happIness, we will treat 
this question at grenter length in the foLLowlng chapter. The mor· 
al fra.mework has substantinted our conolusion resulting from Ilant'e 
epia temolofjlcal fraY:lework concernlng the phenomenal na ture of hap-
plneB!3. BUt, the moral framework has shown why this must 'be so on-
ly to the extent· that Kant opposes happiness to moz'ali ty. The 
meaning given to happ~,ness wi thin the moral fra.mework follows Kant's 
concept of man as dualistio. Happiness 1s thus opposed to moralitJ 
or duty as a rival pr-inciple or ideal by \\bich man can direct his 
life. Happines~ is discussed in so far as it is a practioal prin-
ciple of aotivity, direoting that life on a phenomenal level. 
We are now able to procoed to the oentral problem of tho the-
sis. We must now oonsider the exact oonstituents of the subjeotivE 
and objoctlve ooncepts of happiness. Only then can we understand 
Kant's view that happinoss as an end is not p8.r-ticularly capable 01 
)8 
explaining why man should be lord of the univorse. 
38lmmanuel Kant, Cr-itique of Judgment, tr-ans. J. H. Bernard, 
2d ed. [revised], The Hafner Libran of Classics, ad. Oskar Piest 
(New Yor-k, 19S1), par B1 (P. 301). The paragraph number refers to 
the original German edi tion; the page number in parenthesis refers 
to the Haf'ner edition. This work will be designated simply as 
JUdgment. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MAN'S QUBST FOR HAPPINESS 
AND THE SUMMUM BONUM 
The value of life ~or us, if it 1s es-
timated ••• (by ••• happiness), i8 
easy to deoide. It sinks below zero. 1 
When Kant says that the natural end of man is happiness, 2 
one might question his right to use ~e word ~ as well as the 
word ha2pineas as an end. We have already seen that nature~ for 
Kant, ia a conoept or the Wlderstanding synthesizing appearanoes 
according to the mind's laws and the forma or sensIbIlity and eiv-
1ng no knowledge or a thing as 1 t 1s 1n 1 tsel1.'. As to man, then, 
we know only his appearance. Granted tha. t Kant allows man, as a 
moral agent, to pieJ:"ce through to things as they are and "not as 
they seem to be, yet this act 1s only a w1111ng of the fact of ex. 
teno. and not a knowledge of what i8. How, then, does Kant come to 
speak of an end of manls nature wi thout understandiOO man as unl-
lJus1sment, Par. 83, n.l0 (P. 284). 'I 
2GroUDdwork, p. 69 (98). 
3Nature here is cons1dered in a material sense as being the 
sum total of phenomena or the sum total of the laws governing the 
existenoe of phenomena. cr., Pure, p. A419, B446, n.b (392). 
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fied through an inherent and dynamic principle of flnalitJt Kant 
finds no phenomena of ends, purposes, goals, or finnl purpose, and 
much less, t.'1e phenomena of perfec t happiness. Nor does Kant allow 
the concept of end, unlike ~ priori concepts of cause, effect, re-
lation, etc. to be a category of the under~tanding. In the third 
Cri tique Kant seelcs to justify his use of the concept of end, 0.1-
thoup'.h he has already found necessary the use of the concept in thE 
first Critique. By the time of the th~rd Critique his thour,ht had 
advanced to the point where he realized that man does seek a great. 
er uni t1 in the knowledge of the world than tha t allowed by deter-
minant judgment (understanding) and a unity less than ~~at offered 
by the transcendental ideas. Before the third Cri tigue there was 
the opposition between knowlodge, where phenomena were related to 
one another by the categorie~ and morality, where pure reason con-
ceived its transcendental ideas and manifested itself in the parti-
cular as a pl"actical will commanding free actions. In the third 
Cl"ltigue Kent seeks for same relation between these two spheres of 
action. This relation 1s bl"ougH: about by introducing a third facul-
ty, the faculty of reflective judgment, or the faculty of feeling. 
By menns of the faculty of reflective judgment, Kant says that 
me brings pht;'nomena in relatIon to onets own self-consciousness. 
What we cannot know or will aecording to understanding and reason, 
we can!!!!. In other words, we can, with the faculty of reflec-
tive judgment give a unity to phenomena Wh!1h Is not actually a 
knowledge of phenomena, bu t whi ch 1 s only the uni ty of the mInd 1 t-
I 
I I, 
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self. This unlty involves an Ideal of reason, that Is, design. In 
order to understand Kant's attempt to give a concept of a more uni-
fied man, we will consider how he ostablishes ::118 r1ght to use the 
concepts dos1gn and purpose. We will later seo that he employs thE 
same method 1n his determine. tion of the concept ot" happiness. 
DESIGN IN NATURE 
Two facts forced Kant to accept design. First, he recognized 
the tact that scientists proposed hypothetical laws to establish 
the unit,. or empirioal principles under higher ones, and then they 
seemed to prooeed to verify them in ~ture. The ordinary man would 
say that success results because such laws are inherent in objects 
or nature. The critioal philosopher would SElY that reason ttthinksf1 
the law coherently and primarily ror the sake of order in the mind, 
and not for the order of nature itself. Kant, then, is faced wi th 
the question as to why the scientist would ever think that nature 
is 1n conform! ty wIth the laws proposed by his own mind. " Kant re-
plies the. treason carmot help but think "purposiveness s£ nature 
in its varie ty, It through which na ture is represented fl as if" des igr. 
was inherent in nature.4 
The second fact that caused Kant to propose the runct10n of 
refleotl ve judgment wI th its principle at design was h1s 1nter-
pretation or the beautiful and the sublime as ental1ing a universal 
and A priori pleasure, that Is, a pleasure not dependent on nature. 
In explaining the pleasure that is consequent upon the activities 
4 Introductlon, Par. IV (P. 17). 
of the arts and scienoes, Kant found tho need ror the use of the 
idea design. 
Kants tells us the. t the concept of des 19n mus t ha vo been 
"aportivelytt introduced into the nature of things by a "rationali-
zing Bubtlety" intent on making nature conprehonsiblo acoordlng to 
some analogy ra thor t.i-J.an to arraN our gain In knowledf.;e based on 
objective grounds.5 We wIll follow him as he explains this "ration .. 
alizing subtlety". 
Kant tells us that observation ot inanimate things or arti-
facts would never introduoe the idea "":of design. The reason is that 
)Vhile one part Is tor the sake ot another where inanima te things 
are concerned, each part does not exist by another's means. Even 
though a thing has external mOving power, unless 1 t has Interns.l 
tltormatlve" power, mechanioal laws alone, Kant believes, give ade-
6 quate cogn1 tion of such thlll!;s. However, Kant finds that a 11 vlng 
~hole, an organism, does not 8eem capable of explanation through 
blind mechanism. Thus, in the case ot an organized whole, the 
iwhole seems to be prior to ani to determine the parts, while the 
parts and the whole seems to be reoiprocally ends and moans to each 
other. Hence, only by this p~ocess of thought does ~eason arrive 
at the noti~n or design In nature. But Kant Immediately reit~rates 
that this reasoning process is merely the "thinking" of speculative 
reaso~ and in retlecting upon these organiSMS soientists only teel 
-
SIbid •• Par. 61 (p. 20$-06). 
6Ibid •• Par. 65 (D. 220). 
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design as a "guiding thread" for judgment78,nd not for phenomena. 
However, Kant has not yet accounted for the concept of final end 
or purpose. 
Final end or purpose, as men ordinarily conceive 1 t .. tells us 
what a thing Is for. But .. Kant notes, an organism seems to be an 
end in Itself; it is "purposiveness wi thout purpose. tI Nevertheless. 
if we go beyond the organism and consider 1 ts rela tien to the en-
vironment, two questions arise: (1) ~~at Is the fir~l purpose of 
the orga.nism? (2) Wha t Is the final purpose of nature or the wor-ld 
itself? In seeking to answer these questions Kant finds that therE 
are many things in nature for wh lch no purpose can be assigned. 
Also, Kant finds that nature lDrks against us, for we can never ex-
perience a totality of successive phenomena., and, consequently, we 
never have a complete picture of past, present, or future phenome-
na. How then Is one to come to a. knowledge of the purpose of na-
ture which is given to us successivel,., a.nd never as a whole? Bea. .. 
son has renched its limit. We ca.n never know wha.t the end of nu-
ture or of ~lY particular orgwliam is. However, Kant admIts, once 
the ide~ of tinal end and purpose have been suggested, speculatIve 
reason can find no can tradlotlon in the notes assigned to the oon-
cepts even though 1 t ca:nnot verIfy' the concepts In reality. For that 
matter one oannot prove the final purpose of nature devoid of all 
posslbI1it,y. Reflective judgment can then make use of the idea 
7lQ1d., Introduction, Par. V (P. 22). 
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1n order to give greater uni t'1 to enplr1cal laws. Man can ninter- I, 
prot" nature and r:1 va Ita greater £1.00 more personal s1 gn1ficance 
than understanding's pIcture of mechanism 1n terms of cause and af 
fect and other categorIes of the understanding. Prr\ctical reason, 
however. can gt ve legi tlma te use to the ~ den. ':£ deSign or final end 
This use pertains to actIvity. Thus, practical reason connects fl 
nal end with man's freedom in moral activity, and views nature as 
moral universe. Reflective judgment feels design; practical rea-
son wIlls deSign to exist by willing an activ1ty In accordance wit 
its own ideas of the law. In short, 1'1nal purpose is merely a con 
capt whicb bas practical value and not speculat1ve value. The 
oept 1s not abstracted from any experience for theoretlcQ'l know-
ledge of mture, not 1s it applied to the manifold of sense per-
ceptions in order to understand nature. So much for Kant's acoount 
of the "ratIonalizing subtlety" that introduced the concept of fi-
nal end. 
THE PRAC'frCAL M~OD OF KANT 
Much the same method used for the introduct10n of the ooncept 
of end. or of puropose Is used for arriVing at the concept of happi-
ness. Tho concept of happines::1 1s not a prime conoopt such as tho 
conceptsof Qlue, hot, hardness, table. etc. ~lere is no phenomena 
of happiness as there would be the diverse phenomena contained 1n 
the concept!a!n. How, then, 1s the concept of bappiness introdua:rl. 
Kant's method begIns with some objective fact. Reason ttthinKS" 
out a hypothetioal coherent system b1 reflecting on this objective 
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fact. Practic ,;1 reason then gives reality to the idea of theoreti-
cal reason, eithor out ot expedienoy or out of neoessity, by cam-
mandlng activi t;y in conform! ty with the idea. Caird explains this 
procedure as follows: "[\V]hen the ideas of reason a!"o oonceived, 
not merely as determining the objeo t of 1 tsel.f, but as oapable of 
giving a new determination to our oonsoiousness of the objects of 
8 
experience, they are regal-ded aa prInciples of action." For exam-
ple, the idea of freedom, though having no fO\Uldation in phenome-
nal experienoe, can be regarded as giving & new determination to 
one 'a oonsciousness of i)henomenal ex~rience. The ideas of' free-
dom and morality cause man to will activity ~ 1! reason, unmoved 
by Phenomenal motives, commands through and of itself alone. De 
f'acto, man can never havo knowledge (proof) thut he has so acted. 
~ence, moralIty and freedom, as ideas, are not valuable to theore-
tical reason but to practical reason only. Again, the transcenden-
tal idea of God beoomes a practical idea when one wills 4n act of 
religion in oonform! ty with the content reason gives to the idea of 
God. The 1dea of God, then, is not important for theoretic&l pur-
poses but only for praotIoal purposes. The soientist, also, gives 
new determination to phenomenal p lura 11 ty. lie oonceives this plu-
raIl ty as the C,osmos, not for the sako 01" knowledgo, but for the 
sake of activity. Th.u8, conceiving th.o phenomena as unified, the 
sciontist w111 search for more general laws in order to br1ng 
8Edward Calrd, The Critical PhilosoPhY .2!. :InL"llaZluel Kant, II, 
(Glasgow, 1889), p. 4I4. 
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his consciousness of phenomena to a ~rcater unity. If it Is true 
that the transcendental ideas have practical value, it is no less 
true of Kantts ideals. Historians of philosophical tho.lght give 
great prominence to Knnt's transoendental ideas, but little 1s sai 
a.bout his ideals. Yet, the ideals play an important role in man's 
eve~day living. The ideals nre needed to f1ll the tremendous gap 
between Kant's categories of knowledge and the tr~ee transoendenta 
ideas. For example, end, purpose, morality, happiness, the state-
these are all ideals. They are nei thor cate€;ories of the under-
standing nor are they transoendental "'!ideas. Yet, they are needed 
1n mants eve~day speeoh. 
An ideal is that to wh10h no actual phenomenal experience has 
ever been cOl!lplately adequate and yet one to wh:.o1:1 every phenomena 
must in a sense be related as to a norm. An ideal entertains a 
hope because it 18 basod on :faith, and, for Kant, faith 1s based 
" 
ultimately on speculation which cannot be verified and not on know 
ledge. Kant explains the use of the ideal in a very concrete exam 
pIe. Thus, he considers Plato's Republic as an ideal for the use 
of practical reason. The Republic, Kant explains, 1s like an i.dea 
constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom 
in accordanoe with laws by whIch the freedom of each 1s 
made to be consiatent with that of all the othir~.-; 
TThisJisat any rat. a-nec8ii'SirYide'aWEl"ch must be taken 
as furidamental, not only in f1rst projeoting a constitution 
but 1n all 1ts laws. • •• 'flds perfect state may never, 
indeed, come into being; none the less this does not affect 
the rightness nf the idea, Which, holds up this maxim as 
the archtype toward which the actual system of law and or-
der for mank1nd may adv~lnce as a goal. For what is to be 
the h1 [",has t stage, where mankind may have to c orne to a 
halt and how eat a If' me. ever have to be lert between 
the Idea and Its realization, those are quostions which 
no ono can or ought to answ,.r. For this event depends 
upon freedom; and it is in the power ~f freedom to pass 
beyond any and every specified 11nl1t. 
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Thus man, through the use of the ideal of Plato's Rep!M>llc, 
seeks to bring a society into existence in conform1ty with this men-
tal ideal. However, according to Kant, tnf.m must not imagine that 
he has attained an insight 1nto the esr.ence of society. Plato's 
concept is not knowledge. It is merely a blueprint of what one 
considers "ought to be." This ideal remains an !. priori ideal of 
reason. What is ultlllately efrected 11$ explioable 1n phenomenal terms 
... 
Another example of Kant' 9 use of this prac tica.l method 1s 
found in a later work. Here Kant tells us that ethIcs views l'a EOs-
sible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature," and in this case thE 
latter is "a practical Idea useu to brine 1nto existence what does 
not exist but can be made actual by our conduct •••• "10 Here, ala 
Kant tells us, pure practical ideals always pertain to mo.rality ane 
are brought 1nto existence by pract1cal reason, that is, the ob-
jects signified by them are made to exist. On the other hand, the 
9Pure, p. A316, B373 (312). ElseYlhere Kant writes: "Al-
though we oannot concede to ••• Ideal. objective reality (exIs-
tenoe), they are not therefore to be regardod as figment:] of the 
brainJ they, supply reQ.:,on wi th a standard which is indispensable tc 
1 t, provldl.ng 1 t • • • with a concept of th& t wh tch is entIrely 
complete in 1ta kind, and thereby enabling it to estimate and to 
Imeasure the degree and defect:::; of the 1ncomplote" (Ibid., p. A570, 
B597 [486]). See, also, a discussion on Kant's mothod by Charles 
W. Hendel, "Freedom, :'emocracy and Reason, fI The rh110s0rt of Kant 
and OUr Modern World, ad. Charles 1'/. Hendel ~;: 'torti, ~ '7). pi;>. -llO-'lr~ • 
lOGroundwork. p. 80, n. (104). 
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ideals 01' reflective judgment are not purely practical but refleot 
an interpreta.tion of the phenomena: "Teleology views nature as a 
kingdom of ends." but in th1 s case the latter is only a theoretical 
11 Idea used to explain what exists." Not until practical reason 
makes use of a speculatIve ideal ca.n the ideal said to be practical. 
filien p~ctical reason does make use of these types of ideals, Caird 
12 
explains that we must not regard judgment or practical reason as 
merely applying a un! versal which it receives from the hands of' 
reason. Rather, we ought to conceive reason itself' as going beyond 
its abstraot unity to the determlnattDn of that which Is distinot 
~rom itself. In this way, reason beoomes dynamic or practioal, and 
able to transcend the limitations of speculative reason. Thus, 
~hen Kant's philosophy isaaid to be practical, the meaning is that 
ideals 01' reason and of the imagination, although not strictly 
!knowledge of the essence of th1ngs, govern man's activity in the 
~orld and allow man to assert that he is free. 
IKANT'S CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS 
Among the apparently numberless ideals of the imagination is 
that of happiness. Man seeks to use this ideal as a principle for 
~ls activity. Huppineas is introduced into Kant's first CrItique 
~s a prInciple of action. Man seeks to give a new determinatIon ~o 
~s peroeptions wh1ch of themselves they do not have. lie seeks 
llIbid. 
12CaIrd , p. 383-84. 
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to b~ing phenomena 1n relation to our conso10usness by subsuming 
erta1n phenomena undor the conoept of happiness. Thus, as mention 
as made above, the oonoept of happiness does not label phenomena 
s does a oonoept of the understanding. Such concepts as red, bl~ 
old, hard, and the like a~e basic oonoepts. Furthermore, such 
onoepta as man, dog, table, and the 11ke are the result ot a s1n-
hesis ot mnny basiC peroeptions into ono thought. Such oonoepts 
re not ideals of mas ousbt to be, but they are oonoepts of things 
e ls!l2!! to ex1 s t -even though we only know them as thly appea~ to us. 
inppines1, then, does not label phenollena 1n the same sense tha t 
e know them to be, but rathe~ the ooncept ot happiness labels 
henomena as an agent teels that they ought to be. The manitold ot 
xperlence beoomes related to o~ oonsoiousness as something per-
onal o~ as something atfecting our personal lives. The way that 
henomena is subsumed under the ooncept of happiness does not give 
" 
s knowledge ot the phenomena, but as before stated, a new way of 
etermining phenomena In one's own oonsciousness. In his epistomo-
ogioal app~aoh to philosophy, Kant would s imply never consider 
he question of happinesa by starting with phenomena and seekIng 
o induce the 0 oncept ~om real1 ty. There is no phenomenon of 
applnes8 given 1n the synthesis of the faoulties of' the aerlses 
I I' 
I 
:11 
I: 
nd undorstanding. Uenoe. we oannot have knowledge of happiness "I 
n 80 far as 1 t is an ideal. '1:he quos t10n arises, then, atito the 
~igin 01' the ideal. There 18 no problem as to the faot that man 
oes seek to utilize the ideal of happiness as a prinoiple for 
, , 
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guiding his life. On investigat10n we will find that there is an 
analogous "rationalizing subtlety" on Kant's part that introduces 
the ideal of happ1ness just as there was that "subtlety" in intro-
ducing the ideal of' design. 
The fact with which Kant begins is the observation that man 
has m&ny nee& to meet, many de8!~e8 to satisty, and the ev1denoe 
for th1s ls phenomenal experience. Granted the idea of end, Kant 
says that through "reflection" on phenomenal man, reason feels man 
to be a whole; hence, as having internal desipp and final purpose. 
Reason, then, conoludes that man mus~ be capable of effecting 
ohanges in the phenomena. Otherwise, man would be completely pas-
sive and wait upon nature's meohanical laws to fUlfill those needs. 
Now for Kant, man is essentially a doer; one who elicits, chooses, 
and wl11s: "Man is a being who, as belonging to the world ot 
sense, has wants, and so tar his reason has an offioe which it can-
not refuse, namely, to attend to the interests of his sensible na-
n13 t~e, and to form praotical maxims •• • • 
What are these praotlc'~l maxims? They involve a plan of llfe 
tor sensible nature. Kant sees the maxims as a "fi tting into a 
wholen of the different wants ot man: n [R)eason employs the un! ty 
of maxims In general ••• merely to bestow upon the inoentives ot 
desire, under the name ot happiness a unity of maxims whioh other-
l3Practical, p. 181 (1$2). 
r 
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wise they cannot have. ,,14 
At this point Kant is strossing the!!£! that men use the 
practical maxims of happiness to order their activity. Reason 
gives an undeserved unity to the diverse oomplexities of man's in-
clinations or drives which are given as phenomena. As an example 
of what he means, Kant says that one who wants to avoid the anxie-
ty ot making his lies agree with one another and of not being en-
tanglod "by their serpent coils lt will adopt the principle of truth. 
15 fulness to put order into his life. '!he same applies to the prin-
ciple of happiness. Reason does not'!induce the fact that the end 
for which all men strive is happiness from experience. Reason 
"thinks" the ideal because of the fact that man is not in posses-
16 
sion of complete satisfaction of all his inclinations. Through 
i, 
I 
the category of relation man understands himself in relation to I, 
many objeots. Consequently, what is really known 1s not the 8S-
sence of happiness but phenomena synthesized as one thougbt throu~ 
understanding's ooncepts of inclInation and desire, and these phe-
nomena are put in relation to SOMe external object or phenomenon. 
Man simply gives a greater unity to tho multiple phenomena under 
the term happiness: "The concept of happiness is not one that man 
derives by abstraotion fram h1s instinots, and so deduoes from his 
l..4 Imrnanuel Kant, RelIgion WithIn the Limits of Reason Alone, 
trans. Theodore Meyer Greene (Ch!oago,-1'~"34), P.~. ThIs work: 
will be designated simply as Religion. 
lSIbid. 
16Practlca1, p. 133 (112). 
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animal nature, but it is Q mere ~ of a state that he wishes to 
" make adequate to tho idea under merely empirical cond1tions •••• 
Wha~ then, are the essential notes of this 1deal state as 
thought by reason? Kant will consider happiness under two aspeots: 
the ideal or perfect happ1ness and the particular or determinative 
concept whioh one uses in a practioal proposition. The ideal of 
happiness Is described as "the satisfaction of all our desires, ,!!!.-
tep!ivell, in respeot of their manlfoldnes8, Intensivell, in re-
.pect of their degreo, and 2~tensive~1, 1n respect of their dura-
18 tion." Thus, the ideal of perfeot h«ppiness must include the fielo 
of all the appetite.. The faculty to be uatisfied must be capable 
of receiving gratlfloHtion in proportion to its hIghest developed 
potentiality. Also, fear of loss must be absent. Kant.s well knnm 
defInition describes happiness as "the condition of a rational be-
ing in the world wi th whom everything soes according to his !.!!h 
W " and will." The big question for Kant about both of these defini-
tiona is the determination of the ideal since what man wishes and 
wills can be anything at all. What 1s the measure ot the wiSh and 
will. Kant say. experienoe shows that speoification of the ideal 
Is done through "empIrIcal prInoiples; for only by means of experi-
ence oan I know what desIres there are which are tor satisfaction; 
17 :r.Udpent, Pa.!'. 83 (PP. 279-Bo). 
l8Pure, p. AB06, B834 (p.636). 
19Praotlcal, p. 265 (221). 
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or what those natural oauses are which are capable of satisfying 
20 
them. tt In both the moral and epis temologcal frameworks. Kant haa 
stressed the faot that the ideal does not include the objeotive 
ooncept as it should it happiness were a true ideal of reason. 
~t. in experienoe, deter.mlnes the ideal? "[IJt is every man's 
own apecial feeling of pleasure and pain that decides 1n what he is 
1 ,,21 th to p ace his happiness, • •• For Kant, en, we must first ex-
perience an object and then deoide whether it is an objeot of hap-
piness if we use the principle of happiness as a rule of 11fe, WhIt 
1. to be said of this? The statement leads one to think that Kant 
is equating pleasure with happiness. 
We oannot esoape the faot that Kant explioitly gives the ideal 
of happiness a hedonistic "bent" when he says that happiness is fta 
rational being's consoiousness of the pleasantness of life unln-
"22 terI'Uptedly accompanying his whole exi.tence •• ',. If this is 
" 
Kant's only meaning for happiness, then it 1s tI'Ue that happiness 
and pleasure, tor Kant, are one. However, as Paton points out, 
this definition of happiness is obscure and oonfusod in the light 
of his m2£! common considerations of happiness as the total satis-
faction of our needs and inclinations. Paton comments further that 
Kant haa done this t'perhaps 1n order t.o contrast happiness as 
20~, p. A806,B834 (636). 
21 Praotical. p. 135 (112-113). 
22Ibi~., p. 129 (108). 
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sharply as possible with morality.,,23patonts view that we should 
take happiness aooording to a meaning embracing Kant's major works 
as a whole seems oorrect. As early as the first Criti9ue Kant had 
alreadJ spoken of happiness as a union of all ends prescrIbed by 
our deslres into one slngle end,24and not as a regard tor pleasure 
alone. Further.mo~e, Kant says that happlness must be estimated: 
"[O]ur happiness is the only thIng of ponsequenoe provided 1 t 1s 
estimated u reason espeoially req'll1res. not by its transitory sen-
2S 
sation, but by the influence that this haa on O~ whole exlstence." 
In other words theI'c are other const~tuents than just pleasure in 
the concept of happlness. Is thls 1n oontradiction to the state-
ment that what is pleasing determines the concept? The answer is 
no, if we consider that while pleasure must always be bound up wltb 
the objoct estImated, stlll reason ought to choose what 18 best for 
the satisfaotion of one'a whole existence: "[T]here is required 
for the Idea of happiness an absolute whole, a maxlmum of well be-
ing in my present, and • • • future, state. • • • [The ide~ Is ra-
tional 80 far al ••• that end is chosen which can accord with the 
greatest and most abiding weltare, and, on the other, the fittest I 
means are ohoson to secul'e each ot the oomponents ot happiness. n2E ~i'ill 
'II 
i 
23x. J. Paton, In. Detenoe 2t Reason (London, 1951), PP. 163-64. (I 
24Puzte , p. A800, B828 (6)2). II.illl 
2SPractical, p. 181 (1$2). 
260roundwOrk, p. 26 (85); Religion. 
Religion. PP. 60-61. 
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From this quotation it seems more in keeping wi th Kant's 
thought to say the. t his ideal of happiness involves the aot1 vi ty 
of choice of the ends and means; that pleasure is a necessary but 
not the chief constituent; that happiness 1s a weal cr welfare or 
contentment, which for Kant means what 1s good for me and not ne-
cessarily pleasure. Furthermore, when Kant says that happiness is 
rational, he moans that happiness i8 willed throu~p the eleotive 
wIll and not the brute w.1ll. We eaw this distinotion in the pre-
oeding ohapter. We saw too that the eleotive will never can be 
influenced by instinct or pleasure 11; the will is to be morally 
good. But Kant does allow a sense in which happiness Is objeotive-
ly gOod. 27HapPineas, then, does involve more than pleasure. 
Kant is more specific and olear in a later work when he says 
that happiness is a ooncept unifying "all man's purposes possible 
through nature, whether external nature or man's nature •••• ,,28 
Thus, man has more purposes than mere pleasure. What are" some of 
the types of objeots makIng objeotive happ1rs ss? "Power, wealth, 
honour, even health and all that oomplete well-being and content-
ment wi th one's state • • • and goes by the name of ~ppiness."29 
AgaIn, we find Kant oonsidering the different ends that might oon-
stitute happiness: uIs it riohes that he wants? ••• Is it knOJW-
27For the treatment of happiness under reason, see pages 60-6L 
28 lsSSment. Par. 83 (P. 281). Italios not in original. 
29 Ground~ork, P. 2 (61). 
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~.dg. and insight'? • •• Is it long life?,,30The quota tio~ in con-
text, are preoisely in regard to the oonatituents of the ideal of 
!happiness. 
Furthermore, from the defin1 tlon of an inclina.tion we can ar-
gue that Kant ought not to be tnterpreted as saying that happiness 
consists merely of pleasure. Kant S&ys that an inclination always 
indicates a need which is an interest in some thins. He then 
points out that "what interests me 1s the gbjeot of the action (so 
31 far as this objoct i8 pleasant to me). tI A quest for happiness, 
then, 18 not exolusively a quest for""!pleasure, for 8el£-10\'8, or 
for the fulfillment of illicit desires. Granted that pleasure is 
one no~ tor one's interest in the object of happiness, the fact 
remains the object of happiness !!a be other than pleasure. It 
happiness i8 willed only by the brute wIll. then, to be sure, plea-
sure is the concem of the agent. But Kant has speoifically stated 
that happ1ness must at time be willed by the elective w111, and 
when so done, pleasure cannot be the objeot or happiness sought. 
There must, then, be another norm other than pleasure that w1l1 de-
termine what the objeota of happ1ness 'Ud. 11 be, and that norm was, 
for Kant. reason. In most places Kant does apeak or happiness 1n 
relation to the norm or pleasure. He seems to regard that many merl 
Use pleasure as the only nor.m 1n dete~1ning the objects of happ1-
30 Ibid., pp. 46-47 (85-86). 
31 ~., p. 38, n. (81). Italios not in the original. 
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esse That 1s, pe~haps, the reason why Kant oannot aooept the Id 
f happ1ness as the prime prinoiple o~ moral activity. Yet, the 
aot remains that Kant allows, and in fact demands, that tho ideal 
lso be oapable of being determined by reason. In such a case, 
leasure would be ratIonally subo~inated in the hierarch1 of ob-
ects making up happiness. 
We como then to \vhat we may conolude to be an accurate descr.ip. 
ion for the ideal happiness. Happiness Is a principle of action 
r a motive of action. The resulting activity is a dynamic posses-
ion of an object. Kant says happiness is eontentment "with the 
08.es8ion and enjoment of anything •••• h32He does not say "with 
he enjo)1llent" alone; he also says It."i th the .~ossession." The act 
f possession is not to be considered a8 a static state, that is, 
assivlty 1n which one 1s aware only of pleasure. In the Kantian 
pirit of a voluntar1stic philosophy, man is an agent. Man is es-
., 
entially an actor. Hence, the act of possession is the moving to-
arda an object as well as contentment in tinally attaining it. 
appiness is activity in originating, choosing, willing, seeking, 
ttainir~, and resting in an object. The act of contentment is the 
ossession of an object overflowing into sensible and intellectual 
njoyment. Th1s of course Is the ideal of happ1ness. If men de-
ermine the ideal in concrete circumstances by tm norm of pleasure, 
hen happiness becomes passive and equivalent to pleasure. 
ent Par 8 s not in the 
However, this would be what men make happiness become for them-
selves. Kant oannot be said to agree that they have an objective 
notion of happiness. 
We may now turn our attention to the obJeotive and subjective 
oonoepts of happiness in so far as the ideal is determL~ed con-
cretely by pleasure or by reason. With regard to the subjective 
state of happiness, what specifically are the different interior 
states of happiness? Is imler peace which follows on observance 
of the moral law an example? Is the consciousness of perfection 
leadIng to intellectual joy a de8crip~ion of a state of happiness? 
With regard to objective happiness, is the moral law an objeot of 
happiness? Is Virtue happiness? OUr purpose now will be to dete~ 
mine the extent of the objects which determine the abstraot ideal 
of happiness; and the exact concrete designation of what does and 
what does not belong to the subjective concept of happiness. OUr 
" 
method in answering these questIons will be to follow Kant where 
he discusses happiness as a principle of activity. From the man-
ner 1n which Kant speaks of the principle and acoording to the way 
the principle 1s used, we will be able to learn the significance 
of happIness along with its concrete designations. 
Kant's conoern is whether or not the principle of' 'h.appiness 
should be the first of principles which guide man's activi ty. He 
answers this question by aski~~ another: Does the ideal of happi-
ness when used as a principle of activity 1n faot onable man to 
achieve happ1r~ ss Z Since happiness is man's end, and sinoe men 
everywhere will admit that they want happiness, it would seem thnt 
happiness could be attained. Knnt answers that "what man under-
stands by happiness a.nd what 1s in fact his proper, ultimate, natu-
ral purpose ••• would never be attained'by him," for, he oontin-
ues, man cannot "rest and be contented with the possession and en .. 
joyment of anything whatever. ,,331s the reason that of St. Jlugus-
tine, that is, that our hearts are made for God, and they will not 
find res t except in Him? Such an answer would imply knowledge of I 
man-God relationship, which has been ruled out by the first 
Critigue. 
Kant's first answer is that we try to find happiness follow-
ing the ideal of happiness as a plan of life. Kant says that prac 
tical reason requires for a plan of action for life an ideal that 
is: (1) determinate, (2) ~ priori and necessary; and, (3) univer-
sally applicable to rational beings. How does the ideal of happi-
" 
ness llI!l asure up to this norm? We have aeen that man wishes to 
make the ideal adequate to himself accordinr to his own welfare or 
to h1s own empirical conditions. But Kant says that th l,S is vain 
because: (1) there can be no totality of any series of consequen-
ces resulting from the choice of any one object as a part of happi. 
ness because phenomena appear to us successively and not s1multane. 
ously; (2) 'not all inclinations or appetItes to be satisfied are 
yet known and probably never wIll be known; and yet happineas re-
quires a sum of all inclinations; (3) even a sum or inclinations 
33.Ib.14. 
have no disonrnable hierarchy or primaoy among theMselves and, 
consequently, no principle of unity wI. thin the oonoept other than 
one added ~ postorior!, that is, pleasure; (4) sinoe pleasure de-
sired in possessing an objeot is the norm for many men in the 
ohoioe of the objects of happiness, universall ty of choioe among 
rational beings is impossible; and, finally, (5) reason can find n 
rationalgrounda within the concept of happiness to determine a rea 
aonable hierarohy of values among the different proposed objects 0 
happiness. If pleasure is present in happiness, it must be reason 
able. 'l'his oonol udes our disoussion ()f Kant ts first answer oonoer 
nlng the oapaoity of the ideal of happiness to serve as a rule of 
life. The ideal simpl)" does not conform to ttle norm for an ideal. 
Kant has added little to his line of argument given in the 
moral and ep1stemologioal frameworks. The commands of happiness 
are hypothetioal rather than oategorioal, because, acoording to 
" 
Kant, nothing oOD1'~a.nds man to aeek the ideal state of uninterl'Upte 
oontentment. Man already haa this drive for the ideal in virtue 0 
his very nature. But Kant's presupposition 1s that man cannot be 
tully human by following the laws of nature alone, especially sine 
what nature offers as a no:rm is pleasure. AJso, 'ibstraot meaning of 
the ideal of happiness 1s concretized by reason through the imagina-
tion and understandIng. Hence, the ideal relates only to the phe-
nomenal order and does not allow man to be oonsidered as a noumena 
man sinoe what 1s proposed throu~~ the imagination 1s explicable 
through the natural lawo of oause and effect and other categories 
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of the mind. If then one desires only this uninterruptod content-
ment, and Kant holds that man should not, then one commands an ao-
tivity which wl11 attain such a state. HOwever, such a command 1s 
not 0& tegor1 cal but hypothetIcal because 1 t 1 s based on nature and 
no t on pure reason alone., 
Kant's second reason why the 1deal of happiness cannot lead 
the attainment of happiness 1s more involved. He asks us to sup-
pose the. t we could reduce the notion of happiness to a very m1ni-
mum of true na tural wants agreed on bY' th09 whole hUDl8ll race. 
Could we not then have a necessary, !. priorl, and definite or li-
mited number of mclina t10na and objects specified in the ideal it 
selt? Could we not also detennine the objects to fulfIll those 
11m! ted inclinations according to the norm of the more noble plea-
sures in lite as dld Epicurus? Kant does not give a direct re-
sponse. He merely states that if this oould be done, the concept 
" 
would atill be dependent upon nature and, hence, not ~ priorl. 
Hence, man would only interpret reallty the way i1 ~ according to 
phenomena. and not 1n the way It ousAt ~ be. Furthermore, even 
allowlng this 11mitation to what 1s most universally wanted;, man 
would s till find that tl:lere 1s no rest 1n one's quest tor happines 
accordlng to the Ideal. The reason ls, he tells UB, that nature 
(both man's' own nature and external nature) is and must be at war 
with man. This conflict must neoessarily exlst, Kant continues, 
precisoly to turn man away .from the ideal of happiness to the true 
ideal or tlnal purpose of nature. 
I 
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How does the conrlict between man and nature turn man away 
from happiness to the true ideal? Vfuat are the tNe ideals of na-
ture? In explanation of these points Kant poai t. (he would say 
that reason posits) two norma thnt must be fulfilled ror a thing to 
be designated as the tNe final purpose of nature: (1) the purpose 
mus t trans oend ne. ture ; (2) and at the same tl~, the purpos e mus t 
still retain some nconneotion" with nature. This connection, how-
ever, cannot be one of cause and effect accordIng to the categories 
of understanding since no su~~ relation between phenomena and the 
transcendent can be verlfiedthrough ~ntui tlon. Kant then looks 
for an end that can fultill these oondi tiom He oonslders the pos .. 
siblllty of man as the rlnal purpose of nature. Should not man be 
the rlnal purpose of na tUN beoause he Is the only phenomenal being 
who oan Ilmake out of an aggregate of purpoai vel,. formed things a 
system of purposes?n34We can understand why Kant held this reason 
to be specious It we have carefully followed Ka.nt t s vleW's concern-
Ing the faculty of underotandlng. This faculty merely rollows the 
natural laws of the m1nd in applying its categories of thought. 
In his use of understanding man aots acoording to nature as he does 
when operating throurp some other Instinotive power. Thus, some 
men have a ~reater intellectual insight than others. This is due 
to nature •. If' one does not have a. hi£".h degree of' insight, thare is 
not much he oan do a.bout I t. Furthermore, Kant points out, men do 
34Ibld., Par. 82. (p. 276). 
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not respect otners primar1ly because or their degree or 1ntellec-
tual power; they envy them ror this. Rather, they respeot men ror 
the degree of the:Ir holiness or dynamio paI'sonali ty. This holiness 
requires spontaneity in aotivity and suoh aotivity transoends na-
ture. But man's oonneotion with nature through possession or the 
faoulty or understanding leaves out the norm of transoendenoy, and 
for this reason alone, man oannot be the end of nature. 
Kant turns to a second possible oonneotion between nature and 
man, and this oonneotion is nature t s benefioenoe toward man,. ,But 
Kant f1nds that it man is the rinal ebd of nature ror this reason, 
then man t s happiness de f1n1 tely lIould be tile end of n8. ture beoause 
happiness is the endowment or gi t"t for whl oh man has to thank na-
3$ ture. In pursuIng 'this possibility, Kant again notes that man 1s 
largely passive in receiving nature's large •• , the benefIts ot" hap-
p1ness. Man awaits nature's activity and his own inclinations to 
" 
set him into action and not upon his own creativity (spontaneity). 
Kant is not here denying that happiness has an aotive aspect. His 
thought is that happiness does not cs. tegori cally demand an ac ti va 
aspect according to the ideal, and, hence, allows the possibill ty 
for passivIty. Kant's conclusion will not come a3 a surprise: al-
though we cannot see ~ prior~ why the happiness of rational beings 
should not be the ultimate purpose 0 f nature, if man makes it his 
whole purpose, he ttrendors himself incapable of positing his own 
existence as a tinal pu~pose (of natu~e)."36 
Kant adds to his a~gument by pointing out that natu~e does not 
exempt man trom its natural laws just as it does not exempt any 
b~ute animal. Man 18 no darling of nature. The evidences ro~ thil 
are many: the oountless plagues, the hunger, the frosts, and othel 
assaults of nature against man that daily contront him. All these 
activities of nature oause pain and interfere with happiness; they 
do not cont~lbute to happiness. Furthermore, Kant concludes, man'. 
own natuml disposi tiona I'Ush him headlong into oonflict w1 th other 
men, the ba~ba~ism of war, misery and oppression. Does anyone 
really expe~t nature to be in harmony with his private though 
necessary end? 
Is it ~iches that he [man) wants? How much anxiety, envy, 
and pes tering might he not bring in this way on his head 1 
Is it knowledge and Insigh t? This might pe~haps make evils 
at present hidden f~om him and yet unavoidable seem all the 
more t~ightrul, or would add a load or still fUrth~r needs 
to the desires which already give him trouble enougb.. Is 1 t 
long life? Villo will gua~antee that it wwJd not be a long 
mia e~y? Is it at least health? Row orten has infirm! ty of 
body kept a man from exoesses into wblch perfect health 
would have let him talll--and so on.51 
Kant then proceeds to make one f1nal assault on the ideal of 
~appiness. Were the ideal or attaining uninterrupted contentment 
the end of the world, then B. flueetion i8 raIsed about the whole 
~dea of des.ign. Design means that faculties are disposed to CAITJ 
~ut c.~tain pu~pose8 in the best way possible. If ~len. happiness 
36~UdsmentJ Par. 83 (P. 281); Par. 85, n. 12 (P. 286). 
37 Groundwork, pp. 46-47 (85-86); of., Practical. P. l3h (112). 
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.ere the purpose of nature, thJlnature itself hit upon a very bad 
arrangement in salec tins reason to oarry out thi s purpose. In-
stinot could have done the job better. Kant ooncludes that man 
must possess the .faoulty of' reason f'or a higher destination than 
that of guiding him towa~s happines81 33r else one must say that 
reason was not wisely designed since reason, designed for happin~. 
would not funotion independent of nature. 
\Y.hat effect on the ideal of happiness does this second consi-
deration have? First, we note that the oonoept of' happiness can 
involve aotivity as an essent1al not~. l~t this activity is not 
self-perfeotive 1n the Thomistio sense of immanent action, but it 
is activity which seeks an object as an end of' its activity. Thus, 
thts activity has the Aristotelian-Thon.tio notions of' the "moved 
mover" and transient aotivity. Man would first be moved by inoli-
nation. He is first passive. Reason oomes in to legislate after 
man is moved by the desire for happiness. We saw in Chal'ter II 
that the one meaningful note gi ven by Kant to the conoept of rna t tel: 
W~ that of passivity. Happiness, then, for Kant, can have the notE 
of passivity. The connection between happiness and the phenomenal 
world is simply one of effeot and cause. Further indications of 
the same oonnection oan be noted. Happiness involves actions that 
instinot could better have taken care of. Hunger, frost, assaults 
of other animals and mana own violence against his fellow man--
38 aroundwork, p. 4-5 (63); cr., also, Praotioal, p. 135 (113). 
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all thuse are natural forces which, [(ant says, can interfere with 
man's happiness. If these natural foroes are disadvantageous to 
happiness, subj ecti ve happiness MUS t loval ve fa prleoomenal content-
ment and possession while objective happiness must be limited to 
phenomel1Lil objects, because what destroys a.nd wha t is destroyed 
l'JlUS t both be ph(,nomenal. Kant allows no rola tionship of cause and 
effect between the phenomenal world and the noumenal world, and 
this is the ultimato reason for the phenomenal chara.cter of happi-
ness accordIng to his epIstemological principles. It would S6em. 
that peace of soul resul ting from actl,lvity or the noumenal wIll 
cannot be a specific de sIgna tion of subjective happiness; nor can 
moralIty be a part of objective happines::h 
Kant becomes more explicIt In his notion of happiness in his 
third and last consIderation of wh&.t Is Involved in the conflict 
between man and nature. We ought not fail to uote tha.t nature's 
war against man is a negative relation or "connection" ,Ii'th man. 
Thus, one requirement of Kant ta norm for positing something as the 
fInal purpos e of ns. ture 1s met. Can we find ou t a reason for thts 
connection between man and nature? Secondly,does man meet theS8c 
ond requIrement, thu t 1s, 18 there something transcendent 1n man, 
a.nd does th5.s transcendent have aome "connection" wlth na.ture's 
war? We ~la"e seen in the moral framework tha t Kant In bored to 
explain his ideal tha.t man's tree transcendent end Is manls good 
will. In the third Critigue Kant calls thIs end mants cultqre and 
moral discipline of his will. What is nature's 'bonnectlon" 
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with man's culture ani discipline of will? Kant says this "connec-
tion" is shown in the inequalities of nature which condemn some mer 
to mechanical. drudgery and forces men to be serva.nts to the leisure 
of others. The latter In their leisure advance the arts and selen-
oes. Other examples concern tiw confliots of stutes which drive 
man to establish a world co~ty where order necessary for deve-
lopment of the arts and sciences is provided; and, finally, wars 
which develope talents serviceable to culture and morality by at-
tacking ambitIon, lust of dominion, and the avarice of the leaders 
of states. Kant is very carefUl to make nature's connection with 
man in this transcendent activity a negative preparatIon and not 
a cause. 1':i1WJ, the confllc t of na tUre with man, while opposine 
~an's natural end of happiness. is Ii cond1tion for bring1ng about 
his transcendent end--~le reign of the good wl11. Man's transcen-
dent end 1s the true final end of all nature, and for this reason, 
man can bo called nature's fi!lal end: 
[ViJe cannot mistake the purpose of nature--ever aiming to 
¥lin us away f:r-om the rudeness and violence of those inclina-
tions (inolination!2. enJo:£1!ent) whioh belong rathe:r- to our 
animality aIld for the )nosE part 8"e opposed to the cultiva-
tion of our higher destiny, and to maklt way for the develop-
ment of our human! ty. The beautiful arts and the sciences 
whIch, by their universally communioable pleasuro. and by 
the polIsh and refinement of society, make man more c1 vilized 
if not morally bettor, win us in la.rge measure !'rom the ty-
ranny 0 r "e 118 a prop ens lons , and thus prepare men for a lor.:-
ship in whioh reason alone shall have authority, while tho 
evils with whioh we arevislted ••• harden tho powers of 
the soul not to submIt to them, and so make us fee19an ap-titude 1'or higher purpose wh~ch 110s hidden In us. J 
39Judgment Par. 83 (p. 283-84>. Italios not in orIginal. 
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Kant's reason for saying that man finds no rest in seaking 
ihappiness is not because man WHS made for God, not precisely be-
cause nature is at war a!~ainst his human nature, and not oven be-
oause reason 1a inadequate with the principle of happiness as a 
guide, but primarily, because Kant posits that man's moral selt or 
his human! ty40i8 the proper end of man and nature. 
From this tinal consideration we can conclude to an evan more 
datini te 11m! tation of Kant t s conoept ot happlne ss by comparing the 
aotivity ot transcendent man wIth the aotivity of man's nature. 
From this analysis we tind the fields -pf activity which are exoluded 
from the activities of happiness: man's aotivity in perfeot'.ng 
the arts and the sciences and in the discipline of his will. Kant 
says that man has no Inollnatlop to perfect these fields of activi-
ties. Also any subjective appreciation that mi~~t be the effect of 
such a pursuit, while it may be either an intellectual or sensible 
contentment, we w1ll find, Is not a part of one's happlm"ss. }<ur-
therm.ore, these pursuits are not the higtlost act!v! ty possible to 
~umanlty. In relation to man's highest act1vity, ~~e discipline of 
~is will, these sclences and the arts are merely a propedeutlc. 
At this point, the aver'ago man would probably object thatwork~ 
40 In the pr ecedlng QJ. 0 ta tion and throughcut his works, ltan t seems 
to give tho term humanity greater comprehension than the conorete 
term human nature. He seems to limit the latter concept to pheno-
~enal man; the former, to comprehend man's transoendent moral sel~ 
that 1s, noumenal man. Thus man' B duty is to "raise himself out 
of the rudeness of hi s nature • • • to human! tJ, br wh.lch alone he 
1s capable of setting before himself ends. •• (M. 0..£ ;,{,01-als, n., 
p. 232 [297]). 
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1n the sciences, the arts, in morality, and certrdnly roligious ex-
perience are essential to one t s happiness. By exper1ence man know. 
that he has 8. sense of accomp11shment, of appreciation, of fervor, 
and even an esteem in undeX'takint~ work 1n the arts and sciences. 
Kant would certainly not d1aar'ree that we have them. Nor would h.J 
S8.y that we do not deaire these as ends. But Kant would say that 
IF 
these desires aN not a P:lrt of inclinat1on5 0r appetites. What 1s 
behind this distinction between desires and inclinations? 
The moralists of Kant' 8 age had used the pr Inciple of happ1-
ness as a foundation I'or mo.rality, al'lf! in Kant's opinion, they had 
failed miserably in eotablishlng ethics on a solid foundation. 
Kant accepted their general hedonistic view of happiness although 
he did not reduce happiness to pleasure. However, he did keep plea 
sure £18 one norm for determjiling what obj ects are to const! tute the 
concrete notion of objective happiness. In commenting on Baumgar-
tents tundamenta;J.. principle of morali ty, m Bonum .n omftte !4alum" 
Kant saya that the good for Baumgarten containa "in itself impw.lve 
gro und. of action, and that whIch is superior good contains super-
ior 1mpuls1ve grounds. H41Kant points out that this distinction is 
uselels tor establishIng moral obl1rat10n since obligation would 
ttl.en only depend on the coupling of actions to their highee t impul-
s1ve grounds. But Kant holds that any action orig1nating in impul-
sive desire could not be commanded unconditionally nor could it be 
41Lectures, p. 25. 
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sa1d to be morally good. Take away the Impulse and the act10n be-
comes morally unnecessary, that Is, if impulse is to be the founda-
tIon of moral1ty. Thus, Kant says that a distinction between ac-
tions caused by higher or lower desires, that is,aotions proceedIng 
from 1ncl1nations either to intellectual or to sensible objects, 
Is an 1nvalid d1stinction. Intellectual and sense pleasure-giving 
objects can never be tl~e basis of distinction between moral and 
immoral or a-moral acts: 
It 18 surprising that men, otherwise aoute, can think 
it possIble to dis tingulsh between h1r)her and lower desires, 
according as the 1deas wblch are~connected with £he feeling 
of pleasure have their orIgin in the senses or in the under-
stand1ng; t:'o:r when we inquire what are the determin1ng 
grou@s of desire, and plaoe them in some expeotod pleasant-
ness, it is of no consequence whence the idea of this pleasmg 
object 1s derived, but only how muoh it Rreai'es. • •• Hovr- ' I 
ever dissimilar ideas of objects may be, £bougb they be 
ideas of the understand1ng, or even of the rea80n in oontrast 
to idea8 of sense, yet the feeling or pleasure, by means of 
wh:1ch they constitute the determining prinoiple of the will 
(the expeoted sat1sfact1on which impels the aotivity to the 
production of the object), is of one and the same kl:nd, not [I 
only inasmuch as 1 t can be known empirically, but also inas-
JIlUoh 8.S it affects the ono and the same vi tal torce vhioh 
manifests 1 t.elf in the faoulty of desire, and 1n this re-
spect can anlY4dittor 1n degree from overy other ground of determina tion. 2 
If this nassage is interpreted in the llFrbt of other passages, 
~ant 1s found here preparing ~le way for his own distinction be-
~ween higher and lOVler deaires. He will seek to reduce to one cate-
~ory the not'lons of happiness, lower desIres, and inol:inations be-
~ause he feels that they a.re nothing but desires for objects that· 
42Practloal;, pp,. 130-31 (109). 
oan arise solely from antIcipated sensible enjoyment or intelleo-
tual contentment oonneoted with an object. As long as pleasure is 
connected with happiness, Kant teels that the idea is useless tor 
establishing duty in moral act1vity and In the advanoement of the 
arts and soien06s. As long as men can say that they act because 
ot anticipated pleasuro in accomplishing anyt~11~--let it be some-
thln~ intellectual, strength of mind in overcoming obstacles, or 
even pex-teotion--Kant holds 'that such activity procoeds from a 
prinoiple of selfishness, that la, the principle of happiness. 
With a new bas!s fox- distinctIon between higher and lowex- desires 
Kant feela that he can remove aotivities such as concern man'a cul-
ture and moral dlsoipline tram the sphere of happiness where Baum-
garten had left them. The distinction must also be adequate enough 
t~ distinguish between the subjeotive states belonging to happi-
ne88 aDd those belonging to max-ali ty. 
Ult1ma tel1, the distinction will r 08 t upon one facti' that 
whioh determines the human eleotlve wIll ('~'1illkiihr): , 
[Vi]e oan fInd pleasure in ••• the culture of our men-
tal talen ts, eto J and we jus tly e all these more refIned 
pleasurea and enjoJllents. • •• But to say on t.~1s ac-
oount that ihe, determine the wIll 1n a different it' 
••• thi'i s ust as whenignorantPersons £hit 1 e 
to dabble in Metaphysics imagine matter so subtle, so 
super-subtle, that they ••• think that in this wa;y 
they ha¥e oonceived it as a s21rItu,al and yet extended 
belng.4'" 
What Is the different way in which the will 1s determimd? 
Kant says that when the rational will (Wille) of itself determines 
43Ibid., pp. 132-33 (110-11). First italios not 1n orlg1nal. 
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the elective w!ll, it does so not as the servant of the inclination 
Then the rn tIonal will is "really a higher desire to which tha t 
which is pathologically determined Is subordinate •••• tt44Thus , 
higher desire is the rational will as an appetitive faculty 1n re-
latIon to the elective .wl1l as the spontaneously free caUse deter-
mlng the elective will (WlllkUhr) to action. Reason determines the 
wIll immediately without the medium of feeling or any external 
a~Qnt. Reason itself i8 the origin of the desire. 
pleasure or pain oausos the determination. 
'No antecedent 
• 
The seoond way in which the will"! is determined involves what 
Kant calls pathological determinatIon. Here the phenomena.l inoli-
nations stand in relatIon to the wIll as determining the will to 
to aotion. In this oase the will determined Is the animal wIll and 
not the eleotive will (the higher part of the wIll). Thus, where 
desire for an object originates, not from rational will (Will~), 
but fram the inclinations, this desire, tor Kant, Is a lower de-
aire. Suoh a desire is innate to man; it is an appetite. Inclino.-
tion, in tum, 1s an habitual appetite. What oharacteristics are 
assigned to the higher and lower dosires? 
'!'he higher desire 1.8 a rational desire because reason alone is 
its origin •. It is not innate; it belongs to mants humanity or per-
Bonality, but not to his nature; it rises spontaneously in the ra-
tional will itself without any anteoedent oause such- as ratlocina-
,,/0 
tion or pleasure; reason proposes, 1n an ~ Eriori manner, an ao-
tion that ought to be. Reason proposes it as a duty and not as 
pleasurable; reason proposes what is eternally written 1n the heart 
of mun: "Here, there.fore, we treat not of ends which man actually 
makes to himself in accordance with the sensible impulses of his 
nature, but of objects of the free elective will under its own lawe 
--objects whloh he oue!;t to ~~d8 end.45 
Pul'thermore, higher desires are not primarily interestod in 
any resulting intellectual or material object. Rather, its inte~ 
lies in the interior will aot, the i~terior strength of the will, 
as an end in itself. Rational desires ooncern enQ8 that ousht 12. 
exist and not those ends deSignating objeots that already exist 
or will exist in the phenomena.l order. Thus, reason commands 
perfection in the physical, intellectual aesthetic, or moral realm. 
Reason commands it categorically. 46But reason commands no exis ting 
45!. ~ Morals, p. 2)0 (295). 
46~., PP. 230-45 (296-308). Kant does not include a duty 'I 
to wha t-ne-calls an "his torioal If or n st,~i tutory" (revealod) roli"'11 
gion. Man has a duty only to the "one true religion" wh 1,ch Oom- •. 
prlses nothing but those truthaQr prac tical principles whose uncon- 111,'1 
ditioned neoessity we can become aware of, and which we therefore 
recolgntze as revealed throulgh pure resson l( n) ot e~plriClaillYi. t:wou/p '1 •. 1 
rev. ation, whether na tur&. or 8upernatura • CJ. ., Re B. on, p. l5b. ' 
Kknt's maral religion consists only ffln the heart·s ensposition to 1,'1
1
1'1
'
".1',,'1 fulfil all human duties a8 divine cODL"nand!l," but "not in doe'P2&s and 
r1 t os. " -- (Il21sl.., p. 79). But Kan t warns tha t ft 1. t Is not meant by I 
this tha t it is necessary to suppose the existence of God as a ba- Ilil~I'I',lil 
sis of all obligation in general (for this resi"s. • • simply on the 
autonomy ot reason ita.lf) ••• " (Practical, p. 267 [222]). Thus, I',' !~e m: tl ri~d:e. itg~~th;~~~~ i:1 :li~;I~;c~i=u~~~e ~:ii~~~u:o dl'!: 11'li 
pas i tion ••• tt (Religion, p. 170) .,'ill
1:1111': 
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and determinate degree of perfection according to which one must 
~easure up. To seek to measure up to some existing norm of perfec-
tion would be to act, not from duty, but from incll!la tlon for a ()8l\. 
tain level ot attainment. What does determine tho degree of per-
fection is prudence 1n a given circumstance. Finally, while Kant 
admits that all desires, both h1gher and lower, have pleasure or 
oontentMebt 1n some way connected wIth them, yet higher desires 
are effect. of rational will proposIng an action as a duty. They 
are consequent to reason's command, not the cause.47 
In contrast, 1nclination i8 conaerned either with possessing 
what now exlsts (nature's beneflce) or with making a replica of 
what already ls--some blueprint or model. The obJeot ot inclina-
tion 1s some determined degree ot pertection which ma.n is interes-
ted in attain1ng because ot pleasure to be derived or because ot 
same glory redounding to selt. InclinatIon is also interested in 
activity as a m&ana to the eXisting object, not as an end in it-
selt. Inclinations are viewed as determining our personality from 
without. Selt-oonsoiousness, then, has no initial part in deter-
mining inlinatlona. The deoiding factor whioh distinguishes In-
clination trom higher desire is this, that in the former reason en-
tere only atter inclination has created desire throU(!~ pleasure. 
'Iben reason' attends to its prudential job ot disposing the means to 
attain the end. A~teced.Bt pleasure, therefore, arous •• desire and 
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determines the will as brute elective will. Activities belonging 
to morality, on the other ha d, proceed tt!£2!. the idea of t.'1e pos-
sible action ihrough the reelinr-!: of pleasuro or displeasure in tak-
ing an interest in it or its effect 12 the deede n48 
From this consideration we may summarize, more specifically, 
Kant's ideal of' happiness. Since one norm for determining the ab-
stract Ideal of hap1)lneas is the inclination, the characteristics 
ot the aotivities of happiness oan be based on the notes assIv.~ed 
to inclination: 
(1) Happiness i. merely the SUDr.of the innate desires of na-
ture, a lower desire that cannot be the primary interest to man's 
personalIty or to his humanity sinoe it disregarded noumenal man. 
(2) Happiness regards existing Objects as replicas to be raSh 
ion ed or attained through act! vitJ. The objects are inseparably' 
bound up with pleasure and selt-interest. 
" (3) Because pleasure is a constItuent of the dete·rm.lned con-
cept of happinesfl, there 1s always the possibility of pleasure act-
ing att the motivatiD,f': power for the quest of happiness antecedentl, 
to reason's enterIng the plctu~e. 
(4) Baaed on inclInation, happiness, then, will not always o~ 
ginate in man's willing self-consciousness. Man can remain passive 
with regard' to the contents or the Ideal. Nature alone would give 
meaning to lite were happiness the ultimate rule of lite, not man. 
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(5) Happiness is the matter for determinative judgment and 
the Imagination when the question of concJ~etizing the ideal is 
raised. The oontents g1. ven to the ideal will be in terms ot empir" 
ical concepts.' The understanding's categories of oause and efrect 
express tne relation ot objeots to onets self-consoiousness by 
bringing the empirioal eoncepts inclL~tions and their obJeots inte 
a relation. One can feel th1 s relation as a ht gher Wlity under 
the ideal of happiness. 
(6) Happiness, determined bj" the norm of onets inclinationa, 
is 81 ther "the self-love that oonsis~ in an flxoessi"e fondness fot 
oneself (phllantia), or satIsfaotion wIth oneself (arrogantla). 
The former Is partteularlj" eallfld selt'1shness; the latter !!.il-
conce! t. tt49 
(1) Sinoe inelinations have :no tendency to the IntellIgIble 
world, happIness Is not a desire to experienoe the feelIngs oon-
sequent to aotivlt1-deaires ot reason it.el~. Hence, not all phe-
nomenal states belong to the ideal of happiness. 
(8) If one make" the 1:1 eal of happiness his rule of life, 
th1s man eannot be said to be free or a morally good man. He maj" 
be prudent and skilltul, not 1mmoral, but he oannot be praised for 
~ls goodness. He 1s self-centered and self-seeking. 
We may' now consider JJl'k)re spec1fieally some of those act! vi ties 
~nvolv1ng only eonsequent feeling or intellectual contentment, and 
~hIch, therofore, do not belong to t."1e act1v! ties 0 f happiness. 
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They are the activities which raise man frOM the "rudeness of his 
nature." Feelings and intellectual contentment consequent on will· 
ing duties, command~d by pure reason, are feelings of t~ beauti-
ful, the sublime, of the purposiveness 1n nature, and the moral 
law. Thus, Kant says that the satisfaction of happiness gratifies J 
the s atisfacti on of the beautiful, the subllme, and tl}, purposi ve-
ness in nature pleases; and the satisfaction of the moral law es-
teems.50The differences in these satisfactions are only application! 
of Kant's theory regard·ing the dis tine tion between hi[",her and lowe! 
desires. 
Kant says that in contemplating the beautiful the consequent 
feeling is a "contemplative pleasure or a passive satisfaction. tl51 
This feeling is distinct from the pleasure of happiness because it 
does not precede our judging it; and secondly, because the subject 
is not interested in the existence of any Object but only in re-
flecting upon the idea of an obj ect. Where the beautiful: 18 con-
cerned, pleasure exists without any desire for an object. Posses-
sion of the beautiful is through reflection. Reflection, in this 
instance, is not on any quality in the objeot. Were this true, 
pleasure from contemplating the beautiful would be purely subjec-
ti "le. All people are not affeoted in the same way by some particu-
lar quality' in a particular object. The object of reflection, Kan1 
50Judgment, Par. 5 (p. 43). 
5I x. of Morals, p. 10 (267). 
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conoludes, must be universal. Kant's doctrine of the beautIful 
states that the represontation of objects makes one conscious of a 
rmony 1n 1:11s facultIes of presentation and not of' ulV harmony in 
the object Itsel1'. ,SInce all men's faculties are posIted 8.S being 
constituted the same, a universal and ~ prior! object Is possIble. 
The object 18 a conorete universal. Thus, In saying that this work 
of art is beaut1t'ul, one merely sta.tes a co,nd1 t10n of hIs feelings 
about the tlrepreaenta tlon" gIven 1n his cognitive 1'aoulties. Yet, 
1 t Is a un! versal fee11ng beoause the reeling results trom the har 
ony or the cogn! tlve faoulties perce,t.ved through :reflectIve judg-
ent. 1'he consoiousness of harmony and the plo i.J:lure we take in It 
are one and the same. Kant compaNs the pleasure of happiness to 
that of the beautIful and finds that the former Is momentary and 
cea8es after being satisfied while aesthetic contemplatIon is re-
petitious and free from inclinatIon. Tho pleasure of happiness 
aerves a purpose while the pleasure of art does not present itself 
as userul. The pleasure of' happiness disturbs; that of the beau-
titul is resttul. 
Even in sclence Kant finds til feellng of f,lurposlveness or con-
aoiousness of harmony which 1s a unlvers~l pleasure resulting tram 
a condltion at refleotlve jUdgment and not from any objective pur-
pose in nature. This consclousness of the harmony in our faculties 
arisss when the scientlst finds two or more heterogeneous empiri-
cal 1 aW8 which oa.n be un! fied under a oommon uni ty g1 ven by reason. 
This pleasure can only be experienced after reason has moved one 
, 
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to the arduous task of research. Pleasure cannot move one to the 
activities of scientific research because tho research results onlJ 
t:rom reason's ideal of design in nature. Hence, the pleasure is 
a result of an ~ Erior! principle and can be universally experi-
enced. In this way. Kant 8a~ man oan transcend unders tanding I 8 
rigid and meohanioal law. and interpret nature as something de-
signed for a higher purpose. 
By considerIng the feelings connect,~;d with the arts and sci-
ences, w. only stress the fact thl!l t Kant has limi tad the prinoiple 
of hap pine as to phenomenal aotivlties"'1lnd, at the sante time" exolu-
ded oertain phenomenal aotivities. The activities of the artist 
and the soientist are oreat,lve. They are spontaneous and cannot 
wait upon the inolination of nature, for nature does not tend to 
tha t whioh 1s difficult and strenuous. Kant ooncel ves tLa t one is 
not empirically inc lined to make progress in thene two fields of 
ac tivi tl. The type d: intellectual oontentment connected wI th the 
arts and sciences is an "intellectual pleasure, n,52but not intellec-
tual in the senae of being an aoti vi ty of the understandIng. Ra-
ther, it results from a practical Idea of reason which, for Kant, 
has practical valid! ty only when I t has relat10n to the rna rel world 
of.' freedom. This 1s the 1ntelloctual contentment of the moral 
order. 1 t 1s, however, exper1enced 1n the phenomenal world. 
In the third Cri tlgU8 Kant f.'inds another teeling that truly 
S2Ibid., p. 11 (261). 
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medlates between the phenomenal and noumenal man: the teeling of 
the s ubli... .Ian t say8 tha t the ra eling ot subl1m1 ty i8 two-rold. 
It l8~e reellng of utter helplessness resultlng an the part 
who experIence. the omnipotence of nature acting through Its 
a.nd its earthquakes, or manIfesting its grandeur through the star 
1!7 heavens, and othor n;~tux-al phenomena. At the same time the 
feelinp otaublt.ity Is not merely a negatIve feeling; It Is posltt 
1n the 8ense both of experience ot one's freedom from the des truc-
tlve, mechanical' and powerful forces ot nature and of the sense 
tha t one belongs to a moral world whet.e he too can com: land acti-
vit,.. Dees na. tu!'e Itself cause this t'eellng? If so, then the 
reellng would be mettect of nature'e benefice and, hence, a feel-
lng of happineas. However, the teellng of" 8ubllm1 ty, Kant says, 
has A prior\ grounds. H1s explanatIon tells of a teellng of pain 
which x-1aes out ot the consciousneas of" one's inability on the 
put 01' his imagl na t1 on to ea tlma te the magnl tude ot nature's 
grandeur or destructive torces. !be Imagination 1n turn is forced 
. to reter 1ts representatlon to reason's idea of" totality--the mol' 
W 0 rId. There ax-fses, then, the poai ti ve reeling or plea sure whe n 
reason through reflective judgment makes the Judgment tha t the sen 
sible phenom~nal world 1s infinitely small in compariaon with rea-
son's 1dea 01' absolute totality. Once again we aee that Kant di-
vorces pleaaUZ'e trom an exlsting object; that he bases the pleaaur 
or sublimity on an !. prio!'l cause; and that the ploasure is con-
sequent, not antecedent, to the consideration or reason. The con-
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tenbnent of sublimity Is at once intelloctual and sensible. It 
rais('}s man above the phenomenal world to a higher destination--the 
moral world. In contrast, happiness, under the nor.m of the incli-
ne. t1ons. ties man to the phenomenal feelings of his animality. 
From the teeling of sublim1 ty, we can easily make a transi-
tion to the. t'eeUng of esteem, for the two are closely connee ted. 
, 
This feeling is inseparably and necessarily connected with the oon· 
sciousness of the moral la w, bu t not in such a way tha tit causes 
observance of the moral law. Rather, the moral law causes the 
teeling of eateea or reverence, and epmetimes Kant seems to say 
tha t consciousnoss of the noral law Is the feelIng of esteem. Thus 
estoem bas its negative and positive aspect. For example, when OnE 
i. consoious ot the moral law and submits to the moral law, there 
is pain In the act of submitting; this pain is a feeling 0 f.' humili-
at1on; it u a negatl va aspect of esteem tor the law wh ich neutra-
lizes lower feelings of the inolination and makes us ashWned ot Oul 
lower incli_tiona even to the extent that we should almost want tc 
be without thaD. Yet, Kant say. that there Is so little pain horo 
that W6 should not call it pain for, he guarantees, once wo are 
accustomed to tho teeling, we can never be satisfied without it.53 
The reason ia tha t man believes himself elevated In proportion as 
he sees t.lle'law elevated above the law of his frail nature. 
As a positive foeling it 1s contentment in knowing that the 
S3Praotlcal, p. 20) (170). Tne subJoct of the feeling of os-
teem (or revorence) is treattld in pages 195-207 (164-173). 
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rational will freely determines the human elective will. Thus, 
Kant says, esteem 1s a moral feeling or sentiment, or reverence for 
the holiness of the law.54When Kant snys that this maral feeling im 
a motive for duty, he does not mean that it cause~ moral aotivity. 
Rather e.teem or reverenoe is a oondition. Thus, respeot for the 
law in its negative aspeot affects the lower inolinations and al-
lows for easier operation of reason's pure causality. Reverence 
implies fear; it shakes us 'to want to ponsess hollne8~i of the will, 
it humil~.8 and at the same time elevatos us; it 1s dread and at 
the sEIne time a joy which we oannot l181p but inwardly feel, given 
consoiousness of the moral law.55 
Again, we aee that re.peot tor the law is excluded from hap~l· 
ness for it cannot be oompared to a pathologioal feeling. It is 
" ~6 far from being a feeling of pleasure. • •• The reasons are: it 
1s not antecedent to rational determination of the will; it is the 
'f 
result of an .!. priori oause--the ideal of !n,(jrall ty; it is uni ver-
sally experienoed as opposed to the selfish feelings of one's ani-
malIty. Were we to do an action merely to gain the feeling of re-
spect or the positive feelIng of self-approval, we would lose the 
feeling, s1ro e the feeling i tsel!' is the very consciousness of the 
moral law oommanding, not for the sake of esteem, but for duty. 
54~., p. 201 (169). 
SSIbid 
-., p. 208 (174) and p. 211 (177). 
S6Ib1d• , p. 202 (110); Cf., also, H. 2! Mara1s , p. 221 (289). 
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There rema ins now only one final aspect of the subjec tive de-
termination of happiness and moralIty, and that .is peace of con-
scIence. Aside £rom reverence for tho law wh:eh precedes the car-
ryIng out of a cODlJIJand without having any .?a~~ wi th rega.rd to 
the will, thore ia the effect of one's consclousne~w of having 
acted trom dutr'. sake. Of this Kant says: 
When an upr1ght man Is 1n the greate!!t distress, which 
he might have avoided it he could only have disregay'dod 
duty, ls he not sustained by the consci0usness that he 
has maintained humanity in its prcper dignity 1n his own 
person and honoured it, that he has no reason to be a-
shamed of himself 1n his own sight, or to dread the in-
wardglance of .elf-examlmtion?"": This consolation i. not 
happineas, it 1. not even the amalIiS't part ot' I£,for 
no one would wlah to have oocasion for it. •• This In-
wa.rd nao. 18 • • • merely nega tive as regards what oan 
make fe pleasant. • •• It i. the effect of a respeot 
for scmething ••• 1n comparison and oontrast with which 
lif. with all its enjoyment has no value. He still lives 
only because it 1 a his duty, not because he rims any-
thing pleasant in life.51 
This passage 121 a def1ni te statement to the fact that pea.ce 01 
., 
conscience is not a part of happiness. Kant does not say that one 
can be happy without this peace of consoience. Rather, he means 
that peace of conscience as part of morality 1s a neoessary con-
di tion if we are to enjoy our happlnes1; • /1. problem does arise as 
to exactly where Kant does place this contentment. Kant himself 
finds dlf ficul ty 1n finding a cu tegory to cover it: 
Have W~ not, howevor, a 1IOrd which does not expre •• 
enjoyment, as happine8s does, but indicates a sat18-
faction in one's eXistence, an analogue of ••• happl-
S7Pract1cal, p. 216 (181-82). Italics not in original. 
ness ••• 1 Yesl [T]his word 1s self-oontentment, 
a negative satisfaction 1n one's exIstence, in which 
one 1s conscious of needing noth~.ng. • •• This may 
be oalled intellec tual contentment. The sensible con-
tentment (improperly so-called) 't/hlch res ts on t:."le sa-
tisfaction ot the inolinations • • • can neVer be a-
dequato to the conception of it •••• 
10<} 
Freedom itself becomes • • • oapable of an 
enjoyment which cannot be called happiness, becaurJe it 
does not depend on the positive concurrence of feel-
i n g ••• ; and thus, at least in its orir;in, th5_s enjoy-
ment Is waalogous to self-suffiolgncy which we can as-
cribe only to the Supreme &11'1g.5 
By calling peace of oonscience self-contentment,Kant adds 
11 ttle to the solution of his difficulty. All.8 know 1s tha. t he 
""" plaoes inward peace outside of' happ1Iles8 and under the general ca-
tego1"1 of freedom or morality. The same oan be said for the teel-
ings resultlng from oontemplation of the beaut1.ful, the sublime, 
the purposiveness of nature and determination by the moral law. 
Arguments in favor of th~s position can be supportf;f) by considerin~ 
Kant's arguments against those writers who distinguish between 
'j 
moral and physic!:!.l happiness. 
Moral happiness, Kant says, i8 a self-contradictory nonentity 
His argum.ent is founded on his distinction that morali ty proceeds 
from the human elective will \lh tIe happ~ne8s determinHd by the in-
clinations depend upon the hrute will. Using t.."1.is dlstlnc tlon, 
Kant tells us that Vlore "moral happines~ln the true designation of 
inward peace, man ""'IOuld involve hlIl1l ~11' in a c1roui tous argument. 
Thus, a man must teel himself bound to do his dutY' wi thout adver-
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ting to. the fact. that inward peace of o01l8oience will follow upon 
obedience to duty. Inner peace is an effect only when one 1s con-
scious that he has tried to act out of duty. On the other hand • 
• ere inner peaoe happiness, a part of the subjective state of hap-
piness, inward peace of mind would have to be experienced before a 
man could be moved to duty; in other words, peace of mirxl would be 
the cause while acting from duty would he ~le effect.>9nut acting 
from duty means simply actiDn caused by pUI'e reason's command. 
Hence, the contradiction. Kant uses this reductio !S absurdum ar-
gument to point up h1s position that~ct1ng from any desire ante-
cedent to duty's determlnation of the will will never result in a 
morally good will. Thus, Inner peace mURt be an effect of acting 
out of duty, not the cauae of it. Thia argument 8eema to preclude 
the use of the term moral haEpiness. 
It is II Jgni.ficant the. t when Kant bringeup the idea of mora,l 
" happ1ness, he apeak. of the idea as a misuse of words rather than 
a nonentIty. Yet, again Kantaaya that inner peace may well be 
called happiness. Indeed in Religion WIthin ~ Limits 2! .. J!.eaBon 
Alon.o, a later work than the three Critiques, Kant regularly a-
dopt. the use of the term moral has;>inoss: "[M)oral happlnes:3 
• • • 
60 
consists of a oonsciousness of progress in goodness." In 
answer to th1s dIfficulty it may be said that even in the work on 
591• 2.!: Morala, pp. 220-221 (287-2fl8); p. 23.3 (298). 
6oRellg1on, p. 69, n; cf., also, p. 61. 
II 
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religion and in an even later work, AnthroP91ogy, Kant maintains 
the same princ1plos of the above given al"gument which shows that 
inner peace cannot be an aotivity anteoedent to a categorical im-
perative. Kant w11l consistently maintain that innol" peace must b4 
consequent not only to reason's oom.mand but an effect of an acti-
vity performed from duty's sake. It does not seem probable that 
Kant would ohange so basic a PI" Inciple 1n ordel" to give the desig-
nation ot happ1ne8:~1 to the experience of inward peace of soul. 
Furthermore, the argument, given above, aga1ns t the use of the ca-
tegory moral baRRines. appears in th~ MetaphYSic 2! Morals whioh 
61 is dated 1791, tour years after his work on religion. Kant's use 
of the oategory of moral haPiJiner~s may be interpreted as a. mere 
matter of convenience. In a parallel example, a soeming inconsis-
tency on Kant's part turna out not to be an inconsistency, but a 
"oonvenient way of speaking." Thus, after criticiz1ng the use of 
the category "an intellectual inclination" In tho socond" Criti'Jue, 
1n the Met.al?Ws1c Q!. Moral! Kant yields to popular thought and 
says that "in order to aooomodate ourselves to 0 ommon speeoh, we 
11&7 aai t an 1nclina tl on even to tha t whi oh can only be the ob jec t 
ot an intellectual pleasure--that i8 in say. a habitual desire from 
a pure interest of reason. This however, would not be the cause, 
but tho effect ot the 1 attar interest. and we might call it the 
sense-free inclInation (propens10 intellcctual1s.rP2 
61For the chronological or. :er of Kant' 11 1'0 rks, seo 11 Introduc-
tion" to Kant's Rel1gion, p. !xxxiv. 
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In l1ke manner, it seems at least probable that Kant, witnout 
admitting a change in prinoiple, is compromising only to the ex-
tent of allowing inner peace to be popularly called moral happi-
nesa. Paton, without giving a definite solution to this difficul-
ty, says that Kant would hold that a just man cannot be happy on 
the rack.63If we oonsider the. t a just man would certainly have an 
inner peace from kn<Rf ing that he had a.c tod out of a scnse of du ty, 
Paton's statement would seem to indicate that Kant did not consider 
inner peace a part of happiness. Finall,., Kant says thut thIs 
contentment is a "rational self-love~ which is the love of one who 
knows thn. tit is his maxim to make reverenoe for the law the 
highes t incentive of hls W111.64In the same place he also says 
that it is a "worthiness !2 .:2! haRRY." Happ1ness, then, is sane-
thing in add1tion to worthiness to be happy. The mere fact of de-
serv1ng happiness can be a motive by itself, Kant says, without thA 
motive of sharing in this happiness playing any part.6,S ., 
We have seen that happinesLI as an 1deal is so 1ndetermillc'1.te a 
concept that; man seeks to make 1t a deflnl te plan of life by ap-
pealill,!: to some external norm: the inclinations and pleasant ob-
Jects. Yet, Kant holds that happ1nes~3 1s also rational. 1h!a 
62M• o'f Morals, P. 11 (267); ct. also Practical, p. 255 (213), 
and Lectures, P. j? .. 
9JH.J.paton, categOrical ImEo:'tatlve, (London, (1946), p. so. 
64Re11Sion, PP. 41-42, n; of. Pure, p. A8l3-DB41 (640). 
6'soroundwark, p., 104 (117). 
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means that l"oason, not finding iUly y08s1bIl1ty of determIning the 
concept according to a rational norm contained within the concept 
or ideal of hap,r:ines3, must look for ,1 rational norm outside the 
ideal. Tha t concept or norm wi1l, of course, be the notIon of 
duty. This brings us to our final problem of the relationship be-
tweon duty or rlorallty and h.&ppin&ss. 
SUMMUM BONUM 
We have seen that 'tor the conoept final purpose. Kant requires 
aa a constituent that which needs no other as a condition of ita 
poasibillt)".66The good-wll1, unoondlt:loned by the oontingenoies of 
nature, was tound 113 be the ob3ective good fulfilling this require-
ment. But, tor Kant, the good wl11, or vil'tue, 1s not the !.2!!. and 
cO!plete good. It ls the supreme good. But reason nIUa t consider 
man as a whole and in so doing "takes fbI" fmal purpose the fur'-
therlng of happiness in hannony with moralIty. To further thts so 
far as 1s in our pawnr • • • is oommandod by the moral l~w. "67 The 
final purpos e of man and ex. tarnal na ture , that Is, the ~ummum !!2.-
~ consia ts In this, tlut the mole man possess happiness propor-
tiOM d to h1 s virtue. 
The firs t qU(~Btlon tlla t presents itself concerns the reason 
why Kant thought it noce88ary to un! to happlnest! and virtue into 
one concept, synthetic and not analytio. Kant says that reason 
66 Judgment, Par. 84 (P. 284). 
67 f¥9~.' Pa~. 87 (p, 302). ct. Par. 88 (p. 304) and frac tloal P. 181 ) and p. 222 \18b). 
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'tinds It 1mpossible !.2!: ~ to render conceivable In the way of a 
~ere course of nature a eonnexion so exactly proportionod ••• be-
tween two seta of events happening according to such distinct 
68 laws •••• " Thus, speculatIve reason has no intuition to vali-
date its Ilthlnkingll a connection betwoon tho two sInce the noume-
non does not fall under the unde~standlngts categories of cause ant 
effect. Furthermore experience itself will !'fubstantiato the fact 
that a virtuous man does not necessarily enjoy happiness on accoun1 
of and in proportion to his virtue. Assum11~ Kant's defInitIon of 
hapt'ines8, we can understand what Kant moans. The good man, as VIe 
have seen 18 rot happY' on the rack. The moral law of itself does 
not promise any sensible satlsfactlon.690n ~le other hand, neithor 
does experience show that happiness produces virtue: "For a man 
must have a different crIterion when he is compelled to s flY to him-
selt: I am a worthless fellow, though I helve .fIlled my purse; a.nd 
when he approves himl elf, and says: I am a p:rudent man, f or I haVE 
70 . 
enrIched ~ treaaure." Hence, reason an! experIence both tall to 
yield an Ins ight into the p08sIbili ty of' a. union of happiness and 
moralIty. But neIther doos reason or experience prove that such a 
union is impo8sible. Hence, spoculative reason can "thInk" out the 
eon.latency or possIbilIty of such an ideal unIon, provided there , 
Is some conC!-ete fact whtch necessitates the unIon as a practIcal 
68practlcal, p. 291 (243). Cf., also, Judseoni, Par. 87 (p. 301 
69paton, The CategorIcal Im1eraclve. p. SO. Cf., also, Prac-tical, p. 270 (225 ) and p. 216 lSi). ----
70Practical. PP. 150-51 (127). 
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~ece8sity. 
Kant provides us with that fact. First, he saya that "to 
peed happlneas, to deserve it, and yet at the same time not to par-
ticipa te in it, oannot be oOllsistent with the perfee t voli tion of a 
71 !rational being •••• tt Perfect volition requires t hat man take ao-
lCount of tho need. of phenomenal nature. Stnce the sum of these 
Ineeds are unifiod under the ideal happines~., perfect volition must 
take account of happ1nea~l aa well as morality. Thus, Kant insIsts 
~pon tho fact tho. t wi thout happiness tho moral :man will not have 
~ttalned his oomplete good: "If morafity can offer m.e r:.o prospeet 
that my need to be ha.ppy will be satisf'iod, nei thar can It oommand 
~e.tt72Now Knnt has stressed that fact that natura prohibits this 
prospeot from being realizod. Henoe, it morality. explained in 
terms of' the gi ven fnc t of one' S 8.Wilorene s s of du ty. is to 11a ve maar.!'" 
ine. then JD,)ral -.n must be a.ble to attain some share of happiness 
in the future. Here Kant has oonneoted happiness with his ono r;lv-
en and certain fact--the sense of duty. Onoe a conoept is con-
nected wIth tho oonoept of duty, Kant considers that concept to 
lhave praotical, thought not theoretIcal, value. So much for Kant's 
reason tor ·'t.'linki~n that happ1ness and morali ty are in some way 
connected. 
Kan t now has the problem of explaining how virtue and happl-
71Ibid •• p. 246 (206). 
72lmmanuel Kant, 1orl!'~!n Ubor dlr, PhilosOR~,oh! ~­
IRionslohro. cited in OrBen8,~~Oduction to Religion, p. !xiii. 
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ness are connectHd; in other W orda, )'ljl, the Summum honum can be 
conal.tently thought to be a practically necessary concept. Kant 
nas established the ~ that, the Su.':mWB HollUlll is neoessary psycho-
logically. To show how it is possible that happiness and virtue 
can be united into one ideal synthet1cally, one has neither the 
!benen ts of the c erti tude of' e,~porience nor an intellectual intui-
tim that happiness is proportioned to virtue e1 ther in th ~s 11fe 
~r in the future. Acoordlng to Kant's method, the problem resolves 
itself into a matter of showing what postulates reason conceives to 
!b. practIcally necessary 1n order to;render the ideal possible.7) 
Reason, Kant tells us, ownnot produce any postulates as neces-
sary :t'rom the proposi tlon "Endo;;tvor after happ1ness produces vir-
tue. ll This proposit10n is absolutely false. IIowover, he fInds 
that the proposition, "Virtue necessarily pro,:uoes happiness," is 
not absolutely false. What, then, are the postulates which render 
the concept of the Summum Bonum logically intelligible? ., 
73Ka.nt's proceduro w1 th the concept ~urmnum bonum follows the 
same procedure as wi th any other ideal :In order to extend a pure 
cognItIon practioallz, there must Se an a priori PHr~ose ••• wh1Cb 
determines the Will directly ••• and i'il thIs case fiat is the 
s .22lmm [because of its necessary connection wi th dut7]. This 
Ihowever-;-la--not possible without presupposing theoretical concep-
tions (for whIch ••• no corre.ponding :Intuition can be found, 
~or con8equentl~ by path of theor,r any objective reality). Thus 
by the [moral law] which commands the existence of the [Summum Bo-
Im:!!!l. the possibi11 ty or 1h eso obj eets of pure speoulative reason 
lispostula ted, and the objeotive reality which the ]a tter m uld not 
assure. By this the theoretic~l lmoV/ledge of pure reaaon does in-
~eed obtain an acoess ion, but it oonsists only in this, that those 
concepts wh too otherwise it had to look upon as problema tical ••• 
concepts, are nowahewn 8.ssertorially to be such as actually have 
Objects. --Practical, p. 277 (232-33). 
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Virtue, or hol1ness, is defined as the pe rfec t accordance of 
the will with the moral law. But, Kant says, no rational being of 
the sensible world is capable of this pertect accordance at any mo-
ment of his existence because he haa a phenomenal as well us a nou-
menal will. Pertect holiness can be "thought" to be possessed on13 
by a being with a noumenal will alone. Since man'a search tor 
hol1ness ia required as practioally necessary by reason of his 
awareness of a a.naeof duty, holiness "can only be tound in a 
Rl'Osresa in Infinitum toward. toot perfect accordanoe •••• n74It 
/ 
follows then that such a progress is~saible only on the supposi-
tion of an "endless duration of the existence • • • of the same 
rational being (which Is called the immortality of the soUl.),,1> 
/ 
Bence, immortalIty is the first postulate. 
The second pos tulate is that of' f~eedom.. Thus, If man is to 
give meaning to the given tact of a senae of duty, lithe c09mo1281-
sa, 1dea of an intell1gible woz-ld and the oonsciousness of our ex-
i8 tenee 1n 1 t, by means of the poa tula te of freedom • • • ff 76must be 
held as neC89s&ry. As a member ot an intelligible world man can bEl 
independent of the sensible world and determine his nll according 
to tbe law of the intelligible world. 
On the 8l ppositicm. that man 1s a member of the intellig1ble 
74Practical. p. 262 (218). 
7SIbid •• p. 263 (218.19). 
76Ib1d., p. 216 (230). 
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world, Kant says that "it is n:>t Impossible tba:; morality • • • 
should have a connoxion as cause with happiness (as an effect in 
the sensible wo~ld) if not immediate yet mediate (vIz.: through an 
intelligent author of nature) •••• ,,77'Jh1le men directly cause 
virtue or wot'th1nesa to be happy, God is EOS tulated as the Cause or 
Distributor of happines:'.l proportionate to manta virtue. God can he 
"thooght" to be the principlo both in the noumenal and the pheno-
menal order becauae He is outside the phenomenal \,orld and not sub-
ject to its contingencies as i8 phenomenal man. Hence, Kant con-
cludes that it 1s not repugnant to POJtulate God as tl'>eely produc-
ing phenomenal effects as part of man's happiness. God, as suprem& 
11' holy and the Creator of both the determined and free worlds, 
iJlUst effect a happiness proportioned to manta virtue in the future 
life. The existenoe of God 1s the third, and tlnal, postulate 
which is praotically necessary to mainta tn the consiatency 0 f the 
SUDID'lUDl Bonum. 
For Kant, the concept of tho Summum Bol1W1! is the doctrine of 
how man can become worthy of happIness and not how man can be hap-
py. Yet Kant t s introduction of hAppines 8 into the Summum Bonum. 
as Greene points out, is a recognItion on Kant's part that even in 
the pures t doctrine of morality happinoss :mus t not be ignored.78 
Also, this 1ntt-oduction of happinells into tho Sll.nll1'IU1I Bonum has the 
.sir 
77Ib1d., p. 252 (211). 
78Greone, "Introduction" to Religion, p. lvi. 
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merit 0 r giving a. ra tional norm to the ideal of happiness other 
than the empirical no:rm of pleasant ObjcH'ts and inclinations. Hap-
piness, than, estimated as an indirect duty can be rational and at 
the same time an objective good. As such. Kant saves himaelf tram 
the objection that his concept of happiness means only pleasure, 
tor it would be utterly repugnant that the gOOiwill should direct 
even indirectly an activity looking to man's pleasure. Rather the 
norms tor seeking happiness which the will determined by duty im-
poses on the ideal of happiness are those of j'diet, frugalIty, po-
li teneas, l'eserve, and so on .... thlngs ",,:wbich experience shows con-
tribute moat to well being on the averar;o.,,79I3ut even with happi-
nes~ under the guIdance of pure reason, Kant states that propor-
tionate happiness cannot be attained at all in this world so far 8! 
80 
our own power i8 concerned, but Mua t remain an object of hope. 
The phenomenal world operates under mochanical 1& wa whioh even 
nOUllenal man cannot change. Reason can only propose wha t on the 
average contributes to well beIng or happiness. Hence, man must 
hope tor and postulate the existence of God who wl11 bring about 
a phenomena.l happine.:; ln proportion to his morality. The rela-
tionshlp of happiness and moral! ty 1n this lite am in the future 
remains, for Kant, not one of oause and effeot, but a relationship 
of condi tion betore the cause oan operate. Thus, happine.:1 , ~ole ly 
790roundwork, p. 47 (86). 
8°Practlcal, p. 270 (226). 
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under tho guidance of the brute wl11, will be determined by the 
Inclina tiona 8.0 the. t through exoess the small portion of' happ ineas 
man seeks in th1s lite will he lost by resulting sickne8s. But 
happine8!c~. under the guidance of man'9 1'roe elective will. 1'1111 be 
de term! nod by the principle of frugali ty, reserve, will allow man 
to enjoy a oertrdn amount of happiness provided that he possesses 
tha peace or cons c1 ouanes 8 that oomes from continually acting out 
01' reverenoe tor the law. In th1.s life, virtue alld inner peace are 
oondl ti on s to Ollr happines 3. In the future l1fe, O,l:r- virtue and 
inner peace al"e the oondl t1ans Ql'corttlng to which God will rewaro 
us wi th a em sequent happlnes:i. 
This cons1deration 01' the relat10rulhlp of virtue (worthiness 
to be happy) and happiness throws Ught upon one of Kant 1 a bas t 
known and moot descript1ve definitions of happiness: flHapplness 
1s the oonditlon of' a rational being in the world wi th whom eVery-
th mg 82U.. accordlng ~ h!.!. !JI.!l ~ w111,. • • ,,81'lhls description 
18 perhapa mlaleading. Certalnl7 one wlshes inner peace and in-
tellectual contentment along with physica.l contentment. One might 
then be prompted ta:> saY' that Kant SUI'sly does include inner peaoe 
aa a const1tuent of happines;;. But logically and explicitly inner 
peace am ph;;rJlcal contentment have been separated by Kant. Kant. tl 
defin1tion 'quoted above calls attention to a corlditlon in life, the 
tutUN Ufe. The point 1s that this oond.ltlon 18 a state which 
81 6 I2!£ •• P. 2 5 (221). 
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consists not only of happ1nes5 but also of the aetlvi ty thnt be-
longs to moralIty. Kunt might bAtter h.avo saId that happiness re-
sult~3 or follows (not caused) when overy thing goes according to 
one's wish a.nd wl11. Logically this definition seems to be a de-
finItion of the Summum Bonum rathel~ than of happiness itself. 'Ne 
wIsh and wIll happiness, but we also wish and will inner peace or 
morality_ We wish happil~sa, but we must will the contents ot the 
ideal as conditione for aateguarding our moralit~ or els~we have 
no inward peace for man can be at peace only when he is conscious 
that he has aought to will not only in conformity to duty but out 
of duty'a sake. ~ls seem8 to say no more than that we wish happi 
ness but in proportion to our degree of inward peace or holiness. 
Such ia the proper defInl tion 0 f the Su."?1mum Bonum 
In the la5t analysis, happiness, for Kant, i. the act of con-
tentment ot one's lower desire. in the possession and enjoyment 
ot phenomenally determined objects. UltimatHly tll,is contentment, 
intellectual and sensible, 1s rational and in proportion to one's 
virtue or holiness. Virtue and happiness both mako up that condi-
tion of lite which, for Kant, Is not happiness alone or virtue 
alone. but a oombination ot the two, and Kant calls thls the state 
ot the Summum Bonum. Knnt never seems to have ehanged his views 
either on this materialistic concept of happiness or the supremacy 
of the Ideal of moral t ty over the ideal of happiness in his concep 
of the complete good. 
Kant well summarizes the desires belonging to happiness in 
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a work published in 1A03. the year be.fore his doath.82ThCT'b Kant 
says th1:l.t tho desires of happiness co.:1 bo broken down into three 
levels: (1) deslres where no object Is considered and such would 
be desires for honor, power, and possessions; (2) doslros directed 
to definite objects and those would includes desires fulfilled in 
sexual experience. in possessitl!' MfA terial thIngs, and in companion .. 
ship; and (3), desires embracing the cont~nuance of the proceeding 
two cla9s8s and these include the love of life, the love of health, 
and freedom from anguish, sorrow, or 10s8 of any a ttl:lined well-
being. In no way may these desires ~or happiness be said to in-
clude the hlgher desires proc<',ediLp: .from practic"l reason. By na-
ture and by the desires of happiness alone. man Is not a moral 
8) being. He bec·;)mes moral or reaches the sta te of the SUIIIZlUm Bonum 
only when he has raised himself at"ove nH ture and the desires of 
happiness by turning to the concepts of duty and t,.1te law which im-
pose a rational norm on the desires of happiness. PractIcally 
speaking. perhaps it does not matter whether thls condition or 
state Is called happiness or not. However, ph'.loBoph1ca11y it does 
matter eince philosophy 1s the science of being, and according to 
Kant's philosophIcal prinoiples, inner poace can never be III consti-
tuent note of tre ideal of happiness 1n its determined state. 
82 Immanuel Kant. tiber Padasog1k, 1n Werke, pp. 50S-so6. 
83~ •• p. 506. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY OP THE PROBLEMS 
PRESENTED IN THE THBSIS 
Vie are now in III position to SUMmul"'L(;o Kant's doctrine of hap-
piness and to answer the problems we set ourself tit tho her-inning 
of t..'1'1.S thesis. The first problem concerned tho natura of happi-
ness. The first characteristic note of Kant's doctrine 0" hap;Jir 
.". 
is tha t we cannot know the nature of '~11l ppiness. Ha.ppiness is con-
-
oelvod by Kant as an ideal of one's reason and imagina.tion. Man 
seeks to use this ideal as a possible principle or action in order 
to guide his life without at the same time purporting to give any 
insight into life's meaning. Reason conceives of this ideal state 
aa an uninterrupted contentment wIth the possession and enjoyment 
ot objects without fear of l08ing them. Kant's chief problem con-
cerning this ideal was whether or not the ideal as conoel vod by 
man i8 adequate and oapable ot guiding man's life so that man is 
raised above his animality and is endowed with virtues worthy of 
esteem. Kant's answer was that th.e 1deal as fOlfmed by reason 1s 
completely 1ndeterminate within the idoal Iteel:.r. The concept, 
subjected to a process of analysis, does not contain any norm with 
in itself by whtch lfO:tSOn may determine !. priorI f'or all rational 
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beings what aotuated inter10r states and what objects can bring 
about a !:!!! state of uninterruptod contentment as proposod by the 
ideal. Kant finds that the general lot of men appeal to experience 
or to the imagination for their norm. The only norm experience and 
the imaginat10n advance is that of the inclinations and pleasant 
objects. Concretely expressed the ideal of happiness is the un-
interrupted fulfillment of the sum of tne 1nclinations thr:J\'H~h the 
possession and enjoyment of phenomenal objects. Those objects may 
be sensible or intellectual. Kant holds that the quest for happi-
ness 1s not lifted above the phenorne~l order by merely seeking 
after intellectual objects rit ther than sensible objec ts. He point. 
ed out that inUllectual objects as well as sensible objects can be 
sought simply because of the pleasure or joy oonnected wi th their 
atta1nment. Pleasure, then, was the chief element in Kant's con-
crete specifioation of the ideal. 
Thus, the seoond essential characteristic which Kant assigns 
to the ideal of phenomenal happiness 18 that of selfishness. In 
using tlus concrete prinoiple of happiness as a plan for life, man 
would judge all his ac~.lvity purely in reference to his own salris! 
interes ts. The ideal is determined to :inolude what Kant calls the 
lower desires as opposed to the hiP-fter desires. 
This brings us to the third element oharacteristic of Kant.s 
notion of happiness. We saw th!'tt Ka.nt distinguished between h.iCher 
and lower de$ires on the ground that lower desires are the inclina-
tiona which can always determine the w111 prior to the estimation 
ot rational will. HIp~er desires originate, in contrast to lower 
d.airos, in rational w111 itself. With this distination, Kant was 
able to exclude trom the determinate concept of happiness auch par-
ticular' desires 8S love for the arts (contemplation of the beauti-
ful and the Bublime), love for the sciences (recognItIon of purpo-
siveness in nature in search for greater unIty to physioal laws), 
and esteem for discipline of the will and mornl activity with its 
consequent inward peace of soul. Kant seems to have assigned thesE 
aotivities to t~e categorr of higher desires for two reasons: 
(1) because marl is posit!'d to have na lower inclinations to advanCE 
hlmBelf in these fields of activity; one must be virtuous or capa-
bl. of exeroi8ing great strength of will in their pursuit; and, 
(2) beoause these higher deaires are found to be gonseguent and not 
antecedent to rational wll1's determination of the free electlve 
w1l1i thus, they possess the quality of having a universal and 
~ prior! causalIty. 
The higher desires were characterized 8.sbelonging to man's 
hi ghar self. They take hill away from the rudenes s of his natural 
Inclinations, and, to be more positIve, they allow a man to exer-
c1se freedom, for they regard man 1n his humanity as making un1 vero-
sal law; they make man a member of an Qutonomous kInRdom of ends 
in which he opposes all self1shness and self·centeredness, and the 
tendencies to use one's fellow man as a means to an end. These de-
s1res are tree desires, and 1n willIng activity in conformity with 
them, man becames holy_ or rather, preserves the holiness of his 
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good will. By following these higher de8ires man shows and mani-
fests his belief in the transcendental existence of a moral world. 
In contraet, the concretf~ concept of t!'l6 ideal of happiness 
was limited to the lower desires. Hence, the ideal of happiness 
haa the oapacity to tie a man to his lower inclinations. The ideal 
makes man incapable of regarding the higher d~5tiny of the whole 
man (his humani ty); 1 t allows a man to use h.t<s activities as well as 
other men as meana to Ms 8elfish ends wi thout moral scruple; and 
finally, it makes a man to be passive in regard to act3.vIty, that 
is, man is moved by 1ncli~ tion in tae first instance and not by 
hi. own rational creativitJ or spontaneity. The hirpest intellec-
tual contentment offered by the ideal of happiness determined 
through unders tanding and the imagination is the satis faction that 
one i. the director of his activitIes in disposing the means to an 
end. But Kant remark. that this activit1 involves no rtDre than thE 
principle of prudence. Because the ideal of happinoss can be de-
termined by the fDrm of one's incllm tiona and pleasant objects, 
Kant conoludes that happlness,u8ed by an agent as a fJrinciple for 
unifYing ht s lIfe, does not allow a man the opportuni ty for readlne 
into life a meaning which Is beyond the categorle~ of the empirical 
unders tanding and tho i:magina tlon. When Kant s ta ted th.a t the va.lue 
of happiness 18 less than zero, he wus thinkIng in terms of happi-
ne8S detormined tnrough the norm of InolInationa and pleasant 
object •• 
Yet, it was found that the pursuit of happiness, for Kant, 
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bad to be rational. Kant admits in all his major works that man 
.Wlt have regard for hls own happiness. '.rne quest is a psyohologi-
cal neoessity on man's part. Mnn would not continue his quest for 
moral holiness tulle.s he was assured that he could enjoy a certain 
amotult of pleasure In this pursuit. What Kant has done here is 
twofold. First. he has antlci:pated the objection that he has made 
happiness and pleasure one and the same. If happiness !s to be ra 
tional, and Kant many time. says that it is. then happ!.nes3 cannot 
be identif1ed with pleasure. for, w.hi1e ratlon&wl11 oannot com-
mand pleasure as a duty, yet Kant states in many places ~mt hap-
pine3~ will at time. be willed as an indirect duty. Hence, we we 
able to conc1 we that Kant's notion of happ1nesB mus t inclwe the 
desi:re for objects 0 ther than for pleasure alone. 
The second p:)int that Kant established by making happiness 
an indirect duty was to indicate a second norm for the determlna-
tion of the ideal of happiness. Granted that the ideal will be 
speoified in terms of inclinations and phenomenal objects, yet the 
rational w11l selects and chooses its objects not primarily out of 
regard tor pleasure but aocording to duty's norms of frup:allty, re 
serve, politeness, and others. FOr example. Kant 8~owed that ra-
tional will 1n certain circumstancos must will happlnos,~ in order 
to s8,f'eguai'd man against temptations to ;'lis virtue. But, even in 
th is case, rational '.vi 11 does not w ill happiness as an !.!!i, a good 
In itself, nor as a meana to Virtue, but merely as a oondition or 
"bulwark ,1 which safeguards his moral! tr. Suoh a si tuatl on allows 
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man contentment in the possess ion oJ' pleasant obj oc te, w;'lich he 
considers not only as a part of 111 s hi ppiness but also us part of 
his I1D ral integrity. 'Ie saw one oxa.."llple of such a situation in thE 
case of' extemal religious practices. \~hile rational will does no 
propose external religion as a duty in itself, it does soe the ne-
cessi ty of religious practice where thts lX'B.ctice induces reverenCE 
tor reas on's commands 0 f' duty; in 0 thor wo rd., ex te mal re 1 i ,~1',i on 
can safeguard virtue by allowing a greater subj8ctive facility in 
the observance of the moral law. In accomplishing thls, external reo 
lig:J.on does not act as a positive ca'tf.Se of virtue. Rflther, it nctl 
in a negative manner, by opposing our lower inclinacions, a.nd, con 
sequently, it leaves man in an undisturbod s tase where he can allol 
the rree exercise of ohoice and determ:!n a tlon by pure reason. A-
gain, Kant emphasizes that one, in certain circumst~ce8, must seel 
an increase in wealth to guard against poverty since poverty rnay 
lead to a temptation against virtue. Thus, while the quest for 
wealth and its consequent possession and enjoyment is a part of 
tho quest for happiness, reason also considers this a maral pur-
suit when pursued with temperanoe from the command of reason ulone t 
Kant's dootrine in this matter ts similar to and yet differs 
from Christian morality ooncerning pleasure. His doctrine is the 
same 1n that both recognize that man must have acme sensible as 
well as intellectual joy in the pursuit of holiness. Christian 
moralIty reoognizes that man's nature requires participation in 
sensible satisfaction, and that such activity as leads to pleasure 
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and Joy oan be moral s1noe God ordered the na.ture of :man just that 
way. Kant, on the other hand, never allows the seeking after 
pleasant objeo~ tor themselves or as a means to preserve moral 1n-
tegri ty to he moral. HIs diotlnctlon here, as we h!N e seen, 1s 
rather subtle. His doctrine that there oan be no relationship of' 
cauae and effect between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds demand 
that the quest for happiness be a neoessary C;omltlon but not a 
necessary means to the attainment of holiness. Sought under the 
rule 01.' dl ty, man's ques t for happiness beoomes not only rati onal 
but also morally go04. The .1gnific~ce of his doctrine on the 
rationali't7 of happiness is that the norm for 1 ts l'9.t1onality is 
external to the concept ot happiness. As a pla.n for life, the 
ideal of happiness alone is insuf'flcient. 
OUr second pI'lOblem was to determine wby Kant made happiness 
empirical. In general, we have seen that morality wa~ the most 
a.rx:l s upl'eme and absolutely beat of all existing possible" goods. 
Morality is the good that makes the good will a good in Itself. 
attempting to salvage the corcept of man as a responsible agent, 
Kant had to oppose this to the oontemporary concept of' man as til. 
passive creature of dete~ned nature. If man is considered com-
pletely passive and determined, Kant saw the tutility of tryins to 
draw frorl this conoept of man a sense of duty as a basis for moral 
i ty. In soekinn: ano ther found a t! on for moral 1 ty, Kant found tha t 
the concept of happiness in vogue at that time was essentially he-
donistic. Aga.in, Kant must have felt that it \lOuld be futile to 
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attempt to draw analytically a sense of duty from such a concept 0 
happinoss. For Kant, man's sense of duty was an indisputable fact 
and the primary given 1n man's self-consciousness. Duty alone, 
Kant felt, could be the ground tor morality. Viere duty able to be 
drawn analytically from the concept of he.p:)lness, Kant saw that ma 
in seeking his own happiness could yet c~nceive himself as virtuou 
by merely determining duty according to the norm of pleasure or 
some moral senae which on11 rate. Intellectual contentment "super1 
or" to senaible pleasure. Hance, 1br Kant, happiness and duty had 
to beoome antithetIc; happiness was l'estrictr,d to phenomenal ob-
je~ts; morality was allowed to transcend phenomenal objects to 
include the noumenal world of freedom. 
More specifically" wi thin the epistemological framework of 
Kant's aystem, happiness had to ~e phenomenal. If moralIty was to 
be !. priori, determInate (1n the senso or having the capacity to 
otter a plan of 11 fa according to duty wi thou t going out'.ide the 
concept 1 tselr)" and un1versall1' appllca ble to a 11 ra tional beings 
then its activIties must be froe and transoend phenomenal and self 
centered motivation. Thus, we saw that preCisely because the 
actIvities of t~e arts. the scienoos. and moral dIsoIpline proceed 
ed from prInoiple:! that were !. priorI. determine. te. and universal, 
these aoti vi tics were placed beyond the moti vlJ.tion of t!le pheno-
menal world, even though their effects are yet phenomenal. By 
positIng tho mornl or intellieible noumannl world us a postulate t 
save man's freedom and by 11m! t ing knowledge of real i ty to phenom€l 
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Kant argues thtlt !! the given fact of man's sense of duty is to 
have any intelligibility, thon man ought to be free, or moral, and 
consequently, he s.!!! be .tree by willing his activity not only 1n 
contorm! ty wi th but moti vatod by duty. The concept of nmn as a mo 
al being, for Kant, has meaning only In terms of duty. At the at 
of his whole dIscussion of moral! ty in the Groundwork, Kant again 
insists that we stIll have no knowledge of man's real nature. Hls 
concept of a moral man is proposed as an ideal for mants aetI v 1ty, 
and 11' we remember hi. definition of an Idoal, we will romember 
that knowledge is never the purpose (?)f this mental construct. 
both concepts, th'J.t of happiness and that of morali.ty, remain 
ends. They are not abstracted f'rom experience, nor are they dralfm 
analytically from knowledge of' human nature. Tho one contains 
phenomenal objects toward which activity is directed; the other 
oontains noumenal ends willed f'rom a. sense of' duty. 
-, 
Our thIrd problem asked wh;1 Kant oould not make the end of th 
whole man to be happiness. Kant's answer was that this ~'ould be 
an end unworthy of man. We have seen that tho activities o.f the 
ideal of happiness are lim1t'd to certain ~)henomenal activ1t1es 
through the t'acultios of the understanding and the Imagina tion. 
life direotod by the happiness-principle alone would be, f'or Kant 
a life of slavery to self and to instinct. Life would be based 
purely on knowledge, and for Knnt this WOUld, for all prac tical 
urposes, be the end of freedom, since freedom oannot f1nd support 
1n theoN3tIoal reason but onlY' in faIth through praotical reason. 
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It, then, happinoss is man's end, Kant finds that mankind has l1t-
tle claim to the title of being the lord of tho universe. Kant 
protested on three different occasions that suCh an end for man 
would suppose that mants w1ll was given to him only for the purpose 
of disposlng means to attain the objects of happiness. His comment 
on this proposal was that instlnct could better have served that 
purpose. For Kant, freedom 1s that property which allows man to 
transoend the brute and all natural th1ngs. When man is no longer 
moved by nature and by instinct, and. at the same time, with a cer-
tain aenae of spontanei ty and crea t~i ty he follows autonomous tte'l-
SOD. then can man's life be said to have value worthy of admiratioo 
Furthermore, slnoe happIness 18 iux:wn in terms of phenomena, 
Kant couln not logically- pos1t it as the end of the whole man with. 
out imp17ing that phenomenal man !! the whole man. ThIs would dell1' 
the vexwy p08sibl1i t7 of the nO'Ullenal order, and henoe, deny free-
dom whose possibill t'J' can be postulated only wi tb the su:pposi tion 
of a noumenal and phenomenal world. Thus, the ultimate reason why 
happiness cannot be the whole end of man is the fact of one's awlU'& 
ness of' a sense of duty. Kant feels that suoh an experience as thE 
sense of duty must be explained, and to be explained, the concepts 
of noumenal and phenomenal worlds and freedom must be posited. 
The abstract Ideal of happinoss as an uninterrupt(~<2 contentment in 
the posseaslon of phenomenal objocts Is also incapable of yIelding 
analytioally an explanatIon of one's sense of duty without at the 
same time baaIng duty on pleasure. Henoe, the concept of happiness 
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Kant feela, does not explain what ought to be 1n accordance with 
the fullness of human! ty • 
This brings us to our final quos tion: What is the relation-
ship between happiness and "'1 or all ty? In answering this question w 
mus t keep in mind that Kant has said that reas on cannot l$2!. the 
answer to this question. He has shown that only an ideal relation 
ship be tween happ1ness and virtue (morality) can be IIthought" out 
and, if the ideal 1a consistent, then the ideal has practical use 
for practical reason in guld ... ng man's activity. Thill ideal rela-
tionah1.p between happIness and virt~ can be tlthought fl by making 
el10h a consti tuent In the concept of the Summum Bonum. This doc-
trine 1s a logical progression of the doctrines or happiness and 
morality_ The &bstract definition of happiness proposed by reason 
ia not Buhatuntiated in the phenomenal world. Experience. can nev 
gi ve man hope that he will attain a ata te of uninterrupted oontent-
ment in the poasession of phenom.enal obJects. If happiheas is in 
aome sonae said to be known, the reason 1 a thu t unders t ,ndinr:: and 
imagination have determined the ide il in term. of rhenomena which 
oan be known. In the same manner, moral! ty is only an ideal 
"thou;;:e,ht" out 1n terma of man's sense of duty. The Summum Bonum, 
then, ia neither duty or happiness, but it is a condl t10n or stfd. te 
ot human life in which a man who acts out of a sense of duty do~"s 
enjoy happiness proportionate to his virtue. Acting from a sense 
or duty does not bring about happiness. Reason i tselt with 1 ts 
norma or t emperanoe ourbs the enj oyment of happiness. Even that 
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happiness which reason allows may be Interrupted by nature or by 
man himself. In t~l1 8 11 fe the ques t for hl:ippiness always, for !fan 
remains filled wi th inaocurl ty and frue tration. And yet, Kant 
maintained the psychologiai necessi ty of some partioipa tl on In 
pines8 for man if he is to continue his quest for moral holiness. 
The significance of." the doctrine of the Summum Bonum is that it in 
dieatea this realization on Kant 'a part. However, Kant never re-
trenChes fram the position that one will hot be holy by acting out 
ot the des ire for happiness. Duty, even in the doctrine of the 
SUIIII!1UDl Bonum is still the !upreme e~ of man although it is not th 
oomplete end of man. Even in the Swmnum Bonum the pI'Oper subordi-
nation ot happiness to virtue is maintained. To bring about the 
oorrect relationship between virtue and happtD ••• , a proportion 
between virtue am happiness, Kant had to postulatil eOr'ie Superior 
Being Who is the Distributor of happiness in proportion to mants 
virtue. The postullite of God provides man with 11 hope of attainln 
a degree of uninterrupted contentment, both intellectual and sensi 
ble, in aooordance W:. th the desire and striving to tle holy. But 
this distribution cannot be in this lIfe; it 1s in the future life 
God is able to be this rtDiatributorlt of happincss proportionate to 
man's virtue because He is postulated as the Cause of both the phe 
nomenal and noumenal worlds. 
What are some of the problema whioharise'rom Kant's concept 
of happiness and ita relat10nship to morali ty? According to Kant t 
theory of manta etemal progross to hollnes,. the future 11 f."e of 
man must be a mere continuance of life as found on earth. Thus, 
the (::t\lf! st for holiness demands the continued confllct between the 
phenomenal and noumenal wIlls since an ImperatIve aris~only upon 
this conflict. Virtue consists precisely In the strength of will 
manifested in maintaining the autonomy ot' the free elected will. 
Hence, both the phenomenal will and noumenal wIll must continue in 
exi~lt ano.. Furthermore, with regard to Kant fa doctrine of happi 
In the ruture, man's prospect for happiness must remaIn a 
and necessary- hope it man is to continue his pursuit of holiness. 
Since Kant has 11ml tod happinolB to "the phenomenal world, 1 t fol-
10 •• that Kant !DUe t DIlinuln the oort inued existenoe of both the 
phenomenal world and phenomenal man. These two considerations 1 
to the conclusion tha t Kant must hold some dootrine including tho 
resurrec tion of the body. If we search for a doctrine on the re-
su;'reotion in Kant's works, the following seems to be his last 
definitive post tion on the subject: 
The more secret records ••• of his [Christ's) re-
jurrection and ascension • • • cannot bo used in "the 
nterest of religIon within the limits of reason alone 
without doinr.r violenoe to theIr historical valuation. 
• • • This is·· so • • • beoause thIs a.;ded sequel • • • 
involves a concept, I.e., of the materiality of all 
worldly beIngs, wh1ch is, indeed, very well au i tf3d to 
man's mode of a enauous representation but which Is most 
burdensome to reason In its faith regarding the future. 
This concept involves both the materialism of personalitz 
in men· ••• , whlch asserts that a. personalrty can exist 
only as always conditioned by tho same bodl, as well as 
the materialism of l~cessary existence 1n a world, a 
world which ••• mus t be siatial ••• -:- -In contrast, 
the hypothesis of the spirt uallty of l'ational world-
beiIlgs asserts that the body ca.n remain dead in the 
earth while the Sml. e person is still alive, and that man, 
as a spirit ••• can reaoh the seat of the blessed with-
out having to be transported to some portIon or other 
of the endless space ~llch surrounds the earth •••• 
'!'his hypothesIs Is more congenIal to rea;;on ••• be-
causs of the contlngenoy to 'tJh1ch ms.terlallsm exposes 
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o~ e xis tenoe after dee. th • • •• On the la tter suppo-
sition~r spirituality) reason can neIther take an in-
terest in dragging along, through etern1ty, a body which, 
however purified, must yet (if the personal! ty 1s to 
rest upon the bod,.' a identity) cons is ts of the 8 elf-
same stuff which constitutes the baals of its organiza-
tion and for which, in life. it never aohieved. any great 
love; nor can it render conceivable that th5.s calcareous 
earth, at which th() body is c ompoaed, of which the body 
is c omposad, should be in heaven • • • .1 
Previous to the above quotation Kant said t hat reason 1 tself 
cannot have any knowledge of the fact or resurrection other than 
..,. 
through the accounts of hlstol'1. But, he continues, reason must 
call this his torI cal evidence In to que·~rt! on because of the a'b ove 
./ 
mentioned theoretIcal diffioulties.· Thus, although Kant II 8ems to 
disoount any probability of the reaurr(!ction or the oody, yet his 
dootrine concerning the relationship between happiness and the 
eternal quest tor holIness needs and requires such a resurrection • 
. , 
Another problem regard. the contentment resul ting from our 
conaciousness thn t we have fulfilled our d uty--peace of soul. Or-
dinarily men would say thfi; th~,s experIence is a. part of happiness 
Kant himself admi ts that man cannot be happy unles1 he has Ilttaine( 
a certain degree of peaoe, rut he can only malm this inner iX>8ce tc 
be a condItion to the possession of happiness and not a part of 
happinesLi. His Imbill ty to make pe ace of consciere e a part of 
happiness follows from his epistemological principles concerning 
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knowledge. Thus, man cannot know tho essence or existence of the 
highe!' faou1tiee, and that fact necestli tates that he postula.te thet 
practical neesesi ty. Since the contents 0 r happiness are deter-
mined by the taculties ot knowledge, and are, for that reason, phe 
nomena~ the inward peace resulting trom the operation of oneta 
higher taculties cannot be a constituent ot such an empirically 
determined 1deal as happiness. Thus, Kant's epistemological sys-
tem, in the tinal analys18, seems to prevail over wha t he realizes 
to be a psyChological necessity, namely, the possession of peace 
01' conscience in order to be happy, -and at the same time, as a par 
ot happlness. The result has been that Kant found it rather dirfi-
cult to find a oategory under whioh the oonoept or inner peace wilJ 
fall. 
In conolusion, we oan ask what kind of happiness man has rea-
son to hope for aocording to Kant's theory. Since holiness is an 
eternal que~t and since God 1s postulated as distributing happinesf 
1n proportion to man t s virtue, man can at leas t be satisfiod that 
happiness will in same degree be had. But we must r6member that 
God Himself is only the Distributor of happineso 1n Kant's doctrin 
God is navor an object of man's happiness. Man's quest rOI" hap~:i­
nes:: is forever occupied with phenomenal objects of happine8~ in 
proportion to his virtue. Since the stressf3S a.nd confl lets 0 f thif 
lIfe, thut ls, those between conouplscible nnturo and tho mopal 
law, will always remain irNolvd even in tho rational quest for 
happiness, the best tha t man can hope for is a lim! ted fulfillment 
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ot h1a desires. Cantlie t is of the very essence of' man's ideal 
quest for holines',. Perhaps most men would be satisfied with a 
perfect proport1on between what they do and what they get. Pep. 
haps many could be satisfied if happiness is limited to certain 
pleasant phenomenal objects. Yet, for many men the prospect of 
continu1ng the struggle for holine8~ throu~h an endless existenoe, 
wi thout any hope of' final aohievement is a drear-s thought. Men 
long for an end of probation, for possess ton of final peace and a 
oompletely sat1sfying good. They also long for goods and Joys t:hat 
are above the phenomenal ()rder of' re~li t1. To such men Kant t s doc-
trine of an eternal struggle, unaohieved hol iness, and limi ted ha.p. 
piness will have little appeal. 
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